Category Archives: International Law

Prospek Pengiriman Pasukan Saudi Ke Suriah: Tinjauan Legalitas Menurut Hukum Internasional

In this photo provided by the Saudi Press Agency (SPA), Royal Saudi Land Forces and units of Special Forces of the Pakistani army take part in a joint military exercise called "Al-Samsam 5" in Shamrakh field, north of Baha region, southwest Saudi Arabia, Monday, March 30, 2015. (AP Photo/SPA)

Pendahuluan

Dulu saya pernah membuat sebuah tulisan berjudul “Invasi Saudi ke Yaman vs Invasi Saudi ke Suriah: Perbandingan Legalitas dalam Hukum Internasional” (silahkan dibaca di sini) yang mana kesimpulannya adalah bahwa hukum Internasional –saat itu—akan memandang illegal jika Saudi Arabia melakukan serangan ke Suriah. Karena itulah, dalam artikel saya dulu itu, saya menjelaskan bagaimana jauh lebih aman bagi Saudi Arabia untuk tetap membantu Ahlus Sunnah Suriah dengan cara lain sambil menjaga jarak aman. Akan tetapi, begitulah cepat perpolitikan dunia berubah.

Baru-baru ini ada kabar bahwa Saudi Arabia siap mengirim pasukan ke Suriah untuk memerangi Dawlah Khawarij Da’esh, dan UEA pun ikut bersiap-siap. Kenapa Saudi Arabia sekarang berani mempersiapkan langkah yang jauh lebih tegas di banding sebelumnya yang hanya mengirimkan bantuan senjata dan dana untuk beberapa kelompok mujahidin Ahlus Sunnah?

Syarat Sah Kirim Pasukan Ke Negara Lain

Sebagai rangkuman post yang sebelumnya, jika anda malas membaca, hukum Internasional membolehkan sebuah Negara boleh mengirim pasukan ke Negara lain hanya dalam keadaan-keadaan berikut:

  • Jika Dewan Keamanan PBB mengeluarkan Resolusi atas dasar Bab VII untuk demikian
  • Jika diminta oleh pemerintah resmi sebagai bantuan
  • “Pertahanan Diri Preemptif”
  • Humanitarian Intervention” atau ‘Intervensi Kemanusiaan’ jika ada krisis kemanusiaan yang amat sangat besar dan kalau tidak diintervensi akan bertambah kacau

Dua yang pertama disepakati oleh Ulama hukum internasional serta ‘ulil amri’ secara ijma. Pada dua poin berikutnya ada khilafiyah yang sangat besar di antara ulama hukum internasional, dengan jumhur ‘ulil amri’ cenderung kurang setuju.

Resolusi No. 2249 (2015)

NAH, Dewan Keamanan PBB pada tanggal 20 November 2015 mengeluarkan Resolusi No. 2249 (2015) yang pada pokoknya di pasal 5 mengajak (bukan memerintahkan) Negara-negara yang mampu untuk melakukan “…all necessary measures…”. Bahasa “…all necessary measures…” ini bukan pertama kali digunakan. Misalnya, dulu, saat Irak menyerang Kuwait di awal tahun 90, keluar Resolusi No. 678 (1990) yang mengotorisasi Negara anggota PBB “… to use all necessary measures…” dan kita semua tahu bagaimana USA dan Inggris menafsirkan itu. Dunia pun mengamini.

Sayangnya, resolusi ini agak bermasalah. Dewan Keamanan PBB menurut piagamnya sendiri hanya bisa mengadakan perjanjian dengan anggotanya untuk menyumbangkan pasukan, lalu, atas nama PBB, melakukan serangan (lihat Pasal 43 dst di Piagam PBB). Nah, masalah otorisasi serangan pada NATO atau Negara lain bagaimana? Itu namanya implied powers, alias kewenangan tersirat, di mana ini dianggap berada dalam keumuman mandat Dewan Keamanan PBB untuk menjaga keamanan dan perdamaian dunia. Untuk melakukan ini, setidaknya ada dua hal yang harus dipenuhi yaitu: Harus menyebut Bab VII sebagai dasar secara eksplisit, yaitu membuka pasal-pasal dengan terlebih dahulu mengatakan “…Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter…”, lalu menggunakan kata yang bermakna perintah misalnya “…decides…”.

Makanya itu, Resolusi No. 2249 (2015) ini agak sulit untuk serta merta menjadi justifikasi Negara yang menyerang. Bab VII tidak disebut, dan istilah yang digunakan di Pasal 5 bukan kata imperative melainkan mengajak saja (digunakan istilah ‘… calls upon …’). Nah, dengan demikian, the United Kingdom alias UK (sudah menyetujui serangan udara ke ISIS) pun serangannya agak meragukan legalitasnya karena resolusi DK PBB ini tidak bisa menjadi dasar. Akan tetapi, UK bisa mengeluarkan satu argumen yaitu “intervensi kemanusiaan” karena memang UK berada di pihak yang pro intervensi kemanusiaan dan tidak bisa diapa-apakan oleh Dewan Keamanan karena memiliki hak veto. UK juga dapat berdalil bahwa ISIS juga merupakan ancaman dan lebih baik dihajar sebelum dia datang ke UK, yang tampak merupakan argumen ‘pertahanan diri preemptif’. Apakah argument ini betul? Yah, setidaknya itu klaimnya. Yang jelas, agak lebih berat argumen UK untuk diterima karena kebijakan pun diprotes oleh rakyat UK sendiri tapi hukum internasional tidak terlalu peduli terhadap protes protes seperti ini. Yang dilihat adalah tindakan pemerintah sah.

Resolusi No. 1373 (2001): Suatu Peninggalan Untuk Hukum Internasional

Akan tetapi, jangan sampai pula kita melupakan Resolusi No. 1373 (2001) pasca serangan WTC di USA. Resolusi ini adalah yang pertama dalam hukum internasional menyatakan bahwa Self Defense dalam Pasal 51 tidak harus dipicu oleh serangan Negara lain tapi juga bisa dipicu oleh serangan entitas non-Negara. Lihatlah mukadimahnya di poin keempat, bagaimana “…individual and collective self defense…” dalam resolusi ini yang membicarakan tindakan terorisme. Bukan berarti sebelumnya Negara lain tidak boleh bela diri jika diserang entitas non-negara, hanya saja tidak dilabeli “Self Defense” dalam hukum internasional.

PS: kita kesampingkan dulu kontroversi politis di balik resolusi ini, saya Cuma bahas sisi hukum saja.

Apa konsekuensinya? Self defense, menurut Pasal 51 Piagam PBB, adalah sebuah justifikasi untuk menggunakan kekerasan bersenjata dalam hukum internasional. Dan kita tahu bagaimana Amerika Serikat tidak lama kemudian meluncurkan sebuah invasi ke Afghanistan.

Beberapa hal yang bisa didapatkan dari Resolusi ini adalah antara lain: (i) pengakuan internasional tentang ancaman terorisme, (ii) bahwa serangan dari entitas non-negara bisa menjadi pemicu ‘self defense’ dan hak menggunakan kekerasan bersenjata, dan (iii) bahwa bisa jadi serangan terorisme di dalam wilayah suatu Negara dapat menjadi dasar melakukan serangan ke Negara lain yang menjadi basis teroris itu.

USA diminta bantuan oleh Iraq dan bukan Suriah untuk memerangi ISIS. Tapi bisa kita lihat USA akhirnya toh membombardir wilayah Suriah juga untuk mengejar ISIS dan Jabhat al Nusrah. Ini bisa jadi merupakan suatu praktek yang didasari oleh trend yang ditimbulkan oleh Resolusi No. 1373 (2001) tadi walaupun tidak persis sama tapi spiritnya sama. Memang tidak semua hal yang dilakukan oleh USA ini bisa dianggap sah oleh hukum internasional, karena banyak hal kontroversial lainnya misalnya serangan Drone di Pakistan.

Tapi, khusus untuk serangan kepada ISIS ini, USA tidak sendiri. Seperti dijelaskan sebelumnya, UK sudah mengotorisasi serangan udara ke sana. Perancis, juga karena mengalami serangan teroris ISIS, melakukan serangan kepada ISIS. Karena itu, ini sudah mulai merupakan trend yang dipraktekkan dan tampak diamini oleh dunia internasional. Belum lagi, baru Al Qaeda yang ‘segitu’ saja dunia sudah begitu hebohnya. Sekarang kita berhadapan dengan Dawlah Khawarij yang memiliki wilayah kekuasaan sangat luas, pasukan yang sangat banyak, dan kantong-kantong ekstrimis di berbagai Negara, yang jauh lebih kuat dari Al Qaeda.

Saudi Arabia dan ISIS: Gemath

Banyak yang menuduh Saudi Arabia (secara Negara) mendukung dawlah khawarij. Mungkin mereka lupa bahwa dawlah khawarij ini mendeklarasikan perang terhadap Saudi dan bahkan mengklaim memiliki kekuasaan di Saudi. Apakah ini ancaman kosong? Ternyata sudah banyak serangan ISIS ke Saudi Arabia (data sampai Mei 2015, Juli 2015, September 2015, Oktober 2015, ancaman di Desember 2015, dll). Walaupun jumlah korban diakumulasi mungkin belum sama dengan serangan Paris, tapi bayangkan potensi-potensi bahaya yang ada di Saudi Arabia karena ISIS ini! Bukan sedikit ekstrimis yang ada di Saudi Arabia, apalagi kalau dibandingkan di Perancis. Bukankah Saudi Arabia punya justifikasi sebagaimana USA, UK, dan Perancis?

Karena itulah. Dunia internasional sedang sangat ingin menghabisi si dawlah khawarij ini, beberapa Negara sudah mulai melakukannya, dan Saudi punya justifikasi yang bagus untuk ikut serta. Belum lagi, Saudi dengan menarik menawarkan bantuan melalui koalisi USA. Bagaimana hukumnya bekerjasama dengan kaum kafir dalam perang? Monggo tinjauannya dari segi ilmu fiqih. Tapi menurut saya ini cerdas. Jadi, mereka bisa menebeng legalitas atau setidaknya ketidaklegalan yang dibeking oleh USA, supaya tidak menambah musuh dulu dan mendapatkan maslahat dalam menjalankan perang melawan khawarij.

Dan, siapa tahu, jika pasukan Saudi (dan mungkin Turki) ‘diusili’ oleh pasukan Assad atau Rusia, nah bisa ikut menghajar mereka! Belum lagi lebih mudahnya membantu mujahidin Ahlus Sunnah dalam perang melawan Assad dan Khawarij.

Penutup

Ada beberapa hal yang ingin saya sampaikan sebagai penutup:

  1. Legalitas tindakan militer Saudi ini bukan jelas mutlak legal, melainkan argumennya kuat menurut saya. Terlebih jika betul ini adalah bersama-sama dengan pasukan USA. Akan sulit untuk menghukum Saudi Arabia.
  2. Jika argument ini dapat diterima, ini Cuma legalitas menyerang dawlah khawarij. Kalau menyerang Assad dan Rusia agak sulit, kecuali diserang duluan.
  3. Ini adalah ranah hukum jus ad bellum atau ‘kapan boleh perang’. Ada ranah hukum yang berbeda lagi yaitu jus in bello atau ‘hukum dalam perang’ berisi adab berperang antara lain siapa yang boleh diserang dan siapa yang tidak. Karena itu tidak menutup kemungkinan perangnya sah tapi melanggar jus in bello. Inilah salah satu kritik terhadap Saudi saat serangan ke Yaman. Legal tapi cenderung semberono. Saya berharap pasukan Saudi bisa lebih berhati-hati.
  4. Monggo tinjauannya tentang hukum kerjasama militer dengan kaum kafir. Seingat saya dan kalau tidak salah ibn Rushd dalam Bidayatul Mujtahid mengatakan ada ikhtilaf ulama di sini (bukunya sedang tidak saya bawa, jadi belum bisa verifikasi) tapi monggo saja. Sepemahaman saya, tidak masuk akal untuk bekerja sama dengan Negara kafir yang tidak sedang diperangi saat itu, untuk memerangi kalangan lain yang jelas merupakan musuh yang wajib diperangi. Tapi Allaahu’alam, monggo saja saya dikasih masukan bagaimana dari segi syariatnya.

KESALAHAN PENERJEMAHAN TEKS PERJANJIAN INTERNASIONAL: STUDI KASUS PROTOKOL MONTREAL 1987

A. PENDAHULUAN   

Beberapa hari yang lalu, seorang mahasiswa saya menghubungi saya untuk mengadu. Dia sedang magang di sebuah lembaga pemerintah, dan ditugaskan untuk mereview suatu naskah perjanjian internasional yang akan diratifikasi oleh Indonesia. Ternyata pendapat mahasiswa saya ini betul. Memang ada beberapa kesalahan penerjemahan, setidaknya di satu pasal yang ditunjukkan pada saya sudah ada dua kesalahan. 

Perlu dicatat bahwa jika Indonesia mengikatkan dirinya terhadap sebuah perjanjian internasional, mestinya akan dibuat implementing regulations atau peraturan pelaksana dari isi perjanjian tersebut. Karena itu, bayangkan betapa buruk potensi kesalahan yang mungkin terjadi jika ada kesalahan penerjemahan terhadap perjanjian internasional tersebut! Saya jadi sangat khawatir, karena ini bukan kali pertama saya menjumpai kesalahan penerjemahan terhadap teks perjanjian internasional.

Tulisan di bawah ini adalah cuplikan paper yang saya buat pada tahun 2010 untuk mata kuliah Hukum Perjanjian Internasional yang diampu oleh Ibu Agustina Merdekawati, S.H., LL.M., yang sekarang menjadi kolega saya dan mejanya tepat di depan saya sekarang. Saya tidak melakukan kopas dari keseluruhan isi paper karena hanya sebagian saja yang menyebutkan tentang kesalahan penerjemahan, dan selebihnya adalah tentang hal-hal lain yang saya pun bosan membacanya. Saya juga mengedit sedikit format dan kontennya, supaya inshaaAllah lebih enak dibaca. Selamat menikmati

B. SEKILAS TENTANG PROTOKOL MONTREAL DAN PAPER INI

Protokol Montreal telah siap untuk ditandatangani pada tanggal 16 September 1987 dan berlaku mulai tanggal 1 Januari 1989. Saat masih menjabat, Sekjen PBB Kofi Annan pernah mengatakan protokol ini sebagai perjanjian internasional paling efektif yang pernah ada.[1] Sejak diberlakukan pada tanggal 1 Januari 1989, Protokol Montreal telah berhasil menurunkan tingkat CFC dan Chlorinated Hydrocarbon di atmosfer.[2]

Paper ini dibuat untuk menganalisis secara bahasa naskah asli Protokol Montreal 1987 (berbahasa Inggris) dan terjemahan resmi dalam lampiran Keputusan Presiden No 92 Tahun 1998 yang merupakan instrumen ratifikasi Indonesia untuk mengikatkan diri pada Protokol Montreal 1987. Dalam analisis ternyata ditemukan beberapa kesalahan penerjemahan yang akan berpotensi memiliki dampak hukum yang serius.

C. POTENSI PENYALAHARTIAN

Penulis menemukan bahwa ada dua macam titik di mana penyalahartian bisa terjadi pada klausul-klausul mengenai penurunan zat-zat BPO, yaitu dari kesalahan penerjemahan dari teks bahasa Inggris ke bahasa Indonesia pada lembar resmi negara yang bisa membuat kesalahan pemahaman jika Teks Bahasa Indonesia yang menjadi rujukan awal.

1. Kata may

Pada paragraf terakhir naskah bahasa Inggris, tertulis “…Parties may take more stringent measures than those required”.

Menurut Concise Oxford Dictionary, 10th edition, kata may berarti: expressing possibilities (atau ‘kemungkinan’), expressing permission (atau ‘izin’), expressing wish or hope (atau ‘harapan/keinginan’).

Akan tetapi dalam terjemahan resmi negara, potongan yang sama ternyata diartikan “…para pihak harus mengambil langkah lebih ketat”. Seperti telah dijelaskan di atas, kata ‘harus’ bukanlah kata yang tepat untuk mengartikan ‘may’.

Bisa jadi ini membuat pemerintah Indonesia menerapkan aturan yang lebih ketat dari yang ditetapkan oleh Protokol Montreal karena mengira bahwa itu adalah seharusnya, sedangkan tidak harus. Dan mungkin ini bisa melibatkan kerugian yang sebenarnya tidak perlu tapi terpaksa diikuti karena terikat prinsip Pacta Sunt Servanda.

2. Kata save

Kemudian dalam Artikel 2A(4), 2B(2), 2C (3), 2D(2), 2E(3), 2G, 2H(5), 2I, Artikel 5 (8ter, d, iii), terdapat potongan artikel “….This paragraph will apply save to the extent that the Parties decide to permit the level of production or consumption that is necessary to satisfy uses agreed by them to be essential”.

Kadang pula, kata essential diganti crucial untuk membedakan antara penting dan genting (yang semuanya mengacu pada negara-negara dalam Artikel (5). Interpretasi tekstual dari artikel ini, akan menghasilkan terjemahan yang berintikan “paragraf tersebut berlaku kecuali dalam keadaan di mana para pihak dalam Protokol menyetujui sebuah tingkat produksi dan konsumsi yang dianggap penting/dibutuhkan (bagi negara [artikel 5] tersebut).

Tetapi, terjemahan resmi mengatakan “Paragraf ini akan diberlakukan dengan aman pada pihak -pihak yang telah diizinkan dimana tingkat produksi atau konsumsi nya telah disepakati.”, yang kemudian berarti sangat bertentangan dengan naskah bahasa inggris.

Kesalahan pengartian berawal dari kata save yang diartikan selayaknya suatu verb atau ‘kata kerja’ sehingga menemui pengertian tersebut. Padahal kata save merupakan sebuah ‘kata sambung’ atau conjunction sehingga menggunakan klasifikasi ini, kata tersebut menurut Concise Oxford Dictionary, 10th edition berarti except atau “kecuali”. Saya pribadi bisa sedikit memaklumi jika kata ini disalahartikan, karena penggunaan kata save yang bermakna “kecuali” seperti ini tidak banyak diketahui oleh orang awam. Jarang sekali ini digunakan dalam bahasa sehari-hari. Akan tetapi, bagi seorang penerjemah apalagi untuk teks hukum, tentu kesalahan seperti ini sulit ditoleransi.

D. PENUTUP

Setelah selesai berbicara dengan mahasiswa saya soal kesalahan penerjemahan itu, saya jadi berfikir: berapa banyak kesalahan penerjemahan yang sudah terjadi? Saya pribadi belum pernah melakukan eksplorasi lebih mendalam terkait dampak dari kesalahan penerjemahan perjanjian internasional. Kalau Protokol Montreal sendiri rasanya Indonesia toh menjalankan kewajibannya tanpa kelihatan ada masalah (setahu saya). Jika memang demikian, berarti yang dirujuk adalah perjanjian yang bahasa Inggrisnya karena memang jika ada perbedaan makna antara naskah terjemahan dengan naskah asli, yang digunakan adalah naskah asli.

