Invasi Saudi ke Yaman vs Invasi Saudi ke Suriah: Perbandingan Legalitas dalam Hukum Internasional

Saudi Fighter Jets

Saudi Fighter Jets

Kenapa Saudi tidak/belum kirim pasukan ke Suriah? Jawabnya saya ndak tau, belum tanya sama Pakde Salman. Tapi dari perspektif hukum internasional bagaimana? Nah, sebetulnya banyak yang sudah tau kok: karena Presiden Yaman berdaulat dan berhak meminta bantuan melawan pemberontak, sedangkan kalo di Suriah, (sayangnya) si Assad lah yang berdaulat dan apa iya mau kirim pasukan lawan pemerintah yang sah? Tapi biar keren kita pake (1) analisis hukum, dan (2) tetep dikasih masalah untuk dipikirin hehehe.

ANALISIS HUKUM INTERNASIONAL

Dalam hukum internasional, tindakan agresi itu dianggap sebagai salah satu kejahatan internasional yang paling serius sampai tingkatannya sudah Jus Cogens atau Peremptory Norm (norma tertinggi dalam hukum internasional, kalo ada traktat dll yang melanggarnya maka traktat itu  dianggap hapus. Silahkan lihat Konvensi Wina 1969 pasal 53, juga ILC Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts with commentaries 2001, di penjelasan Pasal 26).

Apa itu agresi? Annex pada Resolusi Majelis Umum PBB No. 3314 tahun 1974, yang kemudian dikutip di amandemen Statuta Roma pada Kampala Agreement di Pasal 8bis, menjelaskan bahwa pengertian agresi adalah:

“…the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations.” (Dengan penambahan penekanan)

Maksud dari sovereignty dan independence ini adalah kedaulatan pemerintah untuk mengambil keputusan dan memaksakan berlakunya hukum di wilayah di mana dia berdaulat itu, tanpa intervensi asing. NAH, prinsipnya itu adalah sebuah pemerintah berdaulat mah monggo aja mau mengizinkan siapapun masuk ke wilayahnya, namanya dia yang punya.

Artinya ada dua unsur utama dari agresi: “penggunaan kekerasan bersenjata” dan “melawan kedaulatan, integritas territorial, dan kemandirian politik Negara lain”, yang keduanya harus terpenuhi.

Maknanya ada beberapa.

Pertama, suku Houthi tidak bisa dibilang melakukan agresi, karena bukan ‘negara lain’ yang diserang.

Kedua,  kalau Presiden Yaman sudah mengizinkan bahkan meminta bantuan kepada Negara lain (dan presiden ini masih diakui), ya artinya syarat “melawan kedaulatan” tidak terpenuhi. Jadilah statement Kemlu Iran ini tidak tepat, dan justru sangat sah serangan Saudi ini. Bagaimana dengan korban sipil yang terjadi? Itu udah beda jalur dan beda pembahasan.

Ketiga, kalau sampai Saudi menyerang pemerintah Suriah, bisa jadi masuk ke tindakan agresi.

Akan tetapi ada satu lagi koridor sebetulnya, namanya Humanitarian Intervention. Maksudnya adalah tindakan agresi (kekerasan bersenjata, dan melawan kedaulatan) tapi ditujukan untuk alasan kemanusiaan, misalnya untuk membebaskan suatu kaum/masyarakat dari tirani. Nah, ini menimbulkan banyak sekali perdebatan, karena di satu ada sejarah panjang tentang just war (perang untuk tujuan yang baik, misalnya membebaskan orang yang tertindas pemerintah dzalim dll) dalam doktrin abad pertengahan, tapi di sisi lain orang udah capek dengan perang setelah kedua perang dunia II.

Nah, sebetulnya di Agresi tadi kalau semuanya memperhatikan ada satu unsur tambahan di kejahatan agresi yaitu bahwa agresi itu adalah “dengan cara yang bertentangan dengan Piagam PBB”. Piagam PBB di Pasal 2(7) mengatakan bahwa tidak boleh melanggar kedaulatan, kecuali dengan pembatasan yang diberikan di Bab VII Piagam PBB yang membuka peluang intervensi berupa sanksi termasuk otorisasi tindakan militer oleh Dewan Keamanan. Jadi di antara perdebatan yang ada, ada kesepakatan bahwa setidaknya ada satu jenis agresi yang bisa dibenarkan yaitu jika mendapatkan otorisasi dari PBB, misalnya otorisasi untuk menyerang Libya dulu itu.