Akan tetapi, tentu ini adalah sebuah potensi masalah. Jika belum terjadi masalah, mungkin saja akan terjadi kelak. Kalaupun tidak, berarti adalah sebuah kesia-siaan melakukan penerjemahan dan setidaknya memalukan. Tahun 2010, saya menemukan hanya dua kata yang salah diterjemahkan Protokol Montreal. Akan tetapi, sudah dijelaskan bahwa ada dampak hukumnya. Lalu tahun 2016, mahasiswa saya baru menanyakan satu pasal saja, sudah ditemukan dua kesalahan. Yang satu berakibat hukum yang jelas, dan yang lainnya tidak terlalu berdampak hukum tapi tampak sangat bodoh (tidak akan saya ungkap di sini, saya tunggu anaknya pulang dan cerita semuanya ke saya inshaaAllah). Bukankah ini sangat memalukan?

Harapan saya adalah penerjemah yang digunakan untuk menerjemahkan haruslah yang berkualifikasi bahasa Inggris dengan baik serta bahasa Inggris hukum sehingga mengenali istilah-istilah yang lazim digunakan dalam bahasa perjanjian internasional. Harapan saya juga, terutama bagi teman-teman mahasiswa, untuk menghindari sedapat mungkin menggunakan buku maupun naskah hukum versi terjemahan. Kecuali benar-benar terpaksa, jangan lah. Sekurang-kurangnya akan ada makna atau jiwa yang hilang karena sebuah ekspresi dalam satu bahasa tidak dapat digantikan dengan bahasa lain dengan terjemahan yang sempurna sekalipun. Atau lebih buruk, bisa jadi ada perubahan makna dan konten. 

Demikian, semoga bermanfaat.

 

—–CATATAN KAKI——-

[1]UNDP Indonesia. “Selamatkan Langit Kita Menciptakan Planet yang Ramah Ozon”. 16 September 2004. 6 Juni 2010, pukul 14.00 WIB <http://www.undp.gov.id >.

[2] National Ocan & Atmospheric Administration, Kementerian Perdagangan Amerika Serikat. “Statistics of CFC and Halons in the Stratosphere.” 2002. 6 Juni 2010, pukul 14.50 WIB. <http://www.esrl.noaa.gov/csd/assessments>

Seputar Jus Cogens

PENGANTAR

Mahasiswa yang telah mengambil mata kuliah hukum internasional mestinya telah mengenali sumber-sumber hukum internasional yang disebutkan dalam Pasal 38 ICJ Statute, yaitu:

  1. Perjanjian Internasional
  2. Hukum Kebiasaan Internasional
  3. Prinsip-prinsip umum hukum
  4. Putusan hakim terdahulu
  5. Karya-karya pakar hukum

Akan tetapi, mestinya kita ketahui juga bahwa masih ada sumber hukum internasional di luar kelima hal tersebut. Contohnya adalah Soft Law atau aturan-aturan yang formalnya tidak mengikat (misalnya Codex Alimentarius yang dikeluarkan oleh FAO atau Resolusi UN General Assembly). Untuk pembahasan lebih mendetail tentang Soft Law sebagai sumber hukum internasional silahkan lihat artikel ini ini ini.

Salah satu sumber hukum internasional yang jarang dibicarakan di luar konteks akademis adalah norma Jus Cogens. Norma-norma Jus Cogens ini terkadang disebut sebagai ‘Norma Tuhan’, tetapi terkadang tidak jelas juga. Kenapa demikian? Mari kita simak pembahasannya.

APA ITU JUS COGENS?

Dalam bahasa Latin, Jus Cogens berarti ‘hukum memaksa’. Jus Cogens disebut sebagai norma-norma yang diakui oleh masyarakat internasional memiliki kedudukan tertinggi dalam hukum internasional. Maksudnya adalah jika ada suatu peraturan hukum yang bertentangan dengan Jus Cogens, maka peraturan hukum tersebut dianggap batal.[1]

Misalnya saja dalam Pasal 53 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 (VCLT), suatu perjanjian internasional akan null and void ketika bertentangan dengan Jus Cogens (dalam konvensi ini disebut sebagai peremptory norms, yaitu sebutan lain dari Jus Cogens). Pasal terebut menjelaskan juga bahwa Jus Cogens ini adalah norma yang diakui oleh hukum internasional sebagai norma yang tidak boleh disimpangi oleh suatu apapun. Ketika sebuah norma Jus Cogens bertentangan dengan Jus Cogens lainnya, barulah bisa disimpangi (lebih detail akan dijelaskan nanti).

Pasal 64 VCLT menjelaskan bahwa jika sebuah perjanjian internasional sudah dibuat, lalu di kemudian hari ada Jus Cogens baru yang muncul (kenapa bisa tiba-tiba muncul baru? Akan dijelaskan nanti inshaaAllah) maka perjanjian tersebut harus berhenti berlaku.

Kasus lain misalnya adalah Pinochet Case di UK House of Lords pada tahun 1998. Normalnya seorang kepala Negara (baik aktif atau mantan) memiliki kekebalan dari yurisdiksi hukum Negara lain. Tapi karena Augusto Pinochet (mantan pemimpin Chile) diberi surat penangkapan oleh Spanyol atas dugaan kejahatan penyiksaan atau Torture yang merupakan pelanggaran jus cogens, maka kekebalan beliau pun menurut mayoritas hakim di UK House of Lords adalah gugur.[2]

PS: nanti akan makin rumit, lihat nanti bagian-bagian selanjutnya.

Norma apa saja yang merupakan Jus Cogens? Yang sekarang disepakati oleh pakar-pakar hukum adalah di antaranya: larangan menggunakan kekerasan bersenjata, larangan genosida, larangan melakukan kejahatan perang, larangan menyiksa, dan lain sebagainya.

 

BAGAIMANA NORMA JUS COGENS BISA MUNCUL?

Sejak lama, mazhab hukum alam telah mengisyaratkan perlu adanya suatu norma di mana tidak ada suatu hukum yang boleh dibuat menentang terhadapnya. Maksudnya, kalau hal tersebut bersifat begitu salah atau imoral maka dia tidak boleh menjadi hukum (bertentangan dengan mazhab positivis yang mengatakan bahwa sebuah hukum, jika dia telah berlaku walaupun kita tidak menyukai isinya, adalah hukum).[3] Kedua mazhab hukum ini saling tarik menarik (bersama-sama dengan mazhab lain seperti utilitarianis, pragmatis-realis, dll), dan mewarnai sistem-sistem hukum yang ada sekarang.

Memasuki era modern (abad 19 ke atas), salah satu manifestasi mazhab hukum alam ini makin populer saat ada hal-hal yang rasanya terlalu jahat untuk dibenarkan oleh penguasa (yang, menurut mazhab positivis, adalah yang memiliki otoritas membuat hukum). The Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ, yaitu cikal bakal dari ICJ) pada tahun 1923 dalam Wimbledon Case[4] sempat menyebutkan bahwa kedaulatan tidaklah tak terbatas (ingatlah bahwa kedaulatan biasanya dianggap sebagai hal yang sangat utama dan mendasar dalam hukum internasional). Tapi konkritnya baru dapat dilihat di tahun-tahun berikutnya.

Pertengahan abad ke dua puluh menyaksikan peristiwa yang bisa dikatakan sebagai kekejaman yang paling kejam dalam sejarah umat manusia. Sebelum perang dunia II, sejarah belum pernah menyaksikan dampak yang begitu buruk dan meluas akibat pelanggaran hukum perang atau pelecehan martabat dan derajat manusia. Begitu banyak jatuh korban di seluruh daratan Eropa (terutama) dan Asia akibat perang dunia II, bukan hanya tentara yang diperlakukan dengan sadis atau penduduk sipil yang jadi korban pengeboman yang semena-mena melainkan juga pembantaian serta penyiksaan terhadap kaum Yahudi menjadi trending topic yang luar biasa jauh sebelum adanya twitter.[5]

Dunia seolah sepakat bahwa memang betul ada norma-norma yang kedudukannya lebih tinggi dari apapun di dunia ini, dan apapun yang bertentangan dengannya harus batal.

 

BAGAIMANA SEBUAH NORMA BISA BERSTATUS JUS COGENS? SEBUAH PENJELASAN FORMALISTIK

Pasal 53 VCLT menyebutkan dua unsur norma jus cogens:

  1. Diakui secara universal di masyarakat internasional…
  2. … sebagai norma yang tidak dapat dikurangi/dibatasi kecuali oleh norma jus cogens

Untuk menjelaskan unsur pertama, ‘pengakuan secara universal’ dapat memiliki berbagai bentuk. Sebagaimana yang juga dijelaskan oleh Bassiouni, norma Jus Cogens dapat beranjak dari hukum kebiasaan internasional. Ingatlah bahwa hukum kebiasaan internasional ini memiliki unsur-unsur (i) praktek Negara-negara yang seragam, dan (ii) keyakinan bahwa praktek tersebut adalah norma hukum.

Walaupun dikatakan demikian, tidak tertutup kemungkinan atau bahkan sangat banyak sekali hukum kebiasaan internasional ini terkodifikasikan dalam perjanjian internasional. Contohnya adalah VCLT dan juga Geneva Conventions 1949. Perjanjian-perjanjian internasional yang mencerminkan jus cogens ini biasanya diratifikasi oleh hampir seluruh Negara di dunia (atau, setidaknya, banyak yang meratifikasinya), dan juga diamalkan oleh Negara-negara yang bukan merupakan peratifikasi perjanjian tersebut.[6]

Unsur kedua, yakni tidak dapat dikurangi/dibatasi kecuali oleh norma jus cogens juga, mengindikasikan status jus cogens sebagai norma tertinggi dalam hukum internasional. Karena itulah jus cogens tidak dapat dikalahkan atas dasar lex superiori derogate legi inferiori (karena sudah paling tinggi). Yang dimungkinkan adalah ada jus cogens yang lebih spesifik yang diutamakan (lex specialis derogate legi generalis, contohnya lihat naskah publikasi skripsi saya yang bisa didownload di sini sini sini) atau ada munculnya jus cogens baru seperti yang disebutkan di Pasal 64 VCLT (lex posteriori derogate legi apriori, memungkinkan juga untuk hilangnya sebuah norma jus cogens misalnya dalam kasus bajak laut).

 

BAGAIMANA SEBUAH NORMA BISA BERSTATUS JUS COGENS? SEBUAH PERSPEKTIF NILAI DAN SOSIAL

Sebelumnya adalah penjelasan sederhana tentang bagaimana ciri-ciri formal dari suatu norma Jus Cogens. Secara substansi, Bassiouni menjelaskan bahwa norma jus cogens memiliki beberapa ciri doktrinal (atau saya lebih suka menyebutnya ciri subjektif), yaitu bahwa jus cogens bersifat:[7]

  1. Bertentangan dengan nurani kemanusiaan secara meluas, dan/atau
  2. Mengancam keamanan dan/atau perdamaian internasional

Tidak ada norma jus cogens yang melarang hal-hal yang tidak memenuhi setidaknya salah satu sifat di atas. Misalnya genosida (silahkan lihat ulasan makna ‘genosida’ yang tepat menurut hukum di artikel ini ini ini ini), jelas bertentangan dengan nurani kemanusiaan secara meluas tetapi belum tentu menjadi ancaman keamanan dan/atau perdamaian internasional.

Ini juga adalah salah satu alasan kenapa jus cogens bisa berubah. Nurani manusia, yang dalam hukum internasional diwakili oleh keyakinan hukum yang dipegang Negara (yang tentu sedikit banyak dipengaruhi opini publik sih). Ini selalu berubah seiring zaman. Misalnya bagaimana dulu perbudakan adalah suatu hal yang biasa saja dan tidak dirasa salah, tapi sekarang sudah dianggap sebuah bentuk kejahatan internasional yang sangat berat.[8]

Saya ingat betul waktu sidang skripsi, saya ditanya oleh Prof. Dr. Marsudi Triatmodjo (saat itu beliau menjabat sebagai Dekan Fakultas Hukum UGM) “kenapa tidak ada satu perjanjian internasional yang merinci apa saja jus cogens itu, supaya semuanya jelas”. Hal ini beliau tanyakan setelah sebelumnya saya menjelaskan bahwa tidak ada satu traktat (perjanjian internasional) yang memuat suatu daftar jus cogens, melainkan ditemukan tersebar dalam berbagai perjanjian internasional, putusan hakim, karya-karya ahli hukum, dll. Jawaban saya kepada beliau adalah “karena memang jus cogens ini mengikuti zaman. Jika ‘dipotret’ dalam sebuah konvensi formal, nanti hasil ‘foto’nya hanya mewakili momen pemotretan dan ketinggalan dengan perkembangan zaman’.

 

BEBERAPA KESALAHAN PEMAHAMAN TERKAIT JUS COGENS

  1. Jus Cogens adalah norma-norma kecil-kecil yang tidak penting.

Saya pernah mendengar bahwa seorang dosen pernah menjelaskan bahwa jus cogens adalah norma-norma terkait etiket yang tidak begitu penting. Misalnya adalah bahwa jika ada pertemuan antar Negara, saat makan harus menggunakan table manner.

Saya tidak tahu ini dapat ide dari mana. Tidak ada satupun literatur yang menjelaskan hal ini, tetapi semua literature menjelaskan sebaliknya (bahwa justru jus cogens itu adalah norma tertinggi dalam hukum internasional). Masalahnya, ini disampaikan oleh seorang dosen perguruan tinggi nun jauh di sana, yang di mana pendapatnya tentu sangat otoritatif bagi mahasiswanya.

  1. Pacta Sunt Servanda adalah Norma Jus Cogens

Hal ini disebutkan oleh beberapa literatur, akan tetapi hal ini kurang tepat. Saya tentu memahami bahwa asas Pacta Sunt Servanda (perjanjian harus dipatuhi) adalah suatu asas yang sudah diterima dengan meluas ke seluruh elemen masyarakat mulai dari wong cilik sampai antar Negara. VCLT pun dalam pasal 26 hanya sekedar melakukan kodifikasi terhadap hukum kebiasaan yang sudah sangat lama dan universal diterima oleh masyarakat internasional.[9] Karena itu pula, begitu pentingnya asas ini, saya pun memahami kenapa akan ada yang berpendapat bahwa asas ini adalah termasuk norma jus cogens.

Padahal, syarat jus cogens bukan hanya pengakuan universal melainkan juga tidak dapat dibatasi oleh suatu apapun kecuali norma yang sejajar.

Justru rujukan utama hukum perjanjian internasional (yang berlandaskan pacta sunt servanda) yaitu VCLT sendiri memberikan bukti bahwa pacta sunt servanda bukanlah norma jus cogens:

  1. Pasal 53 mengatur bahwa perjanjian internasional akan batal jika bertentangan dengan jus cogens.
  2. Jus cogens juga dapat dibatasi oleh jus cogens

Pertama, redaksi pasal ini sudah jelas memisahkan antara perjanjian internasional (yang berlaku atas dasar pacta sunt servanda) dengan jus cogens, dan bahwa perjanjian internasional tersebut jelas kalah oleh jus cogens. Kedua, redaksi pasal tersebut akan menjadi absurd jika pacta sunt servanda adalah jus cogens, bukan?

Ciri-ciri doktrinal yang disebut oleh Bassiouni pun tidak terpenuhi. Memang sebuah Negara yang tidak memenuhi janjinya akan sangat menyebalkan, tetapi tentu tidak sejenis dengan pertentangan dengan nurani kemanusiaan semacam genosida, kejahatan perang, dll.

  1. Semua kejahatan internasional adalah pelanggaran jus cogens

Saya paham bahwa para pakar sudah menjelaskan bagaimana, misalnya, kejahatan perang atau war crimes adalah termasuk pelanggaran jus cogens. Masalahnya, dalam kategori war crimes, ada buwaaaaanyak sekali jenis kejahatan yang masuk dalam kategori tersebut. Silahkan lihat Pasal 8 dari Rome Statute (1998), buanyak sekali. Apakah semuanya merupakan jus cogens?

Contoh yang paling mudah adalah Pasal 8(2)(b)(xii) dari Rome Statute yaitu “Committing outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment” atau “Melakukan kebiadaban terhadap martabat pribadi, terutama perlakuan yang mempermalukan dan merendahkan martabat manusia”. Unsur-unsur perbuatan pidana atau Elements of Crime[10] untuk kejahatan ini ada lima tapi paling penting merujuk pada Element 1:

The perpetrator humiliated, degraded or otherwise violated the dignity of one or more persons” atau “Pelaku mempermalukan, merendahkan, atau menyerang kehormatan satu orang atau lebih”.

Bukan Element 1 ini yang penting, melainkan ada catatan kaki nomor 49 di akhir redaksinya. Nah, kalimat pertama pada catatan kaki tersebutlah yang ingin saya soroti. Bunyinya: “For this crime, ‘persons’ can include dead persons.” Atau “untuk kejahatan ini, ‘orang’ dapat termasuk ‘jenasah’. Artinya, mempermalukan dan/atau merendahkan jenasah seseorang bisa jadi salah satu bentuk war crime.

Memang jahat sekali rasanya menguwel-uwel jenasah orang. Tapi apakah betul selevel jus cogens? Ternyata, para Negara perunding Rome Statute memasukkan hal ini ke dalam catatan kaki karena pernah ada kasus di Nuremberg Trials (pengadilan kepada Nazi setelah Perang Dunia II) di mana pernah ada yang diputus bersalah karena menganiaya jenasah tawanan perang.[11] Rasanya tidak pernah ada landasan lain yang sesignifikan war crimes yang lain yang memiliki banyak kasus dan menarik kecaman internasional (misalnya bombardir terhadap warga sipil).

  1. List ini akan saya tambah kalau ketemu lagi, monggo kalau ada usulan

 

BEBERAPA HAL MEMBINGUNGKAN DARI JUS COGENS

  1. Jus Cogens, Universal Jurisdiction, dan Imunitas Kepala Negara.

Universal Jurisdiction adalah kompetensi hukum suatu Negara untuk mengklaim kewenangan mengadili seseorang di manapun dan oleh warga Negara manapun kejahatan itu dilakukan, dan terlepas dari dasar-dasar klaim kewenangan lain yang dikenal dalam hukum internasional.[12] Secara teori, konsekuensi logis Jus Cogens adalah Universal Jurisdiction terhadap pelanggarnya.[13] Secara hukum pun banyak konvensi yang mengkodifikasi Jus Cogens yang juga memberikan Universal Jurisdiction.[14]

Tapi bagaimana kalau pelaksanaan Universal Jurisdiction oleh pengadilan nasional berhadapan dengan imunitas Negara atau kepala negara, di mana mereka tidak boleh dipaksa tunduk kepada hukum Negara lain?

Ternyata, ICJ dalam Arrest Warrant Case[15] dan Jurisdictional Immunities Case[16], yang dimenangkan adalah imunitas. Beberapa argument para pengadilan tersebut relatif unik dan mungkin butuh pengkajian khusus.

Arrest Warrant Case

Pertama, para hakim melihat preseden Pinochet Case hanya berlaku kepada mantan kepala Negara saja yang tentu imunitasnya berbeda dengan kepala Negara aktif. Karena itu, Pinochet Case tidak dapat menjadi preseden untuk kasus yang melibatkan kepala Negara aktif. Padahal, analisis para hakim di Pinochet Case juga menyentuh imunitas kepala Negara secara umum.

Kedua, para hakim menyatakan bahwa dalam hukum kebiasaan internasional yang mengatur imunitas kepala Negara, tidak ditemukan pengecualian terhadap terduga pelaku kejahatan internasional. Padahal, sebaliknya juga dapat ditanyakan: dalam kewajiban semua Negara untuk mengadili semua pelaku kejahatan internasional, apakah ditemukan pengecualian terhadap kepala Negara? Apalagi perlu dilihat bagaimana imunitas adalah sebuah norma dari zaman kuda makan besi, sedangkan jus cogens dan Universal Jurisdiction bagi pelanggar Jus Cogens bersifat baru. Kalaupun bisa dibuktikan bahwa imunitas merupakan jus cogens, bukankah norma baru akan mengalahkan norma lama bila keduanya secara hierarki sejajar?