Tapi bagaimana dengan Perang Irak yang tahun 2003? Nah mayoritas Negara di dunia mengakui bahwa itu adalah hal yang salah. Tapi ya bagaimana, lah wong UK dan USA punya hak Veto jadi siapa yang mau memberi sanksi ke mereka?

Nah, karena itu untuk amannya secara politis, lebih baik Saudi tidak mengirimkan pasukan ke sana. Nah, tapi mereka mengirimkan dana dan senjata? Itu bagaimana?

BANTUAN SAUDI KE MUJAHIDIN SURIAH

Statement Menlu Iran itu sangat lucu karena di satu sisi dia menuduh Saudi Arabia melanggar kedaulatan Negara, padahal dia sendiri melakukannya.

Dalam kasus USA v. Nikaragua (1986) di ICJ,[1] USA divonis bersalah karena melanggar hukum kebiasaan internasional berupa pelanggaran kedaulatan negara yaitu Nikaragua. Bagaimanakah USA melanggar kedaulatan Nikaragua? Nih kutipannya:

“..training, arming, equipping, financing and supplying the contra forces or otherwise encouraging, supporting and aiding military and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua..” (Operative Clause 3, Judgment)

Terserah Iran mau menyangkal kayak apa, tapi ya kelihatan buanget bahwa Iran banyak sekali mensuplai berbagai macam hal kepada pemberontak Syiah Houthi. Jadi ya mereka sendiri melakukan apa yang mereka tuduhkan, dan ironisnya tuduhannya kepada Saudi justru salah. Emang unyu gemes gemeeesss pengen lempar sepatu (tapi latihan dulu jangan kayak Bush, dilempar sepatu tapi dianya berhasil menghindar).

Nah, sekarang pertanyaannya adalah bagaimana dengan dukungan Saudi Arabia ke beberapa kelompok Mujahidin yang berperang melawan Assad? Saya tidak tahu apakah Saudi Arabia mengirimkan milisi resmi (kalau iya itu tetap masuk ke definisi agresi, silahkan lihat Pasal 2 dari Annex dari Resolusi Majelis Umum PBB No. 3314 tahun 1974), tapi yang saya tahu minimal kirim uang dan senjata. Banyak orang-orang asal Saudi yang ikut bertempur, tapi kelihatannya itu atas nama individu dan bukan atas nama Negara (ini sudah pisah personalitas hukum).

Tindakan mendanai dll ini tidak tergolong dalam tindakan agresi tetapi masih tergolong melanggar kedaulatan. Ibaratnya keduanya dosa besar tapi satunya XL dan yang lain XXXL. Dosanya sedikit lebih kecil dibandingkan agresi langsung. Apakah ini mungkin alasan kenapa Saudi masih berani bermain di wilayah ini? Apalagi temannya banyak, sebagaimana yang kita ketahui banyak sekali pihak yang membantu FSA termasuk Barat.

Lalu, memang ada perdebatan sengit apakah boleh menggunakan justifikasi humanitarian intervention untuk melakukan agresi. Tapi bagaimana kalau ‘hanya’ di level intervensi yang tidak sampai agresi? Kelihatannya argument pro humanitarian intervention akan punya sedikit tambahan justifikasi, apalagi ditambah dengan fakta bahwa jahatnya Assad ke Sunni sudah jauh melebihi jahatnya Nikaragua bahkan Sadam. Tapi mungkin masih belum sejahat Pemerintah Afrika Selatan zaman Apartheid dulu, dan saat itupun tidak ada intervensi langsung (kecuali sanksi-sanksi embargo ekonomi dan militer dari PBB)?

Jadi sekarang pertanyaannya begini: apakah justifikasi Saudi Arabia untuk membantu Mujahidin di Suriah memiliki dasar dalam hukum Internasional? Ataukah sebetulnya menyimpangi hukum internasional tapi kebetulan buanyak yang mendukung sehingga secara politis tidak bisa diapa-apakan?