Ketiga, para hakim menyatakan bahwa preseden-preseden yang ada mengadili kepala Negara adalah pengadilan-pengadilan internasional dan bukan pengadilan nasional. Karena itu, aksi pengadilan nasional dalam melaksanakan universal jurisdiction tidak ada dasarnya dalam hukum kebiasaan internasional. Padahal, apakah belum adanya praktek adalah sama dengan tidak ada hukum kebiasaan? Bukankah dalam kasus Military and Paramilitary Activities ICJ dengan mudah menyimpulkan adanya Hukum Kebiasaan Internasional dengan adanya kehendak yang kuat dari masyarakat internasional (berupa Resolusi UN General Assembly yang by the way normalnya tidak mengikat) walaupun tidak disebutkan satu pun praktek Negara?[17] Bukankah dalam semua sumber hukum Universal Jurisdiction (misalnya GC, CAT, ICSPA) yang mengemban kewajiban melaksanakan Universal Jurisdiction adalah Negara?

Ketiga, kenapa para hakim tidak menyebutkan sekalipun jus cogens dalam kasus yang sangat melibatkan jus cogens begini?

Jurisdictional Immunities Case

Yang mencolok adalah satu saja pendapat hakim di sini, yaitu bahwa tidak bisa mempertentangkan antara hukum substantif dan hukum formil atau prosedural. Mereka mengatakan bahwa Jus Cogens adalah hukum materil sedangkan imunitas adalah hukum formil. Ini adalah argument yang sangat cerdas sebetulnya, karena seberapapun jahatnya sebuah genosida tentu tidak bisa diadili di Pengadilan Tipikor, dan seberapapun buruknya sebuah pernikahan tidak bisa meminta cerai di International Court of Justice. Bagaimanapun juga, memang betul bahwa kewenangan materi dan kewenangan territorial atau kewenangan personal (misalnya) adalah dua syarat yang saling lepas dan tidak berdampak satu sama lain.

Tapi bukankah ide dari Universal Jurisdiction adalah untuk menabrak hambatan-hambatan formil begini? Salah satu hal yang dasar melekat pada Universal Jurisdiction adalah menabrak batas-batas territorial dan personal (terkait kewarganegaraan), yang notabene merupakan hukum formil juga dalam penetapan kewenangan pengadilan. Kasus Kallon dan Kamara di Special Court for Sierra Leone juga mengesampingkan amnesti (juga merupakan tindakan formil prosedural untuk menghambat kewenangan pengadilan)[18] untuk Universal Jurisdiction. Kenapa imunitas Negara adalah hal yang berbeda?

Kedua Putusan Bisa Jadi Benar Juga

Memang pada semua putusan pengadilan yang disebut di atas, hakim-hakim berbeda pendapat. Silahkan melihat dissenting opinions pada kasus-kasus tersebut untuk melihat lebih lanjut perdebatannya. Akan tetapi, ada satu argument yang mungkin bisa dibenarkan pada kedua kasus tersebut.

Kedua putusan pengadilan ini menyoroti tentang fungsi imunitas Negara yaitu menyelenggarakan hubungan masyarakat internasional yang baik. Jika ICJ mengizinkan sebuah Negara bisa menggunakan Jus Cogens untuk mengklaim Universal Jurisdiction dan seenaknya mendakwa kepala-kepala Negara di dunia, bisa jadi ini seakan membuka ‘kotak Pandora’. Malah bisa jadi menjadi alat untuk permainan politis dan menimbulkan konflik antar Negara dan, jika konfliknya bersifat regional dan melibatkan lebih dari satu Negara, bisa berujung repot.[19]

Dapat kita pahami kenapa ICJ kemudian memutus demikian. PBB dibangun atas dasar keinginan untuk hidup damai, sebagaimana dituangkan dalam mukadimah dan Pasal 1 UN Charter, setelah sebelumnya menyaksikan perang dunia II yang begitu menakutkan. Memang betul, belum tentu setiap penggunaan Universal Jurisdiction akan berpotensi menimbulkan perang. Dengan demikian, belum tentu kebutuhan imunitas dapat dikatakan mencapai tingkatan Jus Cogens (sehingga dapat mengesampingkan Universal Jurisdiction yang muncul dari Jus Cogens). Akan tetapi, dapat dipahami kenapa ICJ memilih untuk tidak membuka ‘kotak Pandora’. Mereka tentu ingin main aman, karena trend menunjukkan bahwa putusan ICJ biasanya diikuti (lihat tulisan saya tentang soft law, itu di bab awal-awal ada penjelasan tentang ICJ dan mengapa mereka biasa diikuti).

 

  1. List Ini Akan Saya Tambahkan Kalau Ketemu Lagi Kebingungan Terkait Jus Cogens, monggo kalau ada usulan

 

 

————————————————–

Catatan Kaki

[1] 2M Cherif Bassiouni, ‘International Crimes: Jus Cogens and Obligation Erga Omnes’, Law & Contemporary Problems, Law and Contemporary Problems, Vol. 59 (1998), hlm. 67

[2] R. v Bow Street Stipendiary Magistrate Ex. P. Pinocet Ugarte (No. 3) [2000] 1 A.C. 147

[3] Bandingkan tulisan Mark C. Murphy berjudul.”Natural Law Theory” dan Brian H. Bix berjudul “Legal Positivism”, keduanya ada dalam Martin P. Golding and William A. Edmundson (eds), 2005, The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory, Blackwell Publishing, Oxford. Atau kalau sulit mencarinya, penjelasan sederhananya ada di Abdul Ghofur Anshori, 2006, Filsafat Hukum: Sejarah, Aliran, dan Perkembangannya, Gadjah Mada Press, Yogyakarta, Bab IV tentang aliran-aliran hukum (yang ini ada di perpustakaan)

[4] 0S.S. Wimbledon (UK v Japan) (Judgments) [1923] PCIJ (ser A) No 1.

[5] Sejarah dan perkembangan Jus Cogens ada di Stefan Kadelbach, ‘Jus Cogens, Obligations Erga Omnes and Other Rules – the Identification of Fundamental Norms‘ dalam C. Tomuschat and J M Thouvenin (eds), 2006, The Fundamental Rules of the International Legal Order, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, hlm 21-22

[6] Lihat Op.Cit., Bassiouni, hlm. 68, ada beberapa ciri formal hukum yang ada pada jus cogens untuk membuktikan pengakuan universal, tapi ciri-ciri ini tidak bersifat kumulatif.

[7] Ibid, hlm.70

[8] Lihat sejarahnya di sini http://www.historyworld.net/wrldhis/PlainTextHistories.asp?historyid=ac41

[9] Lihat mukadimah VCLT, lihat juga Malcom Shaw, 2008, International Law (Sixth Edition), Cambridge University Press, New York, hlm 94

[10] Berbeda dengan KUHP di mana kita harus menurunkan sendiri unsur-unsur perbuatan pidana dari redaksi pasal-pasal, Rome Statute merujuk kepada sebuah dokumen khusus yang merinci unsur-unsur ini. Dokumen ini dikenal dengan nama Elements of Crime of the International Criminal Court

[11] Knut Dormann (with contributions by Louise Doswald-Beck and Robert Kolb), 2004, Elements of War Crimes

under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Sources and Commentary, Cambridge University Press, New York, hlm.314

[12] Op.Cit., Shaw, hlm 668

[13] Op.Cit., Bassiouni, hlm 66

[14] Pasal 49 Geneva Convention 1949 (GC) I, Pasal 50 GC II, Pasal 129 GC III dan Pasal 146 GC IV, Pasal 5 Convention Against Torture atau CAT (1985), Pasal IV.b. dan V dari the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid atau ICSPCA (1973), dlsb

[15] Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2002, p.3

[16] Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece intervening), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012, p. 99

[17] Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment. I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 14

[18] The Prosecutor v. Morris Kallon and Brima Buzzy Kamara, Special Court for Sierra Leone, SCSL-2004-15- AR72(E) and SCSL-2004-16-AR72(E), Decision on Challenge to Jurisdiction: Lomé Accord Amnesty (Appeals Chamber, 13 March 2004)

[19] Lihat tulisan Madeline Morris, Universal Jurisdiction in a Divided World: Conference Remarks, 35 New England Law Review (2001), pp. 337-361, terutama pada halaman 352-355

Apakah Kita Berhak Asal Memfatwa Sesat atau Kafir? Hukum Indonesia vs Hukum Internasional vs Hukum Islam

Pengantar

Sekarang di zaman ‘pluralis’ dan ‘toleran’ ini, sangat popular di satu sisi kita mendengar orang berkata “A itu kafir! B itu sesat!”, dan di sisi lain ada yang membantah orang tadi dengan berkata “kita tidak berhak untuk asal memfatwa sesat atau kafir orang lain!”. Menariknya, kecenderungan kalangan intelektual dari golongan kedua itu adalah dari kalangan liberal pengusung Hak Asasi Manusia dan anti-Syariat Islam. Kenapa saya menyebut ‘kalangan intelektual’ adalah karena tentu ada porsi besar orang awam yang hanya ikut-ikutan, dan porsi ini ada di kedua belah pihak.

Saya sangat tertarik tentang posisi orang-orang kalangan liberal pengusung HAM ini yang malah mengatakan tidak boleh asal memfatwa sesat atau kafir orang lain. Apakah stance mereka ini konsisten dengan kerangka kerja hukum-hukum non-Agamis yang cenderung mereka agung-agungkan di atas hukum Islam?

Karena itulah, saya mencoba membandingkan hukum non-Agamis (hukum Indonesia umum dan hukum internasional) dengan hukum islam: apakah kita berhak asal memfatwa sesat atau kafir?

 

Menurut Hukum Indonesia: BERHAK

Dalam hukum Indonesia, Pasal 28E UUD 1945 tegas mengatur kebebasan seseorang untuk berpendapat dan memeluk kepercayaan. Karena itu, justru sangat boleh sekali seseorang dengan alasan apapun menyatakan bahwa ajaran atau orang lain itu adalah sesat atau kafir serta mempercayai hal tersebut sebagai ajaran agamanya.

Batasan yang ada dua, yaitu pertama Pasal 28J(2) UUD 45. Pasal ini pada intinya membatasi kebebasan saat bertentangan dengan ketertiban umum. Bukan hanya bahwa memfatwa sesat atau kafir tidak serta merta bertentangan dengan ketertiban umum (itu masalah kedewasaan menyikapinya saja, mensesatkan kan tidak harus melulu berarti kemudian menyerang),[1] melainkan juga bahwa pasal tersebut menjadikan norma agama sebagai pembatas hak. Artinya, monggo saja yang difatwa sesat/kafir merasa tidak sesat/kafir, ya monggo juga yang merasa orang tersebut sesat/kafir ya berhak mempercayai hal itu.

Batasan kedua ada pada Pasal 156 KUHP tentang Penistaan Agama. Pertama, pasal ini berbicara mengenai penghinaan. Menurut saya beda sekali antara penghinaan dan telaah kritis terhadap suatu ajaran agama. Beda sekali antara menghina seseorang karena kepercayaannya, dengan menjelaskan kenapa kita lebih suka kepercayaan kita sendiri dibandingkan kepercayaan orang lain. Bedanya ada di etiket dan tutur kata. Kedua, pasal ini pun dikritisi oleh aktivis-aktivis Hak Asasi Manusia (silahkan lihat gugatan ke Mahkamah Konstitusi, Perkara No.  140/PUU-VII/2009, siapa saja yang mengajukan).

Kesimpulan: Menurut hukum Indonesia, BERHAK asal-asalan dan suka-suka mensesatkan dan mengkafirkan orang lain.

Menurut Hukum Internasional: BERHAK

Menurut the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 Pasal 19, kebebasan berpendapat diatur dengan sangat tegas. Artinya, sangat sah saja seseorang menyalah-nyalahkan agama lain atau bahkan orang lain yang seagama tapi tidak sealiran. Pasal 19(3) mengatakan bahwa kebebasan berpendapat dapat dibatasi untuk:

  1. Menghargai hak dan reputasi orang lain: Orang lain tersebut dapat terus berpendapat bahwa agamanya benar kok. Dan saya tidak melihat ada masalah dalam reputasi.
  2. Keamanan dan ketertiban nasional, kesehatan, dan moralitas public. Ini sama dengan di hukum Indonesia. Intinya bagaimana orang bersikap dewasa, dan tidak lantas karena kafir atau sesat langsung diserang lempar bom Molotov

Pasal 18 pada Kovenan yang sama juga mengatur kebebasan memeluk suatu agama dan kepercayaan, sehingga terserah saja jika seseorang percaya bahwa orang lain itu kafir atau sesat. Percaya pada alien saja boleh. Pembatasan yang dimungkinkan untuk hak ini ada pada Pasal 18(3) yang pada prinsipnya serupa dengan Pasal 19(3) yang telah dijelaskan sebelumnya.

Kesimpulan: Menurut hukum Indonesia, BERHAK asal-asalan dan suka-suka mensesatkan dan mengkafirkan orang lain.

Menurut Hukum Islam: TIDAK BERHAK

“Seseorang tidak boleh berbicara tanpa ilmu” adalah sebuah aturan yang tegas diatur dalam Al Qur’an maupun Hadist.[2] Terutama soal mengkafirkan sesama Muslim, itu juga tidak boleh sembarangan dan banyak hadist yang melarangnya.[3] Ulama-ulama besar termasuk dari Salafi-Wahabi (yang konon dibilang mudah mengkafirkan dan mensesatkan) juga sudah menyebutkan bahwa hak mengkafirkan hanya ada pada Allah, sehingga yang boleh dihukumi kafir hanya yang sudah dikafirkan oleh Allah dan Rasul-Nya.[4] Maksudnya adalah misalnya orang mushrik, Nasrani, Yahudi, dll, itu sudah pasti kafirnya karena Allah sendiri yang bilang di Al Qur’an.

Orang yang secara dzahir (jelas atau ‘kasat mata’) mengaku Muslim berarti adalah by default dianggap Muslim dan bukan kafir. Pelanggaran-pelanggaran yang dilakukan oleh seorang Muslim, walaupun bersifat dosa besar, itu adalah perbuatan kafir tetapi tidak serta-merta menjadikan orang tersebut kafir. Karena seseorang yang dosanya sangat banyak pun, walau ‘mampir’ dulu dan ‘dicuci’ dulu di neraka, tapi jika ada iman walau sebesar dzarrah (atau atom).[5]

Untuk melihat apakah seseorang yang mengaku Muslim dapat dihukumi kafir adalah bersifat case per case. Bayangkan betapa banyak yang harus diketahui oleh seseorang untuk menghukumi orang yang mengaku Muslim sebagai kafir:

  • Dia harus tahu sejauh mana perbuatan seseorang dapat dihukumi kafir beserta kaidah-kaidahnya, karena sudah dijelaskan sebelumnya bagaimana pelaku dosa-dosa besar pun belum tentu kafir.
  • Dia harus tahu keadaan orang yang hendak dikafirkan itu. Karena walaupun perbuatannya sudah cocok dengan ciri-ciri kekafiran, harus diselidiki dulu keadaan fikirannya. Karena ada banyak sekali kemungkinan keadaan udzur (alasan ‘pemaaf’) pada yang hendak dikafirkan, yang juga harus diketahui dulu oleh orang yang mengkafirkan.[6]

Apakah mungkin ada orang yang awam yang bisa melakukan hal di atas? Seorang Ulama pun, dengan ilmunya, paling hanya bisa memenuhi yang pertama kalau tidak melakukan investigasi yang komprehensif pada orang yang hendak dikafirkan. Karena itulah, misalnya Syiah, mereka sudah jelas kesesatannya. Semua ulama mazhab dari zaman dahulu sampai sekarang sudah menunjukkan bukti-bukti kekafiran dan kesesatan mereka.[7] Akan tetapi, kenapa Pemerintah Arab Saudi mengizinkan mereka masuk Mekkah dan Madinah (yang hanya boleh dimasuki oleh Muslim)? Karena seseorang yang mengaku Muslim, akan dianggap Muslim sampai terbukti sebaliknya. Jadi harus dicek satu persatu dong kalau mau betul-betul dilarang masuk Mekkah dan Madinah.

Nah, kalau untuk orang-orangnya  kan tidak boleh asal memfatwa kafir atau sesat. Kalau ajarannya bagaimana? Tetap tidak boleh asal-asalan, tetapi orang yang memang mengetahui ilmunya tentu saja boleh.

Kenapa boleh?

Kalau ajaran-ajaran yang memang sudah dikafirkan oleh Allah langsung di Al Qur’an, ya itu memang hak Allah untuk mengkafirkan, jadi kalau ada yang bilang “Kamu (Muslim) tidak boleh asal mengkafirkan, mentang-mentang Yahudi dibilang kafir.” Lah itu yang ngomong adalah Allah sendiri berkali-kali misalnya di Surah An Nisa ayat 46.

Nah, kalau dia mengaku ajarannya adalah “Cuma penafsiran yang berbeda” boleh tidak?

Jawabannya adalah iya tapi ada syaratnya. Ingatlah bahwa penafsiran itu ada kaidahnya, di mana jika keluar dari kaidah tersebut maka penafsirannya dianggap menyimpang. Hukum Indonesia mengakui hal ini, misalnya adanya asas lex superiori derogat legi inferiori sehingga hukum yang lebih rendah tidak boleh ditafsirkan sedemikian rupa sehingga bertentangan dengan hukum yang lebih tinggi.[8]

Hukum internasional juga sama, silahkan rujuk the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 Pasal 31 mengenai kaidah-kaidah penafsiran perjanjian internasional. Penafsiran tidak boleh bertentangan dengan makna dzahir serta maksud dan tujuan perjanjian internasional tersebut. Bahkan, sebetulnya dalam hukum internasional sebuah Negara dalam menandatangani perjanjian internasional prinsipnya boleh pilih-pilih mana aturan yang dia mau kecualikan pada perjanjian tersebut yang disebut reservasi. Akan tetapi, itu pun ada pengecualian yaitu jika:[9]

  • perjanjian tersebut melarang reservasi baik sebagian atau seluruhnya
  • reservasi tersebut akan bertentangan dengan maksud dan tujuan perjanjian tersebut

Tentu hukum Islam juga sama. Tentu ada kaidah-kaidah penafsiran yang tidak boleh diterabas, dan kalau diterabas maka akan menyimpang. Misalnya aliran Ahmadiyah Qadiyani yang mengaku Muslim sedangkan meyakini Mirza Ghulam Ahmad sebagai Nabi setelah Rasulullah Muhammad s.a.w., Penafsiran macam apa yang bisa membuat Sabda Allah “…beliau adalah utusan Allah dan penutup nabi-nabi…” (Surah Al-Azhab ayat 40) untuk membenarkan keyakinan tersebut? Kecuali memang mereka tidak mempercayai ayat tersebut adalah Sabda Allah sehingga telah kafir karena iman pada Al-Qur’an adalah rukun iman.[10]

Akan tetapi tentu untuk menyatakan suatu ajaran adalah kafir atau sesat, dibutuhkan sebuah analisis komprehensif terhadap struktur dan metode penafsiran pada ajaran tersebut.[11] Tentu hanya orang-orang yang memiliki ilmu yang berkompeten untuk melakukan hal ini, makanya tadi saya bilang boleh mensesat/kafirkan ajaran yang mengaku Islam tapi ada syaratnya: hanya dilakukan setelah analisis komprehensif oleh orang yang punya ilmunya.

Nah, bagaimana kalau ada yang mengaku Muslim tetapi mengikut ajaran yang sudah divonis sesat atau kafir? Seperti yang sudah dijelaskan sebelumnya, walaupun ajarannya sesat/kafir tetapi pengikutnya (jika mengaku Muslim) dianggap Muslim kecuali dibuktikan sebaliknya secara case per case sebagaimana sudah dijelaskan sebelumnya.

Kesimpulan: Menurut hukum Indonesia, TIDAK BERHAK asal-asalan dan suka-suka mensesatkan dan mengkafirkan orang lain. Ada kaidah-kaidah, syarat-syarat, baik dalam melakukannya juga siapa yang boleh melakukannya.

Penutup

Menurut saya adalah hal yang sangat menarik jika:

  1. Ada yang mengatakan ‘tidak boleh asal memfatwa sesat/kafir’ dengan mindset liberal Hak Asasi Manusia. Padahal justru dalam kerangka hukum Indonesia maupun hukum Internasional (tepatnya hukum Hak Asasi Manusia Internasional) malah boleh asal mensesatkan atau mengkafirkan orang lain, sebagai bagian dari kebebasan beragama dan berekspresi.
  2. Ada yang mengatakan ‘tidak boleh asal memfatwa sesat/kafir’ padahal dia tidak memeriksa sama sekali hujjah yang dibawakan oleh pihak yang mengkafirkan itu. Yang ‘asal’ berpendapat siapa ya sebenarnya?
  3. Ada yang mengatakan ‘tidak boleh asal memfatwa sesat/kafir’ padahal dia bahkan tidak tahu apa arti istilah–misalnya—ushul fiqih, ta’wil, atau bahkan Al Fatihah belum bisa baca dengan sempurna tajwidnya, belum hafal terjemahannya, dan tidak tahu cara menafsirkannya, sedangkan pihak yang mengkafirkan adalah seorang Ulama besar yang hafal Al Qur’an, paham tafsir, dan hafal puluhan ribu hadist beserta sanadnya, dll.

Prinsipnya sih sederhana. Kalau kita tidak paham ya jangan berpendapat, kalau dikasi tau ya di dengerin, kalau nggak paham ya tanya.

Tambahan Catatan:

Fatwa kafir atau sesat itu tidak berarti kita tiba-tiba berhak untuk mengejar, membacok, membunuh, atau apapun yang bersifat anarkis, karena itu bukan ajaran Islam melainkan ajran YAHUDI (silahkan lihat Kitab Perjanjian Lama, Deuteronomy 13: 6-11). Perang pun dilakukan hanya kalau kita diserang kaum kafir, atau dalam saat tertentu jika dibenarkan untuk melakukan perang ofensif (yang juga terkadang dapat dibenarkan dalam jus ad bellum menurut hukum internasional. Untuk bacaan lebih lanjut bisa lihat sumber-sumber lain: carilah keyword ‘military intervention’ atau ‘humanitarian intervention’).

Berikut beberapa dampak nyata secara hukum jika seseorang dihukumi sesat/kafir:

  1. Tidak shalat bermakmum padanya.
  2. Tidak memakan daging sembelihannya.
  3. Saat dia meninggal, tidak menshalati jenasahnya.
  4. Dia tidak mewariskan harta pada ahli warisnya yang Muslim, tidak pula berhak menjadi ahli waris dari seorang Muslim.
  5. Tidak mengambil ilmu agama darinya (kecuali untuk melihat kesesatannya)
  6. dll

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[1] analogi lain: ingatlah bahwa walaupun sesuatu itu benar salah (misalnya pelaku pencurian), itu tidak berarti boleh berlaku anarkis. Apakah karena ada potensi anarkisme, hukum pencurian harus diubah sehingga jadi dibolehkan?

[2] Misalnya Surah Al Isra ayat 36, Hadist dalam Sahih Bukhari No. 100,

[3] Sahih Bukhari No. 6104 dan No. 6105, Sahih Muslim No. 60 dan 110, dll

[4] Misalnya Imam ibn Taymiyya r.a. dan Shaykh Salih al-Uthaymeen. Rujukan lengkap silahkan lihat http://abul-jauzaa.blogspot.com/2010/03/kaidah-kaidah-dalam-pengkafiran.html

[5] Sahih Muslim No. 183a, see also Surah An-Nisa ayat 40

[6] Lihat blog Abul Jauzaa di Note 4 untuk lengkapnya.

[7] Untuk lengkapnya dalil-dalilnya beserta siapa saja ulama yang sudah menjelaskannya: http://salafy.or.id/blog/2012/09/03/membongkar-kesesatan-syiah/

[8] Sudikno Mertokusumo. 1991. Mengenal Hukum (Suatu Pengantar). Penerbit: Liberty Yogyakarta, Hlm. 74

[9] Pasal 19 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969

[10] Sahih Muslim, Hadist No. 8 dan 10. Ingat juga bahwa “rukun” artinya kalau satu tidak terpenuhi, maka semuanya batal, misalnya rukun shalat.

[11] Lihat bagaimana komprehensifnya dalil-dalil yang ada pada link di note 7? Sekilas akan tampak sangat komprehensif, padahal banyak sekali bukti yang bisa ditunjukkan dan dianalisis, dan para ulama sudah melakukan ini

A Comparison between International Humanitarian Law and Islamic Laws of War: The Islamic State of Iraq and Sham (ISIS) and Treatment Towards Prisoners of War in Syria

DISCLAIMER BEFORE YOU READ FURTHER!

1. This is originally a dissertation I submitted to obtain my Masters Degree at the University of Edinburgh in 2014.

2. The original title was “A Comparison Between Islamic Laws of War and International Humanitarian Law with Reference to the Present Armed Conflict in Syria”. However, as discussions with my supervisor developed, I decided to make the legal discussion more specific to laws concerning PoW treatment, and the contextual discussion to be more specific to ISIS (now known as IS). The problem was that the original title has already been approved and cannot be modified. So, I can only modify it here when I personally publish it.  My dissertation, in the archives of the Law School of the University of Edinburgh is still under the original title.

3. Please forgive me for the very shallow and sloppy analysis in the Islamic law part. Not only that I really rushed in writing it (the deadline was 18 August 2014, and I submitted on 4 July 2014 because I was too eager to fly home, and dissertation submission was the requirement for me to request a flight ticket to my scholarship provider). Whats most important is that my knowledge on Islamic law was very VERY shallow at that time, but I really wanted to write something on Islamic law.

Not only that I wish to have a career in this field. But if only you knew what it was like to be in the UK where Muslims were a minority and ISIS suddenly became a hot issue, I really wanted to say something about it not just sporadically but academically. So here comes a very shallow analysis on Islamic law. I have authored another article on Islamic laws of war and international humanitarian law, more broad in legal scope and without any contextual specification to any particular conflict. However it is under review to be published in a national law journal, inshaaAllah, so I cannot publish it here yet. My knowledge in Islamic law is still very shallow, but inshaaAllah at least this article was not rushed and written after I have at least a little more knowledge compared to before. So kindly wait for it 🙂

4. I have actually published this article in my academia.edu page which is downloadable, but I thought I should also put it here in my blog.

5. Please do not hesitate to provide feedback.

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A Comparison between International Humanitarian Law and Islamic Laws of War: The Islamic State of Iraq and Sham (ISIS) and Treatment Towards Prisoners of War in Syria*

 

picture taken from vocative.com

picture taken from vocative.com

Abstract

The Syrian conflict brings warfare to a new level. Jihadists have evolved from small terrorist cells into large armed groups, ISIS being the strongest, and have allegedly committed numerous breaches of IHL especially in the treatment of PoWs. While ISIS claims to follow only Islamic law, does this mean that Islamic laws of war is inconsistent with IHL? This article examines ISIS’s treatment of PoWs in the light of relevant rules of IHL and Islamic laws, finding that both laws of war are generally consistent except in certain points and ISIS’ conduct seems to be heavily violating both laws.

Keywords: the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham, International Humanitarian Law, Islamic law of war, prisoners of war, radical Islam

 

I.                   INTRODUCTION

The Syrian war started from street protests with violent response from the government, and then as violence increased an opposition built up and formed an armed rebellion, both sides supported by numerous states.[1] The strong religious affiliation of the parties i.e. the Shi’a government against the Ahlus Sunnah wal Jama’ah (‘Sunni’, for short) rebels, brought a large number of foreigners to join in the fight, and now there are numerous fighting groups.[2] Given the situation of armed violence between state forces and non-state organized armed forces, this is a non-international armed conflict.[3] Therefore the Additional Protocol II of the Geneva Conventions 1977, 1949, (AP II) –which Syria is a party to[4] and is also acknowledged as customary international law[5]—applies to this conflict[6] and binds the Syrian government forces as well as the opposing forces within Syrian territory.

This article aims to compare Islamic law and international humanitarian law (IHL). Therefore, it may be preferable to observe the conduct of the Islamic “jihadist” fighting groups who intend and have started to build an Islamic state governed by Islamic law, rather than that of the Free Syrian Army who do not share that goal and are more secular.[7]

Among the jihadist fighters, the strongest group seems to be ad-Dawla al-Islāmiyya fi al-‘Irāq wa-sh-Shām, or the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham/Levant (ISIS), who used to be an offshoot from the extremist group Al-Qaeda.[8] Before entering the battle of Syria, they were called Islamic State of Iraq as they were and still are fighting in Iraq, where they control large areas of lands (Fallujah, Anbar, Tikrit, Mosul) and currently almost surrounding Baghdad.[9] In Syria, they also have control over quite a large territory including the province of Ar-Raqqah, exercising control and governance, which may be seen a form of an actual de facto state.[10] This group, like other jihadist groups, denounces the use of any law other than Islamic law.[11] It is this group that will be mainly discussed.

However, Islamic law has been seen in a negative light due to misunderstandings and misinterpretation[12] fuelled further by the 9/11 attack.[13] However, scores of people converting to Islam after searching more about Islam due to the 9/11 incident[14] is a small clue out of many others how Islamophobic messages portrayed by many parties may be incorrect. Numerous fatwas (legal rulings and opinions) issued by Islamic scholar have explained such terrorist acts are not actually based upon Islamic law despite the terrorist groups claiming so.[15]

This article will explore one of the hearts of the islamophobic attacks, which is in the laws regarding jihad. The word jihad linguistically does not always talk about warfare and in fact literally means ‘struggle’ (any kinds of struggle).[16] However, this article will indeed focus on the laws of jihad in context of warfare, which is al-qitaal which literally means ‘combat’,[17] and examine how it compares to IHL. Of many topics that can be discussed under the laws of war, the treatment towards war captives will be emphasised.

On one hand ISIS claims to follow Islamic law, and on the other hand they are one of the parties to the Syrian conflict and therefore bound by IHL particularly AP II. This article will put their conduct of warfare under the test of both laws. IHL may be highly related to international human rights law (IHR), but to assess the acts of ISIS under IHR and to compare it with Islamic law would require an article of its own. Therefore, the international law aspect of this article will be confined to IHL only and not IHR.

The main questions that this article will answer are the following:

  • Would the application of Islamic laws of war breach IHL?
  • Is the conduct of ISIS compatible with Islamic laws of war and IHL?

The analysis of this article will start by comparing the sources of Islamic law with international humanitarian law, how they relate to each other, and how ISIS are bound by both. Afterwards, there will be a comparison between the rules regulating the conduct warfare from both sources and ISIS’s compliance.

The area of rules that this article will focus on would be the various aspects related to the treatment towards war captives during captivity, in particular: execution towards captives, torture and cruelty, detainment living conditions, and termination of captivity. As the conflict is still ongoing and the facts on the ground are very blurred, this article will rely on what information it can find up until 25 June 2014.

It will be found that Islamic laws of war related to the treatment towards war captives generally do not contradict international humanitarian law except in some particular points, and that there are indications that ISIS does indeed violate both of those laws.

 

II.                SOURCES OF LAW: ISLAMIC AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

A.    International Law and Relation to Islamic Law

The traditionally known sources of international law are: international agreements, customary international law, and general principles of law (as primary sources), then past judicial decisions and the works of the most highly qualified publicists.[18] More directly relevant to the law governing the conduct of armed conflict, or international humanitarian law (IHL), the central sources would be around the four Geneva conventions of 1949 (GC) with its additional protocols of 1977 and 2005 (AP), customary international humanitarian law,[19] at times cross-referencing to human rights laws,[20] etc.

A question arises: is Islamic law compatible with international law?

None of the sources of Islamic law (e.g. the Qur’an) is mentioned among the sources of international law. However, Islamic law is one of the legal systems represented in the world civilization, which can also be taken as source from which to derive ‘general principles of law recognized by civilized nations’ as per Article 38(1)(c) of the ICJ Statute.[21]

The GCs mention how mechanisms of accountability will be triggered only in the event of breaches.[22] It consequently follows that IHL will not be opposed towards Islamic law so long as there are no breaches towards IHL committed. It does not matter how these norms and obligations of IHL are characterized (be it under religious obligations, or whatever), as long as they are indeed recognized as binding.[23]

B.     Islamic Law and Relations with International Law

To its believers, Islam is a complete way of life, and its law encompasses every aspect of life including the hereafter (both daily life aspects and worship)[24] including laws governing the conduct of warfare.

To understand Islamic law, one should start from the sources. The primary sources of Islamic law are as follows:[25]

The Qur’an

The Qur’an is believed to be the Arabic verbatim of Allah’s (God) words to Muhammad the Final Prophet of Islam[26] through the Angel Gabriel.[27] The Qur’an is preserved both in writing and through oral memory tradition, and codified around a decade after The Prophet’s death, the same Arabic text is held by Muslims today.[28]

The Qur’an as a source of law sometimes contains explicit legal rules, sometimes it contains narratives from which one can conclude or derive legal rules. On the whole, however, the verses of the Qur’an are understood by means of tafseer (interpretation). The primary way is to interpret based on the Qur’an text itself, then by the sunna, and sometimes by practice of the Pious Predecessors (the Prophet’s companions, and two generations after).[29] Secondarily, tafseer can be made by reasoning (ijtihad, which will be explained later) bearing in mind the rules of the Arabic language.[30]

The Sunna

The Sunna is The Prophet’s tradition, consisting of hadith (utterance, acts, and approval by The Prophet, verified and graded based on authenticity).[31] As mentioned, other than in itself being a source of law, the Sunna is an authoritative means to interpret the Qur’an. Since the Sunna comprises of reports of various incidents in the life of The Prophet, it consists of narratives and stories from which legal rulings are not always clear but can be concluded from the overall report.

It is imperative for Muslims to follow these primary sources–depending on the degree of disobedience, failing to do so would make one a disbeliever.[32]

As the primary sources do not always prescribe clear rulings, or new objects emerge, scholars make fatwas (rulings) by ijtihad.[33] The true sources of law are still the Qur’an and Sunna.[34] Anything from reasoning is mere tool to further understand the Qur’an and Sunna.[35] This is why Islamic rulings, even today, always refer to primary sources.[36]

There are two ways to achieve these kinds of rulings based on reasoning:

  • Ijma (consensus): consensus by the entire Muslim communities represented by the most learned Islamic jurists, deciding by ijtihad[37]
  • Individual ijtihad: done in absence of ijma.[38]

To make rulings, there are a number of methods. The first would be Qiyas (analogy from existing primary sources).[39] In doing Qiyas, a jurist will consider Istihsan (juristic preference),[40] and Maslaha (public interest for this life and the hereafter) in accordance with the maqqasid shari’ah (purpose of the law): to protect the life, religion, wealth, mind, and lineage.[41] Other considerations used is Sadd ad-Dhara’i (preventing evil), i.e. something normally lawful will be prohibited if it provides means to prohibited things.[42] Urf (customary rules) are also considered if consistent with primary sources.[43]

Then, Islamic law comes down to five different legal injunctions:[44]

  • Wajib (compulsory): punishments if abandoned, and rewards if committed
  • Mandhub (praiseworthy): rewards if committed, no punishments if abandoned
  • Makruh (disliked): no punishment if committed, but rewards if abandoned
  • Haram (prohibited): punishment if committed, rewards if abandoned, and
  • Mubah (neutral): those not belonging to the category above

As time goes by, there are four schools of interpretations, namely: Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi’i, and Hanbali[45] which still exist until today.

The question will now be: can Islamic law adopt provisions in IHL or international law in general?

There are verses in the Qur’an condemning those who use laws other than from Allah.[46] However, from the hadith we find that those verses speak of those who blatantly reject the laws of Allah and oppress others from their rights.[47]

Islamic law also observes the principle of pacta sunt servanda[48] and violating it is prohibited.[49] Therefore if an Islamic State has entered into an international convention (e.g. the Geneva Conventions 1949), it is bound under Islamic laws to follow the obligations in that convention.

Further, AP II as customary international law[50] might be considered as urf which can also be used to derive sources of law The key to whether or not Islamic law can recognize IHL is whether or not IHL goes against the Qur’an and Sunna. If IHL is consistent with the Qur’an and Sunna, then it is not impossible for Islamic law to recognize it.

 

III.             RULES REGARDING TREATMENT DURING CAPTIVITY

There are four aspects that will be discussed under this section, namely: permissibility of execution, torture and cruel treatment, detainment living conditions, and termination of captivity, comparing the acts of ISIS to Islamic law and IHL.

 

 

 

A.    Execution towards Captives

  1. Captive Execution by ISIS

Amnesty International,[51] the Human Rights Council (HRC),[52] and numerous other media reports have noted that there have been numerous cases of executions committed by ISIS (some are for crimes not related to war, e.g. adultery,[53] excluded from this article). However, if one ponders further into the incidents, there are two distinct characteristics to be observed.

The first characteristic is when the executions are done as response to certain crimes. An example to this would be the ISIS execution of Sayyed Al-Hadrami which is a leader of Jabhat Al-Nusra (JN) –another jihadist group[54] allegedly for apostasy, upon his confession as confirmed by witnesses.[55] It may seem that ‘apostasy’ here refers to JN attacks towards ISIS, and Al-Hadrami was one of JN’s leaders. ISIS claimed that JN betrayed and attacked first[56] and labelled it as ‘betrayal and treason’[57] despite both groups initially being allies in the war under the banner of Al-Qaeda.[58]

Other cases would be trials in the detention centres. AI reported that there were captured members of insurgents who fought against ISIS were put to trial before executed. However these trials lasted less than a minute, and did not give fair opportunity for the captive to respond to the allegations.[59] There were notes of captives coerced for confessions,[60] although the AI report did not mention whether this captive was eventually executed.

The second characteristic of execution is when they are done not as punishment for crimes. The HRC reports list a number of instances of captive execution done for pragmatic purposes, such as when the ISIS fighters are under heavy attack or when they anticipate a military loss.[61] Other media reports show ISIS, upon wining a battle, immediately executing all captured enemy soldiers.[62]

  1. Captive Execution: Islamic Law Perspective

There are a number of different opinions in Islamic law on the permissibility of executing captives. Medieval scholars like Ibn Nuhaas mentions that the Islamic leader may, at his discretion, decide to execute war captives if it is deemed necessary.[63] Jihadist groups (including Al-Qaeda and their offshoots) highly take reference to Ibn Nuhaas for their war guidelines,[64] which explains ISIS’s executions not as sanction towards any particular crime.