Nah, tadi kan saya bilang ini mau kasih masalah untuk dipikirin. Sekarang monggo difikirkan pertanyaan ini <3

Untuk segala kekurangannya saya mohon maaf, kalau ada koreksi atau masukan monggo lho atau kalau ada pertanyaan juga silahkan 🙂

Catatan Kaki:

[1] yang putusannya tentu hanya mengikat para pihak yang bersengketa (Pasal 59 Statuta ICJ) tapi dapat menjadi sumber rujukan dalam hukum internasional (Pasal 38 Statuta ICJ), karena kontennya bisa merujuk pada sumber-sumber mengikat dalam hukum internasional misalnya hukum kebiasaan internasional (Pasal 38 Statuta ICJ)

CATATAN TAMBAHAN: TUDUHAN KEJAHATAN PERANG KEPADA PASUKAN SAUDI ARABIA DI YAMAN

Ada beberapa artikel yang menunjukkan bahwa banyak tuduhan kepada Saudi Arabia karena melakukan kejahatan perang di Yaman. Apakah itu betul, padahal sudah saya jelaskan legalitasnya di atas?

Bedakan antara Jus Ad Bellum dan Jus In Bello.

Jus Ad Bellum adalah “hukum untuk memulai perang”, atau alasan-alasan sah untuk memulai perang. Itulah yang saya bahas di tulisan saya yang di atas. Sumber hukum utamanya adalah Piagam PBB seperti yang sudah dijelaskan di atas, dan pelanggaran terhadapnya disebut AGRESI. 

Jus In Bello adalah “hukum tata laksana perang”, atau metode-metode sah yang boleh digunakan selama berperang. Mudahnya adalah siapa yang boleh ditembak dan siapa yang tidak, dan kehati-hatian apa yang harus dilakukan oleh para pihak yang berperang untuk mencegah korban yang mestinya tidak diserang. Sumber hukum utamanya adalah Konvensi Jenewa 1949 I-IV dan Protokol-Protokol Tambahan 1977, dan pelanggaran terhadapnya disebut WAR CRIMES atau KEJAHATAN PERANG.

Bagaimana hubungan antara keduanya? 

Tidak ada. 

Bisa saja seseorang melakukan serangan ke negara lain yang melanggar Piagam PBB, tetapi saat perang berlangsung dia melakukan kehati-hatian yang baik agar tidak mengenai obyek sipil. Dengan begini, bisa kena AGRESI tapi bisa jadi tidak kena WAR CRIMES.

Demikian juga seseorang bisa saja melakukan serangan ke negara lain dengan cara yang tidak melanggar Piagam PBB (misalnya memang dimandatkan oleh Dewan Keamanan) tapi kemudian di lapangan dia asal bombardir warga sipil. Dengan begini, bisa jadi tidak kena AGRESI tapi kena WAR CRIMES.

Dalam Fiqih Jihad juga dikenal pembedaan seperti ini. Misalnya dalam Bidayatul Mujtahid karya ibn Rushd, dalam Bab Jihad dibedakan penjelasan (1) kapan boleh menyerang musuh dan kapan tidak boleh menyerang musuh, dengan (2) saat perang berlangsung siapa saja musuh yang boleh diserang dan siapa yang tidak boleh diserang.

Dengan demikian, walaupun inshaaAllah sudah jelas Saudi tidak salah dalam mengirimkan pasukan ke Yaman, tapi bisa jadi mereka tetap melakukan WAR CRIMES (walaupun tentu akan ada banyak versi yang menceritakan bagaimana kejadiannya). 

Allaahu’alam, mari kita lihat prosesnya.

12 Comments

  1. Posted March 27, 2015 at 4:18 am | Permalink

    assalamu’alaikum, tulisannya bagus pak, tapi sayang PR nya susah. ^O^

  2. Posted March 27, 2015 at 4:18 am | Permalink

    assalamu’alaikum, tulisannya bagus pak, tapi sayang PR nya susah. ^O^

  3. Posted April 14, 2015 at 3:36 pm | Permalink

    If you are given a chance to edit among Chapter V, VI &VII of UN Charter, what would you alter?

  4. Posted April 14, 2015 at 4:08 pm | Permalink

    That is a very good question. I am really not sure. I wish I could do something about Article 23(1) and Article 27(3). From a jurist’s perspective, I find provisions on the permanent membership and veto rights unjust. However, I worry about the political implications that such a revision would make. After all, one of the lessons learned from the League of Nations is how important power is to implement the law.

    If one were to say that I can assume that the politics are fine, then the motive to revise the said articles have disappeared as well.

    So I find it safest to say that I dont know. But thank you for your question, it is a very good one.

    I am now curious as to what might be your answer to that?