However, it has been suggested that Ibn Nuhaas’s opinion was based on necessity and functionality which was highly influenced by the urf of warfare of the middle ages, and therefore is not applicable nowadays.[65] The actual law as seen in the Qur’an does not mention execution as possible outcome:

Therefore, when ye meet the Unbelievers (in fight), smite at their necks; At length, when ye have thoroughly subdued them, bind a bond firmly (on them): thereafter (is the time for) either generosity or ransom: Until the war lays down its burdens…[66]

The ijma of the companions of The Prophet also decided similarly, that captives are either to be set free by ransom or without ransom, and execution is not allowed.[67] Along these lines, some modern scholars such as Mawdudi argued that captives may not be killed at all due to a hadith where The Prophet prohibits[68] and regrets[69] it.

This difference of opinion, should be resolved by referring the matter back to the primary sources, as the Qur’an suggests in 4:59:

…If ye differ in anything among yourselves, refer it to Allah and His Messenger, if ye do believe in Allah and the Last Day: That is best, and most suitable for final determination.”

The modern scholar Yusuf Qardhawi has a more ‘middle view’ on the matter: captives may not be executed except in very exceptional circumstances.[70] This opinion is the strongest, as it finds more evidence in the primary sources as will be explained as follows.

In general, killing is prohibited in Islam with only a few exceptions, including as penalty for the most serious crimes.[71] Another exception would be self-defence, as mentioned in a hadith.[72] However, those references talk about the prohibition of killing fellow believers and not in instance of war either. Would war time references rule differently?

In context of war, the Qur’an in 47:4 and 9:4-5 mentions that the killing is permissible during the commencement of battles but should cease when the enemy has stopped fighting or surrendered. Consequently, it is (generally) impermissible and haram to kill the war captives from the defeated or surrendered enemy. In fact, as previously mentioned, in the Qur’an 47:4 only two options are given for the captives: release with or without ransom. The exceptions can be found in the hadith, where war captives who were executed were for very specific crimes.[73] Although, one may also argue that Mawdudi’s position is also correct along these lines, as the captives are not executed simply because of their status of captivity.

In the aforementioned hadiths and from the Qur’an,[74] executions were for the following crimes: persecution towards Muslims, murder, treachery, or a combination thereof. Another one to add would be perhaps one of the most controversial of Islamic law: apostasy, where there is hadith prescribing death penalty for them.[75] Some medieval and modern scholars have understood that the hadith prescribing death penalty for apostasy is limited to apostates who then also commit treason and wage war against the Muslims,[76] as supported by some verses from the Qur’an[77] and hadith.[78]. As mentioned earlier, it seems that ISIS used this understanding of apostasy against Al-Hadrami. If the sentence was issued following a proper trial (as will be explained later), then this execution is consistent with Islamic law.

One controversial part of the sunna is the fate of the People of Qurayza[79] –a Jewish tribe who lived in Madinah. They were sentenced to inter alia have all their combatants executed, women and children sold into slavery, and all properties confiscated.[80] This must be understood in its proper context, and only the execution will be discussed in this article. During the Battle of the Trenches, the entire Muslim population was facing threat of extermination by an army five times larger than their own from one direction. The Qurayza betrayed a treaty with the Muslims, which and attempted a pincer attack which would have actualized the extermination towards the Muslims.[81]

Other than the treachery, there was other uniqueness to the circumstances. This sentence was imposed upon the Qurayza by Sa’d bin Muadh, an arbitrator which has been agreed by the Qurayza (chosen because he was the leader of the People of Aws, an ally to the Qurayza).[82] It has always been clear to the Qurayza, however, that mass execution was likely.[83] However, the Muslim regime applies Jewish law to Jewish people[84] as part of the as part of the Sahifat al-Madinah –a treaty between different groups in Medinah including the Muslims and the Jewish and is constitution for the city. This is the treaty that the Qurayza betrayed.[85] It is therefore not surprising that Sa’d’s judgment was a sentence prescribed by Jewish law,[86] as acknowledged by the leaders of the Qurayza themselves.[87]

Having that said, it can be concluded that ISIS execution which was carried out following Ibn Nuhaas’s opinion (i.e. those committed by necessity) is not in accordance with Islamic law. However, the execution towards Al-Hadrami and also other captives after sanctioned by trials may seem to be in accordance with Islamic law, as they were in response to certain crimes.

It must be noted, however, that there are major critics to how these jihadist groups in declaring others as apostates with a very loosely and incorrectly understood methodology.[88] ISIS in particular seem to feel that they have rights to make such declaration and thus wage war against other Muslim groups especially because they feel like they have established a dawlah or state which incurs authority.[89] Among the groups they declare as apostates would be the Ikhwanul Muslimeen in Egypt[90] and the entire Syrian opposition who are also Sunni Muslims.[91]

It would require a comprehensive analysis to properly understand the concept of dawlah Islamiyah and can ISIS act as an proper authority for the Muslims. This article is not the proper avenue for this. However, it may suffice to say that there have been an extensive number of rulings (fatwa) classifying these jihadists as deviants and Khawarij or rebels against the legitimate Muslim community, criticizing their methodology including. These fatwas come from various schools of Islamic thoughts.[92] Further, fellow jihadist scholars have issued fatwas specifically against ISIS such as Abu Baseer Al-Tartousi[93] and even the pro Al-Qaeda scholar Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi.[94] The looser the understanding of ‘apostasy’ is, then the more people could fall under this category and get executed.

There is another test to consider whether the executions were lawful under Islamic law. The previous references mention only about how the law was applied when the facts have already been established[95] or confessed to.[96] If the facts are still contended, Islamic law requires certain principles of fair trial, before a judge who has been appointed, as follows:[97]

  • The principle of legality, as emphasized in the Qur’an[98] and hadith,[99] how people are not punished for laws that were not instated yet or even laws that the persons were genuinely unaware of.
  • Presumption of Innocence, as the hadith prescribes the onus of proof on the claimant.[100]
  • Equality before the law, as mentioned in the Qur’an and [101]
  • Rights to a defence, as prescribed in the hadith.[102] Defence counsels, though, was unknown in the early Islamic age. However, a famous early Islamic scholar (Imam Abu Hanifa) ruled that it is permissible to have a legal representative in court and this opinion was followed by many jurists [103] and we can see this permissibility evolve as a right in Islamic courts today..[104]

Rights to appeal find no basis in the primary sources, other than pardoning by a Muslim leader as the Prophet has done on a number occasions (which is not a judicial act but rather a discretion).[105] Some have noted that this is because, historically, the Islamic judiciary was more of a religious nature and not designed to be hierarchical[106] and the appeal system used in religious courts nowadays (e.g. in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and in the Republic of Indonesia)[107] is a more secular development when Islam interacted with diverse cultures and civilizations.[108] However, there is nothing in the Qur’an or Hadith that rejects appeal mechanisms, therefore these developments can be part of urf.[109]

Considering these requirements, there are some evidences that ISIS has failed to provide fair trial in sanctioning execution (including coerced testimonials, no rights of self-defence, etc). Therefore, there are strong indications that these acts are against both Islamic law and IHL. However, it must be noted that there is evidence that ISIS applies equality before the law, since it has been noted to sanction their own members for crimes against civilians including some high officials (unrelated to war but example of ISIS general policy)[110] and sometimes joining common courst between different jihadist groups to put unlawful murders to trial.[111]

As a final note, Islamic Law also encourages avoiding punishment and promotes reconciliation and repentance instead.[112] Personal repentance is always open until the soul has reached the throat on one’s death bed, as mentioned in the Qur’an[113] and hadith.[114] But to what extent does personal repentance affect criminal responsibility? For crimes mentioned in The Qur’an in 5:33,[115] repentance is bars punishment if done before the alleged criminal is defeated or captured.[116]

There is a difference in opinion whether repentance simply requires ceasing their criminal activities or should it also require that criminal to also surrender themselves to the Muslim leader.[117] However, the companions of the Prophet understood that if a sin involves wronging others then repentance should include undoing the wrong and seeking forgiveness from those wronged.[118] Therefore, it may seem that the stronger opinion is one that requires surrender.

No reports show that ISIS hunts down their enemies who have ceased the crimes, as the cases mentioned earlier were alleged active crimes (i.e. persons allegedly caught in treason etc). However there are reports showing that ISIS accepts the defection of enemies from their original group (who fights against ISIS) or otherwise pledged allegiance without necessarily participating combat within ISIS ranks[119] which may be a sign of repentance by surrender and making amends.

Further, there are hadith mentioning how punishment must be averted if possible.[120] Reconciliation and pardoning is encouraged between the accused and victim’s family to prevent punishment.[121] There has not been any information of ISIS practicing this in context of war.

  1. Captive Execution: IHL Perspective

The GC gives no clear prohibition on execution, except for some restrictions. Examining Common Article 3, there are prohibitions of murder and sentencing/executing prisoners of war without proper trial.[122] AP II says that persons below 18 years, pregnant women, or mothers of young children may not be given death penalty.[123] The GC III further prescribes: (1) non-retroactivity,[124] (2) considering non-allegiance in context of international armed conflict (which is not applicable in the context of non-international armed conflict, since fighting against the legitimate government is usually a political crime) [125] (3) possibility of sentence reduction, (4) applicability of the same punishment for the Detaining Power’s soldiers committing the same offense, and (5) communication with the Protecting Power regarding the sentence.[126]

A fair trial, in summary, would include: a regularly constituted court, established by law, independence and impartiality, presumption of innocence, information on the nature and cause of accusation, necessary rights and means of defence, trial without undue delay, interpreter assistance, examination of witnesses, presence of the accused at the trial, public proceedings, and non-nebis in idem.[127] Failure to follow these rules would constitute a war crime, as per Article 8(2)(c)(iv) of the Rome Statute (ICCSt).

A particular emphasis need to be given to Article 100 of the GC III where death penalty has to be prescribed in the national laws of the Detaining Power. However, in case of occupation, Article 64 of the GC IV rules that the penal laws that previously applied to the area should remain in force except for special security needs of the occupying force. Technically it would be therefore unlawful for ISIS to replace Syrian law with Islamic law. However, some of the war-related crimes punishable by death in Islamic law coincides with Syrian law i.e. murder, treason (including apostasy).[128]

To this point it does not appear that there is any contradiction between the Islamic laws of war and IHL, and ISIS execution of Al-Hadrami and captives with trials may seem lawful. Ibn Nuhaas’s opinion, on the other hand, with a liberally understood rule ‘can execute whenever the Muslim leader sees fit’, is unlawful in IHL. Therefore, ISIS execution of captives without trial is unlawful.

However, while there is no categorical prohibition on executions, there are requirements. It is these requirements that have to be examined to see whether there are any contrasts between both laws and to judge ISIS’s acts.

  1. Appeals, Sentence Reduction, and Possible Pardon

It has been shown that Islamic law does recognize the possibility for pardon, but there is no clear precedent on sentence reduction. However, there may be hints to it in the case of the Qurayza. The judgment passed by Sa’d bin Mu’adh[129] applies for distant cities[130] while the Qurayza lived in the same city as the Muslims. The punishment for near cities in Jewish Law is complete extermination.[131]

On rights to appeal, GC IV requires mechanisms of appeal either through court or by petition. As mentioned, Islamic law does not traditionally recognize appeals in court but it can be adopted, and petitioning for pardon is possible. Other than ISIS accepting defection of JN fighters (arguably a case of pardon), there is no information on practice of this.

 

 

  1. Principles of Fair Trial

It has been seen that generally there seems no conflict between Islamic Law and international standards of fair trial.[132] However, there may be a few points that could potentially be in tension.

For trials without undue delay, the hadith had the trials and executions done promptly while the GC III requires more technicalities.[133] On legal counsel, Islamic law does not see it as a compulsory requirement.[134] On legal proceedings in general, Islamic law has no elaborate court procedures in the Qur’an and hadith.[135]

The aforementioned matters are resolved by virtue of urf development and are practiced by many Islamic states today. However there are evidences of ISIS violations of these rules as mentioned in the previous subsection, with the addition of not providing the items mentioned in the previous paragraph.

  1. Death Penalty only for the Most Serious Punishments

Unlike the principles of fair trial which finds its way in the sources of IHL as well as IHR and citing each other, crimes that are punishable by death have no particular requirements in IHL as it does in IHR. This is excluded from this article’s analysis.

B.     Torture and Cruel Treatment

  1. Torture and Cruel Treatment by ISIS

In summary, reports from AI, HRC, and other media show that ISIS has committed the following acts to captives:[136]

  • Beating and flogging
  • Pulling out nails
  • Electrocution
  • Crucifixion
  • Prolonged solitary confinement

For the beating and flogging, the testimonials recorded by AI[137] mentioned victims screaming in pain. The reports also mention the flogging done with arms raised until armpits shown[138] (a detail which will be important later). These acts were done either for interrogation purposes[139] or no particular purpose at all.[140] Crucifixion was mentioned in the ‘torture’ section of the Human Rights Council Report.[141] However, the fact is that the persons were executed first for sabotage before crucifixion,[142] therefore cannot classify as torture.

  1. Torture and Cruel Treatment: Islamic Law Perspective

From a very powerful hadith: “..Allah would torment those who torment people in the world[143] it is very clear that there is a general prohibition of torture in Islamic law. It is even unlawful to torture animals.[144] Another hadith with similar narration but with additional context may imply that there are possible exceptions i.e. proper reasons to inflict pain: “…Allah would punish those who torment people in this world (without any genuine reason)”.[145]

It is correct for one to infer from that hadith that there may be lawful reasons to inflict pain on persons. However, there are various limitations imposed in inflicting pain.

These lawful pain inflicting finds its way in corporal punishments for categories of offences as follows:

  1. hudud offences: crimes prescribed in the Qur’an supplemented with hadith, such as flogging for fornicators and persons drinking intoxicants[146]
  2. Qisas or retaliation: if a person inflicts certain damage to another then the victim can either retaliate by inflicting the same damage or forgive.[147] In the previous subsection it has been shown how forgiveness is preferable and encouraged.
  3. Ta’zir crimes: crimes not prescribed in the Qur’an but by the judge or the leader of the Muslims[148] which’s punishment may include flogging by maximum of ten (10) lashes.[149]

While there is no limit to the extent of damage that Qisas may bring, since it really depends on what damage was inflicted to the victim in the first place, there are very strict limitations as to how flogging may be performed:

  • The hadith prohibits hitting persons the face.[150]
  • The hadith requires that item used for flogging should not be a hard object, so it will reduce the pain.[151]
  • The flogging may not result in any wound. This is inferred from the Qur’an because the word used for ‘flogging’ in the Qur’an is jaldah, which is therefore understood that the flogging should not break the skin. [152]
  • While striking the lash, to reduce the pain from angle of strike the armpit of the flogger may not be exposed (practice of companions of The Prophet).[153]
  • The lashes should be directed to different parts of the body except the head and genitals, so the pain is not concentrated at one body part (practice of companions of The Prophet).[154]

As a display of a correct way of flogging under Islamic law, one can see an example conducted by ISIS against a fornicator in this footnote.[155] As the reports show, ISIS seems to be violating Islamic law through acts of torture in detainments. Many of the acts of torture seem to be without purpose, and even those arguably committed as punishments seem to not be carried out properly.

Another possible time where corporal punishment may arguably be done is in obtaining information. As a general rule, the hadith prohibits coercion to obtain information related to crime.[156] However, a minority of medieval scholars like Ibn Hazm and Ibn al-Qayyim argued that it is possible to beat suspected thieves to recover stolen goods, but this requires that the suspect is notoriously deceitful and treacherous and a very high likeliness that this suspect is indeed the culprit.[157] Confessions obtained by duress are still inadmissible in trials but if the stolen goods are found, this can be used for trials.[158] However, this opinion seems weak as it not only goes against the majority and has no direct evidence in the Qur’an and the Sunna[159] which explicitly prohibits torture in general and coerced testimonial.

The ISIS practice torture for confession was not to obtain information for investigation of something else. Therefore, this is a violation of either interpretation of Islamic law even loosely when interpreting the minority opinion to go beyond recovering stolen goods.

Another very controversial way of ‘corporal’ punishment would be crucifixion on wooden prop. The Qur’an prescribes as this alternative punishment for “..those who wage war against Allah and His Messenger, and strive with might and main for mischief through the land..”,[160] which means waging war against the Muslims and aggravated by terrorizing, plundering, and cruel murdering.[161]

Crucifixion in Islam does not nail the person’s hands and feet as mentioned in the Bible.[162] Practice of crucifixion does not exist in the primary sources, and scholars differ in their ijtihad between: crucifixion until death by starvation, crucifixion then execution on the wooden prop, or executed first before crucified.[163] It may seem that ISIS follows the third interpretation[164] which may be the strongest opinion bearing in mind the prohibition against torture, at least compared to the first of the three opinions. However, one may argue that the penalty is inappropriate as the ‘crime’ was merely an act in combat by the enemy (i.e. planting improvised explosive devices on ISIS vehicles) and does not fulfil the aggravating requirements as mentioned in the previous paragraph.

  1. Torture and Cruel Treatment: IHL Perspective

The term ‘torture’ is an infliction of severe pain or suffering, for a number of purposes, i.e. interrogation, punishment, coercion, and intimidation.[165] There is no question that the prohibition against torture is universally recognized. The CAT, to this date, has been ratified by 155 states.[166] Further, great scholars[167] and case laws[168] have noted that this prohibition is not only customary international law but also a jus cogens norm which is non-derogable.[169] When torture is committed during wartime by one of the parties to the armed conflict, it is a war crime.[170] As it has been shown, Islamic law is in agreement with this, thus the act of torture by ISIS is a violation of both laws.

While the CAT further understands that there are no exceptional circumstances that would justify torture,[171] recent developments post 9/11 may suggest new developments. Dershowitz, for instance, proposed a ‘torture warrant’. The argument is that if a person withholds information that may lead to an imminent terrorist attack that may kill many innocent civilians, then by necessity it should be legal to torture the said person.[172] This concept of ‘torture warrant’ is similar to what was practiced in England a few centuries ago.[173] However this argument is a mere proposal on how to develop the law, and not what the law is.

Another proposition which may, at a glance, seem compatible to the existing law. As Lord Phillips says, torture may be done as an imperative necessity and later being a justification to exclude criminal responsibility rather than legalizing it.[174] This argument may, to some extent, find justification in the ICCSt.[175] However, such argument would require imminence of the threat and not to mention actual certainty that the person actually has and will provide the correct information, which is very rare to happen on the field.[176] Even in an actual event of facing imminent threat to life, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) have held in the Gafgen v. Germany Case –also citing numerous other case laws arguing similarly.[177]

One may wonder, however, how the aforementioned ECtHR judgment(s) would fare when compared to the aforementioned ICCSt provision[178] which explicitly excludes events of imminent threat to life from criminal responsibility. In this particular point, following the ECtHR cases, there is a little conflict with the minority and weaker opinion of Islamic law. It has been shown how Islam generally does not allow torture for information except arguably for cases where the defendant is well known of being treacherous and untrustworthy, where coercion may only be used to recover stolen goods, but perhaps interpreted a bit further to include more grave matters similar to Dershowitz and Lord Phillips (e.g. finding spies or saboteurs etc).

When corporal punishment in Islam is brought to the discussion, classifying it as torture is difficult. In the first layer, because the CAT and the ICCSt (in crimes against humanity) requires that the infliction of pain is not inherent to lawful sanctions.[179] However, as a war crime in the ICCSt, the element discussed in the previous paragraph is not discussed[180] and none of the ad-hoc tribunals discussed it.[181] Yet the provisions in the CAT are a source of law under the ICCSt[182] and should therefore apply nonetheless. It is common sense that pain is inherent in corporal punishment and the Qisas, and in Islamic law such kinds of punishments are legal and prescribed. However, IHL allows disciplinary punishments but prohibits corporal punishments towards war captives.[183] This is where Islamic law is in conflict with IHL, but it does not yet amount to war crimes. Therefore, if ISIS flogged anyone for a prescribed punishment, it is not an act of torture but it is nonetheless illegal under IHL.

As a second layer consideration, even if one argues that no form of corporal punishment is lawful anyway since AP II stipulates that “…the following acts against the persons referred to in paragraph 1 are and shall remain prohibited….(a)… any form of corporal punishment…”,[184] there is still a minimum threshold of pain and suffering inflicted for the acts to be qualified as torture. The threshold is only possible to be satisfied in the case of Qisas, since it is a retaliatory punishment that depends on how painful the damage was inflicted in the first place. Torture requires act has to be severe and “causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health”.[185] There is no clear standard of severity to classify as torture.[186] The ECtHR in the Selmouni v. France case mentioned:

“..it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical or mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victim, etc.[187]

Dormann mentions that ‘beating’ has been noted as one of the examples of severity required,[188] citing inter alia:

  • ECtHR in the Aksoy v. Turkey Case.[189] Beating was only one of the form of torture that the applicant suffered, apart from electric shocks, slapping, etc, resulting in in a bilateral brachial plexus injury, which is a damage to the certain parts of the spinal nerves.[190]
  • The Human Rights Council in the Muteba v. Zaire Case,[191] Estrella v. Uruguay,[192] and Lopez Burgos v. Uruguay.[193] On all cases, beating was just one of the numerous forms of torture and ill treatment received in certain lengths of time. There is no description of actual damage suffered, except Lopez Burgos who had a broken jaw and eardrum perforation.
  • The Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture.[194] Beating is among the methods of torture (which includes lashing), if it causes: wounds, internal bleeding, fractures, cranial traumatism, or certain nerve damages.

Essentially, the aforementioned list mentions prolonged infliction of pain of various means which in many of those cases causing much physical damages and injury. Therefore, assuming to dismiss the first layer argument, corporal punishment in Islamic law still does not fulfil the threshold of severity required in torture. This is not consistent with the rules of IHL, but it does not yet amount to serious violations (with qisas as a possible exception, depending on the case).

The evidences show that the acts of ISIS, even in cases of prescribed punishments, may have been exceeding the severity threshold by electrocuting and causing injuries of various degrees. Therefore, ISIS has violated IHL.

As for the case of crucifixion, whichever interpretation of Islamic law used may be a war crime. While crucifixion is not torture as they are legal sanctions in Islamic law, they may possibly fall under war crimes of “Committing outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment”.[195] This crime causes real and lasting suffering from humiliation or ridicule.[196] Even the interpretation used by ISIS (which seems to be the strongest opinion) could classify in this war crime, the ICCSt notes that the ‘victims’ of this crime could include dead bodies.[197]

Arguments can be made that, while the desecration of dead bodies is a violation of IHL,[198] the preparatory committee (PC) of the ICCSt based this on just one post-World War II case law.[199] Therefore, one may wonder whether this really represents customary international law which would require uniformity of state practice and opinion juris.[200] Lack of state practice would cast serious doubt as to whether such a norm is indeed a customary rule, except in case of overwhelming opinion juris.[201] Although, on the other hand, the PC in the same note acknowledged that the victim need not to be aware of the humiliation (referring to mentally handicapped or unconscious persons).[202]

The other interpretations of crucifixion could classify as inhumane treatment i.e. ‘…serious mental or physical suffering or injury or constitutes a serious attack on human dignity…[203] depending on its severity. Executing on the wooden prop (depending on the treatment of the victim while on the prop) could inflict less suffering than the other alternative i.e. starving the person to death. This is for judges to determine on a case per case basis.[204]

C.    Detainment Living Conditions

  1. Detainment Living Conditions by ISIS

Official reports by AI and HRC,[205] in describing ill-treatment towards captives, focus almost entirely on particular acts of torture and physical/mental abuse by the ISIS guards and officials. There is minimum description of the detainment facilities without mentioning whether they are good or poor, except one case in the AI report of a person detained in a bathroom and prolonged solitary confinement.[206] There is no mention of food arrangements, overcrowding, filth, or others, but the AI report does mention some buildings used for detention including: the governor building basement, a ‘U shaped building’, some buildings used by the previous government, and a hospital.[207] This is while other AI and HRC reports usually mention these issues very thoroughly if violations are found.[208]

Individual media reports hint a few instances: a person chained to a wall for five days without food and water,[209] a cell deprived of sunlight,[210] persons blindfolded for days, cells containing twenty to thirty five detainees (but did not compare to size of cells or mention overcrowding), and obstructing prayer of Muslim captives.[211] The author did not find any further information.

  1. Detainment Living Conditions in Islamic Law

It is clear from the sunna that it is wajib to treat the war captives well and respectfully during captivity, as it was a clear cut order by The Prophet in a number of hadiths after battles and also as one of his dying messages.[212] Captives should not suffer the heat of the sun in the hot desert, and were detained in the houses of the Muslims or sometimes in masjids (places of worship).[213] Food, clothing, and healthcare of the captives were responsibility of the Muslims, and humiliation of captives is prohibited.[214] This treatment is despite the previous extreme persecution towards the Muslims.[215]

Further, there are intriguing mandub provisions supplementing the wajib rules particularly regarding providing food for the captives. Evidences of mandub provisions are rules from the sources of Islamic law mentioning how praiseworthy certain deeds are or mentioning acts done or approved by The Prophet, but those deeds are not prescribed or commanded or cursed upon violations.[216] The evidences will show that when it comes to providing food, Islamic law adds a different degree of generosity: to provide the captives better than what the captors enjoy themselves.

While wajib rule is to treat the captives well and respectfully, the mandub rule brings it further. The Qur’an says:

A Fountain where the Devotees of Allah do drink, making it flow in unstinted abundance[217] …. And they feed, for the love of Allah, the indigent, the orphan, and the captive,”[218]

The general context of the verses deeply elaborates how heavily rewarded these acts are.[219] The hadith shows that this verse of the Qur’an was revealed in connection an act of providing the poor, orphans, and captives, equal amounts of food, and the Prophet mentioning how praiseworthy such act was.[220] There is an abundance of Qur’an verses and hadith mentioning the virtues of caring for the poor and orphans and cursing those who do otherwise.[221] The Qur’an in 76: 8 puts ‘captives’ together in the same criteria as the ‘poor and orphans’. The way to understand this is clearer when put to practice by the companions of The Prophet. When instructed to treat the captives well, the companions of The Prophet gave preference to the captives over themselves when serving food.[222] The captives were surprised with the serving of with luxurious meals of the time which even the captors themselves did not enjoy (e.g. milk and bread, while the captors only had dates).[223]

It should be noted that although mandub provisions are not compulsory (as laws usually are understood to be),[224] they are important as righteous Muslims would strive and compete to achieve these extra rewards.[225]

These provisions can also be concluded to include prohibition against torture and cruel treatment, which is certainly not a well and respectful treatment as required. The previous subsection has explored ISIS’s violation of Islamic law in that respect. However, in condition of living during detainment, there are minimum reports of violations of Islamic law. This may indicate that the violations might not necessarily represent the general policy of ISIS. As for the mandub provisions, there are no indications of ISIS following them.

There are general rules requiring respects to religion, although nothing specific on captives. Imposing faith[226] and insults[227] are prohibited. The practice of the companions also show respect to other faiths in conquered areas.[228] It is very ironic that there are reports of ISIS obstructing the act of worship of fellow Muslims and therefore violating this rule.[229]

  1. Detainment Living Conditions in International Law

As a general rule, Article 13-14 of GC III demands humane treatment and respect. Further, acts of torture and other cruel treatments are both violations of this provision.[230] There is no disagreement between IHL and Islamic law here, and the previous subsection has explored ISIS violations.

When elaborated further, the rules in GC III regarding quarters, food, and clothing seem to be much more elaborate in text rather than that of Islamic law, but as a general principle there seems no disagreement either. IHL requires the conditions of quarters for captives to be as favourable as those of the captors.[231] While early Islamic tradition did not have prisons, there is nothing against designating special buildings as long as they follow the general guideline of well and respectful treatment. There are only a few indications of ISIS violations in providing proper quarters for captives, but there is no information how it compares to the quarters of ISIS fighters except some hints from social media posts from a jihadist in Syria mentioning that mujahideen (fighters) sleep in apartments, abandoned homes, and in the streets (without mentioning which group of jihadists this refers to).[232]

IHL also requires proper food and clothes for the captives.[233] This is consistent with the previously mentioned wajib rule in Islamic law and definitely does not prohibit the mandub provision relating to food. There is little information indicating violations in ISIS practices in providing food or clothing, as it was in the case of quarters. Health and hygiene within detainment facilities must also be guaranteed.[234] Islamic law, although does not provide rules as elaborate as IHL, also demands the same. In providing health, there is a report of captives treated for their injuries inflicted while captured[235] but nothing more. As for the matter of hygiene, there is no information except the report of a captive held in a bathroom. It has been shown as well how, as a general rule, Islamic law is consonant with IHL in requiring the respect of religion.[236] Therefore, ISIS violation towards Islamic law in this matter is a violation towards IHL as well.

One other requirement in IHL is that captives may not be detained in areas where they may be exposed to the fire of combat zones, or otherwise used as human shields.[237] The primary sources of Islamic law do not mention anything about this matter, most possibly because in the time of The Prophet captives are release very soon after cessation of hostilities (which will be explained later) thus was never faced enemy counter-attack with prisoners at hand. However there is a general policy of protecting captives from harm, so it can be inferred that the rules are consistent with IHL. The AI report does seem to show that some known ISIS detainments are in areas under ISIS controlled (i.e. not contested).[238] Another report mentions ISIS detainment facilities in areas which were eventually overrun by other fighters,[239] but this report did not mention whether or not an attack of such gravity to the area was expected.

D.    Termination of Captivity

  1. Termination of Captivity by ISIS

There are some known instances of release of war captives by ISIS or other reports indicating their general policy in the matter. The first is when ISIS captures civilians with allegations of treachery with enemy forces, but later finds that the civilian is innocent.[240] The release, mentioned by ISIS as ‘exile’, was conducted by transporting the person to a safe area in Turkey and given back what is left from his possessions and also given some money.

The second practice is shown by a report of ISIS demanding ransom from the country of origin of the captive in question. One report shows demand of $100.000 ransom for Armenian captives, or else the captives in question would be executed,[241] while another report shows a general practice of demanding ransom for captives.[242] The latter report mentions journalists being captured and demanded ransom, not enemy soldiers. To discuss the legality of capturing non-combatants for ransom is to discuss the general rules on treatment towards non-combatants during war in Islamic law, which is beyond the scope of this article. The author submits this report as an indicator of ISIS general policy of demanding ransom.

The third practice is not an example from the Syrian conflict but in the Iraq war between ISIS and the Iraq government of Maliki, which the author submits only as example of ISIS general policy. This practice is a report of ISIS accepting the ‘repentance’ of captured Sunni Muslim soldiers in the ranks of the captured Iraq army, who then joined ISIS.[243] There has been a similar case in Syria cited before, but those repented were not yet under captivity.

Other than those already mentioned, captivity under ISIS rule seems to terminate either when captives managed to escape or be set free due to ISIS forces being driven out of the area,[244] or where the captives themselves were terminated (i.e. executed).

  1. Termination of Captivity in Islamic Law

It is the opinion of Ibn Nuhaas that the leader of the Muslims can choose four ways to end captivity: execution, slavery, and release with or without ransom. However the Qur’an in 47: 4 seems to only accommodate the last two options, and it has been discussed how execution is not a valid discretion of the Muslim leader.

The option of slavery is a topic that deserves a research of its own, but in summary from primary sources of Islamic law: slavery rules are unlike other known concepts of slavery (e.g. prohibition in slave abuse and overburdening, masters must assist slaves in heavy works, slaves can be appointed as leaders, etc), high rewards in releasing slaves or sometimes compulsory (e.g. in case of abuse), and the purpose is not to institute slavery but to gradually abolish pre-existing structures which has been achieved,.[245] It may seem that ISIS follows this and does not take slaves.

The remaining two options i.e. release either with or without ransom, before discussed further, requires the cessation of hostilities. This requirement need not to be the actual end of war in general, but the cessation of specific battles as the sunna shows e.g. the Battle of Badr, Battle of the Trenches, etc, while the Muslims were in constant state of war (starting with the Battle of Badr until the Conquest of Makkah).[246] In the practices of captive release by ISIS in the first instance (set free upon trial), it is not clear as to whether it happened after the cessation of hostility at least in that particular area. This is because there are numerous areas in Syria where hostilities occur and some areas which may be relatively safe.[247]. However, the released captive in the report did not mention hearing gunshots.

The second instance (in process of negotiating ransom) did not show whether the ransom negotiations were concluded, but did seem that they occurred while the area was in hostility. The report of the general policy of ransom demanding does not show any instances of release circumstances thus cannot be assessed. The third instance (mass repentance in Iraq) was indeed after the cessation of hostility and after the enemy has been subdued.

After the cessation of hostilities, as mentioned, the captives can be released either with or without ransom. From the sunna, especially after the Battle of Badr, there has been four different practices. The primary practice was ransom by money, then there was ransom by providing basic education to some Muslims who were illiterate (based on necessity at the time, therefore is arguably flexible depending on the situation), exchange of captives, and setting free without ransom for those who cannot afford to pay ransom (presumably illiterate as well).[248]

The record shows that after every other battles fought by the Muslims, there was no case of ransoming i.e. release of captives were all without ransom. On this basis, some scholars such as Abu ‘Ubayd argued that more recent practices should abrogate earlier ones.[249] However, this is a mere practice of the Prophet which does not contain any prohibition to take ransom,[250] and not to mention that the option of ransom is in the Qur’an. Without any prohibitive language one cannot therefore declare taking ransom as haram,[251] so Abu ‘Ubayd’s argument only reveals which act is mandub (i.e. releasing without ransom).

While ISIS acts may not be what is preferable, but demanding ransom for release of captives are not unlawful under Islamic law.

  1. Termination of Captivity in International Law

Provisions relating to termination of captivity are stipulated in GC III, particularly in Article 118(1): Prisoners of war shall be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of active hostilities. The next paragraph of the same article mentions that release of captives must be done despite absence of peace treaties or perhaps even ceasefire agreements, so long as the cessation of hostilities have occurred.

What ‘cessation of active hostilities’ means is not clear and the commentaries are silent. To this issue, Lauterpacht argued that what is meant by ‘cessation’ cannot be merely suspension but must be termination of hostilities.[252] There is some logic behind this since the suspension of hostilities would imply a prospect of resumption of hostilities. While one of the important purposes of keeping enemy soldiers in captivity is to reduce the general fighting capacity of the opponent by isolating some of their forces,[253] releasing prisoners after every suspension of hostilities would defeat the purpose of capturing them in the first place. Others argue that the termination of hostilities (e.g. peace treaties) does not guarantee that either party will not re-attack,[254] just like how the Revolutionary United Front attacked the government of Sierra Leone again not so long after the Lome Accord peace agreement was signed.[255] However, one can also argue that as far as sensible expectation goes, resumption of hostilities is more reasonably implied in ‘suspension’ rather than ‘termination’ of hostilities.

Despite the debate, neither side would rule out the legality of releasing captives during suspension of hostilities. One may argue that hastening the release of captives is indeed in the spirit of the GC II provisions,[256] and reinforcing the enemy may be just a loss of the detaining power. Therefore, Islamic law is generally consistent with IHL by requiring release after suspension of hostilities, although this runs the risks of resumption of hostilities before the release takes place. For Muslims, the loss of reinforcing the enemy is compensated by a greater goal. Muslims believe showing kindness during captivity brings rewards from Allah, and further there is virtue in da’wa (calling others to Islam)[257] which can be in form of examples (e.g. kindness and justice during captivity).[258] Because of this, at the time of The Prophet, a number of people embraced Islam.[259]

One potential conflict between IHL and Islamic law would be ransom demands. While nothing in IHL prohibits ransom, it may delay the release of captives since the Sunna does not prohibit ransom despite not preferring it. This is especially true if hostilities have terminated. Ransom demands for captives may be very close to the war crime of taking hostages[260] which requires persons being detained and that there are conditions to their release.[261] However, this crime requires that the hostages are civilians or those unlawfully detained[262] while this article limits itself to war captives.

Following Lauterpacht’s argument, ISIS does not yet have the obligation to release their captives. Time will tell whether they will act consistently with IHL upon the termination of hostilities, or whether they will still exist at that point.

 

IV.             CONCLUSION

From the analysis it has been shown how there is a general compatibility between IHL and Islamic law in the treatment of war captives. Examples of these would be the prohibition to execute captives except for special crimes, the general prohibition of torture, proper detainment living conditions, and release upon cessation of hostilities. Towards these laws, there have been numerous indications of violations by ISIS. Some of them are due to ISIS interpretation of Islamic law, such as the case of execution under Ibn Nuhaas’s opinion which is a weaker opinion and does not represent the majority position of Islamic law. Numerous violations, however, are blatant disregard towards either law such as: the general prohibition against torture and cruel treatment, and failing to provide some elements of fair trial.

There are only a few points where Islamic law and IHL are not compatible. One case is the crucifixion punishment where some interpretations are a violation of IHL but only a war crime under the ICCSt (not necessarily so in customary international law), which is one that ISIS follows, and the other interpretations would more likely fall under cruel treatment. Another case is corporal punishment which is also prohibited in IHL, but mostly not yet a war crime. Some are only incompatible if Islamic law only relies on the primary sources, but can very well adapt through ijtihad to be compatible such as requiring defence counsels during trial and appeals. In these cases, ISIS’s practice may very well be consistent with Islamic law but violating IHL.

However, ISIS does not violate everything. Some cases of execution are done for specific crimes which seem to be consistent with Islamic law and IHL, there are evidences of applying equality before the law in trials, and indications of poor living conditions in detainment facilities might not represent the general policy of ISIS. Further, it has been mentioned that there were some reports and claims that ISIS members were punished for violations which include trials for unlawful murder.

ISIS claims to denounce any law other than Islamic law. However, they should live up to their claim in sticking to Islamic law and follow stronger and majority positions when finding differences of opinion. If ISIS could do this, then it would at least minimize so much harm even from an IHL perspective. Although, seeing the roots of where they came from (Al-Qaeda) and the ease in which they denounce groups of different methodologies (e.g. the Ikhwaanul Muslimeen), one would reasonably be pessimistic of such prospect.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

* This was submitted as a masters dissertation at the LLM in International Law program of the University of Edinburgh titled “A Comparison Between Islamic Laws of War and International Humanitarian Law with Reference to the Present Armed Conflict in Syria”. The author wishes to thank Dr Stephen Neff who supervised this dissertation, as well as Dr Tazul Islam and Rami Al-Ashqar for their assistance in providing resources.