  5. Posted April 17, 2015 at 5:52 am | Permalink

    Hai, Happy Friday!

    Sorry for just replying, I got a lot to do this week. I know, right? It is hard to say, which one we might want to change. But, I think this would be my idea;

    Sometimes, I got perplexed by Article 25 with the Articles in chapter VI regarding pacific settlement of dispute. In chapter VI, SC can only make recommendation, so I assume it’s not binding (eventhough some scholars would say it still has some binding nature), but in Article 25, the wording of it most likely refers to the binding force of SC decision. So, what if I make statement in one of the Articles in Chapter VI to make it binding? Would it be awesome to force states not to involve in war if dispute arises unless they wanna be bombarded by UN Military forces? I think so. 🙂

    Unfortunately, in my view, permanent membership and veto rights are kinda cool. Five of them are like the founding fathers of UN, thus I might give them some extra credits. Haha, but anyway, it’s relative, no? It depends on which country you are representing. I will then prefer to extend the number of SC non-permanent members to 15 states.

    Eventually, regarding the collective self-defense, It is mentioned in Article 51 that it can only be pursued in respond to direct and incurred armed attack. Since the world is highly unpredictable, you won’t know when will North Korea or Iran launch its nuclear weapon striking certain states, you won’t know when will terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda, or arguably-state like ISIS, or perhaps militant Islamist groups like Boko Haram, occupy or even annex your state’s territory, will you? Hence, I will support to add the wording of “threat of armed attack” as well for either individual or collective self-defense.

    Overall, that is just my opinion and we will see what will happen next, perhaps when any of us attains a chance to be involved in the future amendment of UN Charter.

  6. Posted April 17, 2015 at 7:29 am | Permalink

    I cant reply your reply to my reply so I shall respond here. Thank you for such a thorough reply , which is a very well thought answer as well! Great job, Wyncent!

    If I may make some notes, though, here are some comments to your ideas:
    There is already room for binding measures for the security council, i.e. Chapter VII. Chapter VI is non-binding, and is meant to be used for less urgent situations and to still put trust in the parties. Its a game of politics, i.e. managing trust between parties of the conflict and the third party. “Peace or bomb” as a direct threat is not good for a mediator’s role. However, if the situation gets worse, the SC can issue resolutions under Chapter VII to call for a cease and probably direct them to pacific settlement of disputes. Or, at least, using both in combination. And if it gets even more worse, the end possibility is also military sanction. They have their steps in their right time. Or do you think this is not enough?

    On the permanent membership, I do not see ‘being founding fathers’ being a justification to have veto rights, though. By now you must have seen how veto rights may seem very counterproductive to the UN’s main aim of securing international peace. It is also not democratic either, which is ironic. Not to mention, this is not just a present to the founders of the UN, rather it was meant to be a representation of the world’s biggest powers at the time, as well as -supposedly- the alliances. The political constellation has changed now, to some extent. Im not persuaded that this is still fair today.

    Finally, on the case of ‘threat of attacks’, I recommend you to research the concept of Preemptive Self Defense Doctrine and the Caroline test. ‘Threat’ does not seem to explain what you described, rather it is a foreseeable attack. This is what many so vehemently (but very unconvincingly) argue to be a part of Article 51 of the UN Charter. So, rather, if we accept the idea of Preemptive Self Defense, it is to be a way to extend the interpretation of Article 51. However, while the idea may seem justified, but in practice it is very difficult to control. It is very prone to abuse, that it may start more problems than what it may have prevented.

    Thats just my thought, though 🙂

  7. Posted April 17, 2015 at 8:17 am | Permalink

    thank you for your explanation, I will see further on it.

  8. Posted April 14, 2015 at 3:36 pm | Permalink

    If you are given a chance to edit among Chapter V, VI &VII of UN Charter, what would you alter?

  9. Posted April 14, 2015 at 4:08 pm | Permalink

    That is a very good question. I am really not sure. I wish I could do something about Article 23(1) and Article 27(3). From a jurist’s perspective, I find provisions on the permanent membership and veto rights unjust. However, I worry about the political implications that such a revision would make. After all, one of the lessons learned from the League of Nations is how important power is to implement the law.

    If one were to say that I can assume that the politics are fine, then the motive to revise the said articles have disappeared as well.

    So I find it safest to say that I dont know. But thank you for your question, it is a very good one.

    I am now curious as to what might be your answer to that?