[1] BBC. 2014. Syria: Story of the Conflict (found at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-26116868 accessed 5 May 2014 at 8.25pm)

[2] BBC. 2013. The Syrian Rebel Groups Pulling in Foreign Fighters (found at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-25460397 accessed 6 May 2014 at 10.59am)

[3] Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Appeals Chamber, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Decision of 2 October 1995, para. 70

[4] ICRC Official Website. Treaties and State Parties to Such Treaties – Syrian Arab Republic (found at http://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/vwTreatiesByCountrySelected.xsp?xp_countrySelected=SY accessed 5 May 2014 at 4.42pm)

[5] Marco Sassoli et al. 2006. How Does Law Protect in War: Volume I (Outline of International Humanitarian Law) Third Edition. Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, Chapter 4: p.5

[6] See Article 1(1) of AP II

[7] Koert DeBeuf. 2013. What Does the Free Syrian Army Want? (found at http://fikraforum.org/?p=3161 accessed 6 May 2014 at 12.38pm), see also: Syrian Opposition. 2014. Draft Statement of Basic Principles: Agreement for a Political Settlement from the Second Geneva Peace Conference (found at http://www.al-bab.com/arab/docs/syria/opposition-principles-for-settlement-in-syria.htm#sthash.rUcQPuIC.dpbs accessed 6 May 2014 at 12.42pm)

[8] Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi. ‘The Islamic State of Iraq and Al-Sham’. Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol 17, No. 3 (2013), pp. 19-44, at pp.19-20

[9] Memlik Pasha. 2014. ISIS Insurgents have Almost Surrounded Baghdad (found at http://www.aymennjawad.org/14711/isis-insurgents-have-almost-surrounded-baghdad accesser 6 May 2014 at 1.07pm), see also International Business Times. 2014. Iraq Crisis: Who’s in Control of What? Map Shows Cities under ISIS, Government, or Kurdish Forces (found at http://www.ibtimes.com/iraq-crisis-whos-control-what-map-shows-cities-under-isis-government-or-kurdish-forces-1607100 accessed 20 June 2014 at 11.32pm)

[10] BBC. 2014. Syria: Mapping the Conflict (found at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-22798391 accessed 6 May 2014 at 1.24pm), see also Douglas A. Ollivant and Brian Fishman. 2014. The State of Jihad: The Reality of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (found at http://warontherocks.com/2014/05/state-of-jihad-the-reality-of-the-islamic-state-in-iraq-and-syria/ accessed 23 May 2014 at 9.05pm)

[11] Official speech by Al-Adnani (ISIS Official Spokesperson) titled “Apologies Amir al-Qaeda”. Audio, transcript, and translation can be found at Pieter van Ostaeyen. 2014. New Audio Message by ISIS Abu Muhammad al-‘Adnani as-Shami – Apologies Amir al-Qaeda (found at http://pietervanostaeyen.wordpress.com/2014/05/12/new-audio-message-by-isis-shaykh-abu-muhammad-al-adnani-as-shami-apologies-amir-al-qaida/ accessed 21 June 2014 at 9.25pm)

[12] Wael B. Hallaq. 2009. An Introduction to Islamic Law. New York: Cambridge University Press, p.1

[13] Halim Rane and Jacqui Ewart. ‘The Framing of Islam and Muslims in the Tenth Anniversary Coverage of 9/11: Implications for Reconciliation and Moving On’. Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, Vol. 32, No. 3 (2012), pp. 310-322, at pp.312-313

[14] Huffington Post. 2011. Conversion to Islam One Result of Post-9/11 Curiosity (found at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/08/24/post-911-islam-converts_n_935572.html accessed 5 May 2014 at 6.57pm)

[15] E.g. Muhammad Afifi Al-Akiti. 2005. Defending the Transgressed by Censuring the Reckless Against the Killing of Civilians, (found at http://www.warda.info/fatwa.pdf accessed 6 May 2014 at 1.45pm), pp.33-48

[16] Canner Dagli. ‘Jihad and the Islamic Law of War’. In Ghazi bin Muhammad et al (Editors). War and Peace in Islam: The Uses and Abuses of Jihad. Cambridge: The Royal Islamic Strategic Studies Centre and the Islamic Texts Society, p.48

[17] Ibid, p.76

[18] Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice 1946 (ICJ Statute)

[19] Sassoli, Note 5, Chapter 4: pp. 3-14

[20] Ibid, Chapter 14: pp.1-20

[21] James Cockayne. ‘Islam and International Law: from a Clash to a Conversation between Civilizations’. International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 84, No. 847 (2002), pp. 597-626, at p.623

[22] Articles 49, 50, 129 and 146 respectively of the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (GC I), the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (GC II), the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (GC III), the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (GC IV) respectively

[23] Cockayne, Note 21, p.624

[24] Mawil Izzi Dien. 2004. Islamic Law: From Historical Foundations to Contemporary Practice. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, p.35

[25] Ibid, p.36

[26] hereinafter The Prophet

[27] Ahmad Von Denffer. 2014. Ulum al Quran: An Introduction to the Sciences of the Quran. Leicestershire: The Islamic Foundation, pp.6-7

[28] Ibid, pp.10-38

[29] Denffer, Note 27, pp.97-102

[30] Ibid, pp.103-104

[31] Dien, Note 24, p.38-39, and ibid, pp.7-8

[32] ___. 1430 H. Al Qur’aanul Kareem. Madinah: Majma Al Malik Fahd for Holy Qur’an Printing, (hereinafter The Holy Quran), 4:59 and 80, 5:44, 6:62, etc

[33] Hallaq, Note 12, p.19

[34] See: The Holy Qur’an, note 9

[35] Hallaq, Note 12, p. 40

[36] E.g. the Fatwa of the National Shari’a Council, Majelis Ulama Indonesia No. 02/DSN-MUI/IV/2000

[37] Dien, Note 24, p. 46-47

[38] Hallaq, Note 12, p. 22

[39] Hallaq                , Note 10, p.22-23

[40] Dien, Note 24, p.57

[41] Hallaq, Note 12, p.25

[42] Dien, Note 24, p. 62-63

[43] Ibid, p.60-61

[44] Ibid, pp.96-99

[45] Hallaq, Note 12, p.31

[46] The Holy Quran 5: 44, 45, and 47

[47] Ismail ibn Kathir. 2000. Tafseer of Ibn Kathir Vol. 3 (Edited, Translated, and Abridged by Safiur-Rahman Al-Mubarakpuri). Riyadh: Darussalaam, pp. 187-189

[48] The Holy Qur’an, 5: 1, 9:4, 16: 91, and hadith found in Abu Zakariya Yahya bin Sharaf Al-Nawawi (Compiler). 1999. Riyaadus Shaliheen: Vol II (English translation by Muhammad Amin and Abu Usamah). Riyadh: Darussalaam, hadith No. 1585

[49] Ibid, Al-Nawawi, Hadith No. 1584, and The Holy Qur’an, 63:1-3

[50] Article 1(1) AP II, see also Sassoli, Note 15, p.3

[51] Amnesty International (AI). 2013. Rule Of Fear: ISIS Abuses In Detention In Northern Syria (found at http://www.amnesty.org.uk/sites/default/files/updated_rule_of_fear_isis_abuses_in_detention_in_northern_syria.pdf accessed 22 May 2014 at 7.44pm), p.15

[52] Human Rights Council. Oral Update of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, 18 March 2014 (found at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/CoISyria/OralUpdate18March2014.pdf accessed 22 May 2014 at 8.07pm), pp.2-3

[53] AI, Note 51, p.14

[54] Al-Tamimi, Note 8

[55] The Syrian Observer. 2014. ISIS Kills Nusra Front Emir in Raqqa (found at http://www.syrianobserver.com/News/News/ISIS+Kills+Nusra+Front+Emir+in+Raqqa accessed 22 May 2014 at 8.28pm)

[56] ISIS Official Statement of 7 March 2104. Arabic audio and English transcript can be found at Pieter Van Ostaeyen. Abu Muhammad Al-Adnani About the Allegations Made Against ISIS, 8 March 2014 (found at http://pietervanostaeyen.wordpress.com/2014/03/08/abu-muhammad-al-adnani-about-the-allegations-made-against-isis-by-jabhat-an-nusra-leader-abu-abdullah-al-shami/comment-page-1/ accessed 23 May 2014 at 2.22pm)

[57] Al Jazeera. 2014. ISIL Says it Faces War with Nusra in Syria (found at accessed http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/03/isil-says-it-faces-war-with-nusra-syria-20143719484991740.html, 22 May 2014 at 8.33pm)

[58] Al-Tamimi, Note 8

[59] Amnesty, Note 51, p.13

[60] Ibid, p.8

[61] HRC, Note 52, p.3

[62] McClatchy DC. 2014. Al-Qaida’s ISIS Takes 2 Syrian Cities, Executes Scores of Rivals (found at http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2014/01/13/214335/al-qaidas-isis-takes-2-syrian.html accessed 23 May 2014 at 2.11am)

[63] Ibn Nuhaas. ___. The Book of Jihad: Mashari Al-Ashwaq Ila Masari Al-Ushaaq Wa Mutheer Al-Gharaam Ila Daar Assalaam (English Translation by Noor Yamani), (found at http://api.ning.com/files/qnlif5STwXWJllDpiD8eR4ZJaME0iAeChqROisCh9REBFkr*W8yLdvIgQU-DjaJtNHTh1BG5Tmz20bVZDZmrci6TNPb5lEYS/MashariAlAshwaqilaMasarialUshaaqRevisedEdition.pdf accessed 6 May 2014 at 7.36pm), pp.161-162

[64] Chettan Bhatt. ‘The Virtues of Violence: The Salafi-Jihadi Political Universe’. Theory Culture Society, Vol.31, No. 1 (2014), pp.25-48, at p.28

[65] Khaled Abou El-Fadl. Between Functionalism and Morality: The Juristic Debates on the Conduct of War. In Jonathan E. Brockopp. 2003. Islamic Ethics of Life: Abortion, War, and Euthanasia. South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press, p.115-116

[66] The Holy Qur’an, 47:4

[67] El-Fadl, Note 65

[68] Abul A’la Mawdudi. 1980. Human Rights in Islam. Leicester: The Islamic Foundation, p.36

[69] Muhammad bin Ismail bin Al-Mughirah Al-Bukhari (Compiler). 1979. Sahih Al-Bukhari Vol. 9 (English Translation by Muhammad Muhsin Khan). Lahore: Kazi Publications, Hadith No. 299

[70] Yusuf Qardhawi. 2010. Fiqih Jihad. Bandung: Mizan, pp.708-710

[71] The Holy Qur’an, Qur’an e.g. in 4:92-93, 5:32, , see also: M. Cherif Bassiouni. 2014. The Shari’a and Islamic Criminal Justice in Time of War and Peace. New York: Cambridge University Press, p.175

[72] Al-Nawawi Riyadhus Vol II, Note 48, Hadith No. 1356

[73] M. Adil Salahi. 1995. Muhammad: Man and Prophet. Dorset: Elements Books, pp.256-257

[74] Ibid, p.433-434, see also: The Holy Qur’an 5: 32-34 and Kathir Tafseer Vol. 3, Note 47, pp.161-163

[75] Al-Bukhari Vol. 9, Note 69, Hadith No. 17

[76] Taqi ad-Din Aḥmad ibn Taymiyyah. 2007. As Sarim Al Masul: Vol. 3 (Revised Edition). Ad-Dammam: Dar Al Ma’ali, pp 696 and 735, and Mohammad Hashim Kamali. 1998. Freedom of Expression in Islam. Kuala Lumpur: Ilmiah Publishers, p.96

[77] The Holy Qur’an 2: 256

[78] Abu’l Husain Asakir-ud-Din Muslim (Compiler). 1972. Sahih Muslim Vol. 3 (English Translation by Abdul Hamid Siddiqi). Lahore: Ashraf Press, Hadith No. 4593 and see overall context from Note 75, Abu Dawud Sulayman ibn Al-Ashʿath Al-Azdi Al-Sijistani (Compiler). 2008. Sunan Abu Dawud Vol. 3 (Translated to English by Ahmad Hasan). Riyadh: Darussalam, Hadith No. 4351- 4353 (Additional note: Al-Sijistani is known more by his first name Abu Dawud rather than his last name as other scholars usually are), and The Holy Qur’an 5:33

[79] Abdullah Yusuf Ali. 1999. The Holy Qur’an: Translation and Commentary. Birmingham: IPCI: Islamic Vision, fn.3701-3704

[80] Muslim, Note 78, Hadith No. 4368-4371

[81] Ismail ibn Kathir. 2005. The Life of the Prophet by Ibn Kathir Vol. 3 (English translation by Trevor le Gassick and Muneer Fareed). Reading: Garnet Publishing, 147-148, 152, and 155

[82] Ibid, p.160

[83] Ibid, p. 164

[84] Kathir Tafseer Vol. 3, Note 47, pp.184-189

[85] Salahi, Note 73, pp.222-223

[86] ___. 1962. The Torah: the Five Books of Moses. Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America (The Torah), Deuteronomy 20: 13-14

[87] Kathir The Life Vol. 3, Note 81, p.170

[88] Bhatt, Note 64, p.43

[89] Aymen Jawad Al-Tamimi and Jonathan Spyer. 2014. ISIS’ Use of Hudud Punishments (found at http://www.aymennjawad.org/14852/isis-use-of-hudud-punishments accessed 20 June 2014 at 11.24pm)

[90] Van Ostaeyen, Note 11

[91] Al-Akhbar English. 2014. Information Indicates Father Paolo Dall’Oglio is Alive and in ISIS Captivity (found at http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/20110 accessed 27 June 2014 at 00.48am)

[92] Salafi movement: Muhammad Nasir ud-Deen al-Bani. Warning Against the Fitnah of Takfeer (found at http://abdurrahman.org/faith/warningTakfirAlbani.html accessed 21 June 2014 at 00.05am) and Sufi movement: Muhammad Tahir-ul-Qadri. Fatwa on Terrorism and Suicide Bombing (found at http://www.quranandwar.com/FATWA%20on%20Terrorism%20and%20Suicide%20Bombings.pdf 21 June 2014 at 00.09am), see also generally: Bhatt, Note 64

[93] Abu Baseer Al-Tartousi. 2014. A Declaration Regarding the Fighting Between the ISIS and the Mujahideen of Al-Sham (found at http://www.abubaseer.bizland.com/hadath/Read/hadath%20101.pdf accessed 21 June 2014 at 9.52pm)

[94] Transcript and translation can be found at Pieter van Ostaeyen. 2014. Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi: The Case of ISIS and the Position of Duty Toward It (found at http://pietervanostaeyen.wordpress.com/2014/05/27/abu-muhammad-al-maqdisi-the-case-of-isis-and-the-position-of-the-duty-toward-it/ accessed 21 June 2014 at 10.06pm)

[95] Salahi, Note 73

[96] Muslim Vol. 3, Note 78, Hadith No. 4196, 4205-4206, and 4368-4371

[97] See Kathir Tafseer Vol. 3, Note 47, pp.222-223, and Abu Dawud, Note 78, Hadith No.3586 and 3575

[98] The Holy Qur’an 4:7, 5:95, 6:19, 8.38, 9:115, 17:15, 16:119, 28:59, 33:5, see also Gamil Muhammed Hussein. ‘Basic Guarantees in the Islamic Criminal Justice System’. In Muhammad Abdel Haleem et al (Editors). Criminal Justice in Islam: Judicial Procedure in Shari’a. London: IB Tauris, p.36-37

[99] Abu’l Husain Asakir-ud-Din Muslim (Compiler). 1972. Sahih Muslim Vol. 1 (English Translation by Abdul Hamid Siddiqi). Lahore: Ashraf Press, Hadith No. 217-218, and 559

[100] Abu Zakaria Yahya Ibn Sharaf al-Nawawi (Compiler). 1977. An-Nawawi’s Forty Hadith (Second Edition English Translation by Ezzedin Ibrahim). Damascus: Holy Koran Pub. House. Hadith No. 33

[101] The Holy Qur’an 4:1 and 49:13, Muhammad bin Ismail bin Al-Mughirah Al-Bukhari (Compiler). 1979. Sahih Al-Bukhari Vol. 8 (English Translation by Muhammad Muhsin Khan). Lahore: Kazi Publications, Hadith No. 778-779,

[102] Abu Dawud Vol. 3, Note 78,  Hadith No.3575-3577

[103] Taha J. Al-Alwani and Yusuf Talal DeLorenzo. ‘The Rights of the Accused in Islam (Part Two)’. Arab Law Quarterly, Vol. 10, No. 3 (1995), pp. 238-249, at pp.239-240

[104] Article 4 of the Law of Criminal Procedure, Royal Decree No. M/39 (28 Rajab 1422 H.) or KSA LCP

[105] Salahi, Note 73, pp. 432, Farhad Malekian. Principles of Islamic Criminal Law: A Comparative Search (Second Edition). Brill: Leiden, p.362

[106] Martin Shapiro. ‘Islam and Appeal’. California Law Review, Vol. 68, No. 2 (1980), pp.350-381, p.364

[107] E.g. Article 9 of the KSA LCP, and Article 60B(1) of the Indonesian Law No. 50 of 2009 on Religious Court Amendment

[108] Shapiro, Note 106, p.381 , and Bassiouni The Shari’a, Note 71, p.124

[109] For a more elaborate explanation on the rights of the accused in Islamic Law, see: Al-Awlani and DeLorenzo Part Two, Note 103, generally, and Taha J. Al-Alwani and Yusuf Talal DeLorenzo. The Rights of the Accused in Islam (Part One)’. Arab Law Quarterly, Vol. 10, No. 1 (1995), pp. 3-16, generally

[110] Al Arabiya News. 2014. ISIS Fires Aleppo Emir for Threatening Man (found at http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/2014/06/19/ISIS-fires-Aleppo-emir-for-threatening-old-man-in-video.html accessed 24 June 2014 at 8.38pm) and AI, Note 51, p.10,

[111] Official speech by Al-Adnani titled “Then let us invoke the curse of Allah upon the liars” translation can be found at Abu Ziyaad. 2014. Shaykh Adnani’s Speech (found at http://abuziyaad.wordpress.com/2014/03/08/shaykh-adnanis-speech-isiss-spokesman/ accessed 28 June 2014 at 9.36)

[112] The Holy Qur’an 5:34, Muslim Vol. 3, Note 78, Hadith No. 4205, Ahmad bin Sh’aib bin Ali An-Nasa’i (Compiler). Sunan An-Nasa’i Vol. 5 (English Translation by Nasiruddin al-Khattab). Riyadh: Darussalam, Hadith No. 4072-4074, see also Kathir Tafseer Vol. 3, Note 47, pp. 166-167

[113] The Holy Qur’an 11:3, 24:31, 66:8, 110: 3, etc

[114] Zakariya Yahya bin Sharaf Al-Nawawi (Compiler). 1999. Riyaadus Shaliheen: Vol I (English translation by Muhammad Amin and Abu Usamah). Riyadh: Darussalaam, hadith No. 13-24

[115] See: Kathir Tafseer Vol. 3, Note 47, pp. 161-163

[116] The Holy Qur’an 5:34

[117] Ibn Rushd.  2000. The Distingished Jurist’s Primer  Vol II (English Translation by Imran Ahsan Khan Nyazee). Reading: Garnet Publishing, p.550