  10. Posted April 17, 2015 at 5:52 am | Permalink

    Hai, Happy Friday!

    Sorry for just replying, I got a lot to do this week. I know, right? It is hard to say, which one we might want to change. But, I think this would be my idea;

    Sometimes, I got perplexed by Article 25 with the Articles in chapter VI regarding pacific settlement of dispute. In chapter VI, SC can only make recommendation, so I assume it’s not binding (eventhough some scholars would say it still has some binding nature), but in Article 25, the wording of it most likely refers to the binding force of SC decision. So, what if I make statement in one of the Articles in Chapter VI to make it binding? Would it be awesome to force states not to involve in war if dispute arises unless they wanna be bombarded by UN Military forces? I think so. 🙂

    Unfortunately, in my view, permanent membership and veto rights are kinda cool. Five of them are like the founding fathers of UN, thus I might give them some extra credits. Haha, but anyway, it’s relative, no? It depends on which country you are representing. I will then prefer to extend the number of SC non-permanent members to 15 states.

    Eventually, regarding the collective self-defense, It is mentioned in Article 51 that it can only be pursued in respond to direct and incurred armed attack. Since the world is highly unpredictable, you won’t know when will North Korea or Iran launch its nuclear weapon striking certain states, you won’t know when will terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda, or arguably-state like ISIS, or perhaps militant Islamist groups like Boko Haram, occupy or even annex your state’s territory, will you? Hence, I will support to add the wording of “threat of armed attack” as well for either individual or collective self-defense.

    Overall, that is just my opinion and we will see what will happen next, perhaps when any of us attains a chance to be involved in the future amendment of UN Charter.

  11. Posted April 17, 2015 at 7:29 am | Permalink

    I cant reply your reply to my reply so I shall respond here. Thank you for such a thorough reply , which is a very well thought answer as well! Great job, Wyncent!

    If I may make some notes, though, here are some comments to your ideas:
    There is already room for binding measures for the security council, i.e. Chapter VII. Chapter VI is non-binding, and is meant to be used for less urgent situations and to still put trust in the parties. Its a game of politics, i.e. managing trust between parties of the conflict and the third party. “Peace or bomb” as a direct threat is not good for a mediator’s role. However, if the situation gets worse, the SC can issue resolutions under Chapter VII to call for a cease and probably direct them to pacific settlement of disputes. Or, at least, using both in combination. And if it gets even more worse, the end possibility is also military sanction. They have their steps in their right time. Or do you think this is not enough?

    On the permanent membership, I do not see ‘being founding fathers’ being a justification to have veto rights, though. By now you must have seen how veto rights may seem very counterproductive to the UN’s main aim of securing international peace. It is also not democratic either, which is ironic. Not to mention, this is not just a present to the founders of the UN, rather it was meant to be a representation of the world’s biggest powers at the time, as well as -supposedly- the alliances. The political constellation has changed now, to some extent. Im not persuaded that this is still fair today.

    Finally, on the case of ‘threat of attacks’, I recommend you to research the concept of Preemptive Self Defense Doctrine and the Caroline test. ‘Threat’ does not seem to explain what you described, rather it is a foreseeable attack. This is what many so vehemently (but very unconvincingly) argue to be a part of Article 51 of the UN Charter. So, rather, if we accept the idea of Preemptive Self Defense, it is to be a way to extend the interpretation of Article 51. However, while the idea may seem justified, but in practice it is very difficult to control. It is very prone to abuse, that it may start more problems than what it may have prevented.

    Thats just my thought, though 🙂

  12. Posted April 17, 2015 at 8:17 am | Permalink

    thank you for your explanation, I will see further on it.

3 Trackbacks

  1. […] sebelum ini saya menulis tentang perbandingan legalitas invasi Saudi ke Yaman dan Suriah. Inti tulisan tersebut adalah bahwa sulit sekali menemukan justifikasi dalam hukum Internasional […]

  2. […] sebelum ini saya menulis tentang perbandingan legalitas invasi Saudi ke Yaman dan Suriah. Inti tulisan tersebut adalah bahwa sulit sekali menemukan justifikasi dalam hukum Internasional […]

  3. […] Saudi ke Yaman vs Invasi Saudi ke Suriah: Perbandingan Legalitas dalam Hukum Internasional” (silahkan dibaca di sini) yang mana kesimpulannya adalah bahwa hukum Internasional –saat itu—akan memandang illegal jika […]

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