[118] Muhammad Shafi. 2006. Ma’ariful Qur’an Vol. 8 (English Translation by Muhammad Hasan Askari and Muhammad Shamim, Revision by Muhammad Taqi Usmani). Karachi: Maktaba e Darul Uloom, p. 526

[119] Al-Akhbar English. 2014. The War in Syria: ISIS’s Most Successful Investment Yet (found at http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/20133 accessed 23 June 2014 at 1.28am), Al-Monitor. 2014. Dar ez-Zour Becomes Jihadist Battlefield (found at http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/security/2014/06/syria-deir-ez-zor-intra-jihadist-battles-isis-nusra.html# accessed 26 June 2014 at 2.16pm), see also twitter post by ISIS fighter on the field Abu Bakr Al Janabi. 2014. #PT: #ISIS entered Al-Bukamal without a fight, and pardoned all commanders who fought ISIS (https://twitter.com/AbuBakrAl_Janab/status/481762505900163072 , accessed 26 June 2014 at 7.17pm)

[120] Muslim Vol. 3, Note 78, Hadith No. 4196, 4205-4206, Abu Isa Muhammad ibn Isa as-Sulami ad-Darir al-Bughi at-Tirmidhi  (Compiler). Jami’ As-Sahih Vol. 3 (English Translation by Abu Khallyl). Riyadh: Darussalam, Hadith No. 1424, and Abu Dawud Vol. 3, Note 78, Hadith No. 4363-4364, and 4453

[121] An-Nasa’i Vol. 5, Note 112, Hadith No. 4785, 4788, and 4882-4886

[122] Articles 3(1)(a) and 3(1)(d)

[123] Articles 6(2) to 6(4)

[124] with reference to Article 99 of GC 3

[125] Michael Bothe. Direct Participation in Hostilities in Non-International Armed Conflict, Expert Paper submitted in Second Expert Meeting on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities, 25-26 October 2004 (found at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/2004-05-expert-paper-dph-icrc.pdf accessed 9 May 2014 at 10.13pm), p. 17

[126] Articles 99-101 and 107

[127] Louis Doswald-Beck, and Jean-Marie Haenckarts. 2005. ICRC Customary International Humanitarian Law, Vol I: Rules. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.354-370

[128] Articles 535, 263-266 of the Penal Code No. 148 of 1949 of Syria

[129] The Torah, Deuteronomy 20: 13-14

[130] The Torah, Deuteronomy 20: 15

[131] The Torah, Deuteronomy 20: 16

[132] Bassiouni, The Shari’ah, Note 71, p. 125, see also Al-Awlani and DeLorenzo Part One, Note 81, and Al-Awlani and DeLorenzo Part Two, Note 103

[133] Articles 101 and 107 of GC III: A minimum period of six months and communication exchanges

[134] Taha J. Al-Alwani and Yusuf Talal DeLorenzo Part Two, Note 109, pp.239-240

[135] Shapiro, Note 106, and Bassiouni The Shari’ah, Note 71

[136] AI, Note 51, p. 7-15, HRC, Note 52, p.4, and The Vocative. Claims of Death, Torture, and Abuse inside ISIS Prisons, 24 January 2014 (found at http://www.vocativ.com/underworld/crime/claims-death-torture-abuse-inside-isis-prisons/ accessed 28 May 2014 at 4.09am)

[137] AI, Note 51, p. 11 and 15

[138] Ibid, p.8

[139] Ibid

[140] Vocative, Note 136

[141] HRC, Note 52, p.4

[142] FoxNews. Al-Qaeda-Linked Jihadist Accused of Hanging Victims on Crosses, 29 April 2014 (found at http://www.foxnews.com/world/2014/04/29/al-qaeda-linked-jihadists-accused-hanging-victims-on-crosses/ accessed 28 May 2014 at 4.01am), see also: Al-Tamimi and Spyer, Note 89

[143] Abu’l Husain Asakir-ud-Din Muslim (Compiler). 1972. Sahih Muslim Vol. 4 (English Translation by Abdul Hamid Siddiqi). Lahore: Ashraf Press, Hadith No. 6328

[144] Abu Dawud Vol. 3, Note 78, Hadith No. 5248

[145] Muslim Vol 4, Note 143,  Hadith No. 6327

[146] Bassiouni The Shari’a, Note 71, p.133, see also : The Holy Qur’an. 2:216, 24:2, Muslim Vol. 3, Note 78, Hadith No. 4226-4233

[147] The Holy Qur’an, 5:45

[148] Bassiouni The Shari’a, Note 71, pp. 141-142

[149] Muslim Vol. 3, Note 78, Hadith No. 4234, and Al-Bukhari Vol. 8, Note 101, Hadith No. 831-832

[150] Al-Bukhari Vol. 8, Note 101, Hadith No. 734 and Abu Dawud Vol. 3, Note 78, Hadith No. 4478

[151] Abu Abdullah Malik ibn Anas (Compiler). 1992. Al-Muwatta Malik (English Translation by Aisha Abdurrahman Bewley). Granada: Madinah Press, Hadith Chapter 41 No.12

[152] Afzalur Rahman. 1982. Muhammad: Encyclopaedia of Seerah Vol 2. London: The Muslim Schools Trust, p.794, in reference toThe Holy Qur’an, 24:2

[153] Ibid

[154] Ibid

[155] Youtube.com. 2013. ISIS Whipping a Guy Accused of Adultery… داعش الارهابية تجلد متهم بالزنا., video by SyriaLeaks.org (found at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yjSXBFwHTLA accessed 26 May 2014 at 8.21pm). Additional note: The English part of the title is an incorrect translation of the Arabic part. This video shows flogging for fornication, not adultery.

[156] Abu Dawud Vol. 3, Note 78, Hadith No. 4369

[157] Taha J. Al-Alwani and Yusuf Talal DeLorenzo Part Two, Note 103, p.245

[158] Ibid

[159] Ibid

[160] The Holy Qur’an 5:33

[161] Kathir Tafseer Vol. 3, Note 47, pp.161-163

[162] ___. 2004. New Testament: New English Translation. Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft (The New Testament), John 20: 25-27

[163] Ibn Rushd, Note 117, p.548

[164] Al-Tamimi and Spyer, Note 89

[165] Article 1(1) of the Convention Against Torture (CAT, 1982)

[166] UNTC. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Punishment (https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-9&chapter=4&lang=en accessed 24 May 2014 at 12.44am)

[167] M. Cherif Bassiouni, ‘International Crimes: Jus Cogens and Obligatio Erga Omnes’. Law and Contemporary Problems, Vol. 59, No. 4 (1996), pp.63-74, at p.68

[168] Such as the Pinochet case: R. v Bow Street Stipendiary Magistrate Ex. P. Pinochet Ugarte (No. 3) [2000] 1 A.C. 147

[169] See Bassiouni International, Note 167, at p.67, see also Article 53 of the VCLT

[170] Articles 8(2)(a)(ii) and 8(2)(c)(i) of the Rome Statute (1998)

[171] Article 2(2) of the CAT

[172] Alan M. Dershowitz. 2002. Want to Torture? Get a Warrant (found at http://www.alandershowitz.com/publications/docs/torturewarrants2.html accessed 24 May 2014 at 1.52am)

[173] Danny Friedman. ‘Torture and the Common Law”. European Human Rights Law Review, No.2 (2006), pp.180-199 generally

[174] The Telegraph. 2006. Torture May Be Forgivable, Says Judge (found at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1531914/Torture-may-be-forgivable-says-judge.html accessed 25 May 2014 at 2.29am), see also: Ian Turner. ‘Freedom From Torture in the “War on Terror”: is it Absolute?’. Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 23, No. 3 (2011), pp.419-437, at p.429

[175] Articles 31(1)(c) and 31(1)(d) of the ICCSt

[176] Turner, Note 174, at p.431, and Paola Gaeta. ‘May Necessity Be Available as a Defence for Torture in the Interrogation of Suspected Terrorists?’. Journal of International Criminal Justice, Vol. 2, No. 3 (2004), pp.785-794, at p.791

[177] Application No. 22978/05, Judgment of 1 June 2010, paras 87 and 107

[178] See Note 175

[179] Element 3 of Article 7(1)(f), ICC Elements of Crime

[180] See Article 8(2)(a)(ii)-1 and 8(2)(c)(i)-4 both in the ICCSt and ICC Elements of Crime

[181] Knut Dormann. 2004. Elements of War Crimes under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p.59

[182] Article 21(1)(b) of the ICCSt

[183] Article 85 and 87 of GC III

[184] Article 4(2) of AP II, with emphasis added

[185] See again Article 1(1) of the CAT and Article 130 of GC 3

[186] Dormann, Note 181, p.52

[187] Application No. 25803/94, Judgment of 28 July 1999, para 100

[188] Dormann, Note 181, pp. 53-54

[189] Application No. 21987/93, Judgment of 18 December 1996, para 60

[190] Fahim Anwar et al. ‘Bilateral Brachial Plexus Injury’. Journal of the College of Physicians and Surgeons Pakistan, Vol. 22, No. 3 (2012), pp.176-178, at p.176

[191] Muteba v. Zaire, Communications No. 124/1982 (views adopted on 24 July 1984, 22nd session), para 10.2

[192] Estrella v. Uruguay, Communications No. 74/1980 (views adopted on 29 March 1983, 18th session), para 1.6

[193] Lopez Burgos v. Uruguay, Communications No. R. 12/52 (views adopted on 29 July 1981, 36th session), para 2.3

[194] Report by the Special Rapporteur, Mr. P. Koojimans, appointed pursuant to Commission on Human Rights Res. 1985/33, para 119

[195] Article 8(2)(c)(ii) of the ICCSt

[196] Prosecutor v. Zlatko Aleksovski, Trial Chamber, Judgment, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Judgment of 25 June 1999, para 56

[197] Footnote 57 to the first element of crime to Article 8(2)(c)(ii) of the ICCSt

[198] Article 17 of GC I

[199] Dormann, Note 181, p.314

[200] Malcom Shaw. 2008. International Law (Sixth Edition). New York: Cambridge University Press, p.74,  see also: Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1996, p. 226, para 75

[201]Prosecutor v. Kupreskic et al, Trial Chamber, Judgment, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Judgment of 14 January 2000, para 527, see also: Militarv and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America). Merits, Judgment. I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 14., para 188

[202] Dormann, Note 181, p.315

[203] Prosecutor v. Delalic et al, Trial Chamber, Judgment, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Judgment of 16 November 1998, para 543

[204] Dormann, Note 181,  p.315

[205] See Notes 51 and 52 generally

[206] AI, Note 51, p.7, and 11-13

[207] Ibid, pp.6-7

[208] E.g.: Amnesty International. 2005. Guantanamo and Beyond: The Continuing Pursuit of Unchecked Executive Power (found at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AMR51/063/2005/en/0e3f8b95-d4fe-11dd-8a23-d58a49c0d652/amr510632005en.pdf accessed 26 June 2014 at 1.22am) at Appendix 3, and Human Rights Council. Joint Study on Global Practices in Relation to Secret Detention in the Context of Countering Terrorism of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, 19 February 2010 (http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/13session/A-HRC-13-42.pdf ), at Annex II

[209] Vocative, Note 136

[210] Huffington Post. 2014. Inside an ISIS Prison: A Syrian Doctor Shares His Story and Appeals to the World for Help (found at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/chris-looney/inside-an-isis-prison-a-s_b_4906840.html accessed 26 June 2014 at 2.51pm)

[211] Ibid and Daily Star. 2014. Ex-ISIS Detainees Tell Horror Stories of Captivity (found at http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2014/Jan-09/243522-ex-isis-detainees-tell-horror-stories-of-captivity.ashx accessed 26 June 2014 at 2.46pm)

[212] Ismail ibn Kathir. 2000. Tafseer of Ibn Kathir Vol. 10 (Edited, Translated, and Abridged by Safiur-Rahman Al-Mubarakpuri). Riyadh: Darussalaam, p.289

[213] Yunus Gilani and Tazul Islam. ‘Early Islam and Prisoners of War: A Study in Ethical Inferences’. Hamdard Islamicus, Vol. 32, No. 3 (2009), pp. 7-21, at p. 12-13, see also: Ray Murphy and Mohamed M. El-Zeidy. ‘Prisoner of War: A Comparative Study of the Principles of International Humanitarian Law and the Islamic Law of War’. International Criminal Law Review, Vol. 9 (2009), pp. 623-649, at p.641, and Salahi, Note 73, p.432-433

[214] Gilani and Islam, Ibid

[215] Salahi, Note 73, pp.92-102

[216] Dien, Note 24, p.98-99

[217] The Holy Qur’an, 76:6

[218] The Holy Qur’an 76:8, with emphasis added

[219] The Holy Qur’an, 76: 6-22

[220] Mokrane Guezzou. 2008. Great Commentaries on the Holy Qur’an: Al-Wahidi’s Asbab Al-Nuzul. Louisville: Fons Vitae, p.245

[221] E.g. The Holy Qur’an 2:83, 4:10, 107:1-7, Muhammad bin Ismail bin Al-Mughirah Al-Bukhari (Compiler). 1979. Sahih Al-Bukhari Vol. 7 (English Translation by Muhammad Muhsin Khan). Lahore: Kazi Publications, Hadith No. 224, Abu Zakariya Yahya bin Sharaf Al-Nawawi (Compiler). 1999. Riyaadus Shaliheen: Vol I (English translation by Muhammad Amin and Abu Usamah). Riyadh: Darussalaam, Hadith No. 550

[222] Kathir Tafseer Vol. 10, Note 212

[223] Gilani and Islam, Note 213, p. 13, see also: Salahi, Note 73, p.257

[224] Numerous definitions of law from different scholars and schools of laws: Bryan A. Gardner (ed.). 2009. Blacks Law Dictionary (9th ed.). St. Paul, MN: West, p.962 and 1446, Shaw, Note 200, at p.1; Raymond Wacks. 2006. Philosophy of Law: A Very Short Introduction. New York: Oxford University Press,p.23 and p.28; Mark C. Murphy. Natural Law Theory. In Martin P. Golding and William A. Edmundson (eds). 2005. The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, at p.16, and Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts (Eds). 1992. Oppenheim’s International Law: Introduction and Part I (9th Edition). Essex: Longman, pp.16-17

[225] See The Holy Qur’an, 57: 20-21 and 76: 6-22

[226] The Holy Qur’an 2: 256

[227] The Holy Qur’an 6: 108

[228] Mohammad Redha. 1999. Al-Farouk Omar Ibn Al-Khattab: The Second Caliph. Beirut: Dar al-Kotob al-Ilmiyah, pp. 88 and 164

[229] Daily Star, Note 211

[230] See Delalic, Note 203, para 544

[231] Article 25 of GC III

[232] Ask.fm, 2014. Answer by Israfil Yilmaz to “Where do the mujahideens live? Apartments? abandoned homes? on the streets?”. 2014. (found at http://ask.fm/chechclear/answer/111004371645 accessed 26 June 2014 at 7.59pm)

[233] Articles 26-27 of GC III

[234] Articles 29-30 of GC III

[235] Al-Monitor. 2014. Former ISIS Prisoner Recounts Horrors of Detention (found at http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/ar/security/2014/01/isis-prisoner-horrors-syria.html# accessed 26 June 2014 at 8.45pm)

[236] Article 34 of GC III

[237] Article 23 of GC III

[238] AI, Note 51, pp.6-7

[239] Al-Monitor, Note 235

[240] Huffington Post, Note 210

[241] Al-Monitor, Note 235

[242] McClathy DC. 2014. Analysts: Ransom Helps Militant Group in Syria Pay for 4-Front War (found at http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2014/04/21/225086/analysts-ransom-helps-militant.html accessed 28 June 2014 at 2.05am)

[243] The Telegraph. 2014. Iraq Crisis: ISIS Jihadist Execute Dozens of Captives (found at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iraq/10901866/Iraq-crisis-ISIS-jihadists-execute-dozens-of-captives.html accessed 27 June 2014 at 2.53am)

[244] E.g. Daily Star Note 211 and Al Monitor Note 235

[245] For further discussion, see: ___. 2013. Slavery in Islam (found at http://d1.islamhouse.com/data/en/ih_articles/single2/en_Slavery_in_islam.pdf accessed 27 June 2014 at 3.49am) and Sayyid Saeed Akhtar Rizvi. 1987. Slavery: from Islamic and Christian Perspectives (found at http://www.al-islam.org/slavery-from-islamic-and-christian-perspective-sayyid-akhtar-rizvi/prefaces#authors-preface-second-edition accessed 27 June 2014 at 11.47am), especially at chapter “Islam Attacks Slavery”

[246] Murphy and El-Zeidy, Note 213, at p. 646

[247] See BBC Syria, Note 10

[248] Salahi, Note 73, pp. 261-265

[249] Abu ‘Ubayd. 2003. Kitab al-Amwal English Translation by Imran Ahsan Khan Nyazee). Reading: Garnet Publishing, pp.116-120

[250] Muhammad bin Ismail bin Al-Mughirah Al-Bukhari (Compiler). 1979. Sahih Al-Bukhari Vol. 4 (English Translation by Muhammad Muhsin Khan). Lahore: Kazi Publications, Hadith No. 282 and 372

[251] Dien, Note 24, p.98

[252] In Yoram Dinstein. ‘The Release of Prisoners of War, Studies and Essays on International Humanitarian Law and Red Cross Principles’, in Christophe Swinarski. 1984. Studies and Essays on International Humanitarian Law and Red Cross Principles in Honour of Jean Pictet. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, p.44

[253] John Hickman. ‘What is a Prisoner of War For’. Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol. 36, No. 2 (2008), pp.19-34, at pp.21-22

[254] Murphy and El-Zeidy, Note 213, p. 636

[255] Ibrahim Abdullah. 2004. Between Democracy and Terror: The Sierra Leone Civil War. Dakar: Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa, pp214-217

[256] Murphy and El-Zeidy, Note 213, p. 636

[257] The Holy Qur’an 3: 104, Al-Nawawi Riyadhus Vol II, Note 48, Hadith No. 1379

[258] The Holy Qur’an 41: 33 and 61: 2-3

[259] Gilani and Islam, Note 213, p. 14-15

[260] Articles 8(2)(a)(viii) and 8(2)(c)(iii) of the ICCSt

[261] Element 1 and 3 of Articles 8(2)(a)(viii) and 8(2)(c)(iii) ICC Elements of Crime

[262] Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Trial Chamber, Judgment, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Decision of 3 March 2000, para 158, see also the W. List and Others Case and ICRC Commentary on GC IV in Dormann, Note 181, p.126

GENOSIDA: Istilah Secara Hukum vs ‘Penggunaan Populer’

Assalaamu’alaykum warahmatullaahi wabarakaatuh,

 

Istilah genosida atau genocide seringkali muncul di media sebagai nama yang diberikan untuk suatu aksi pembunuhan yang korbannya sangat banyak. Misalnya, Bashar al-Assad melakukan genosida terhadap kaum Ahlus Sunnah di Suriah. Atau, Israel melakukan genosida terhadap kaum Arab dan Muslim di Palestina. Atau, ISIS melakukan genosida terhadap para Yazidi, dan lain sebagainya, intinya kalau ada banyak orang dibunuh pokoknya itu genosida deh.

Tapi apakah istilah genosida ini telah digunakan dengan tepat? Jawabnya adalah TIDAK.[1]

Sebelumnya, saya mau menjelaskan dulu, kenapa sih saya repot-repot untuk urusan istilah beginian saja?

Pertama, bagi kalangan intelektual yang memahami, sangat lucu orang yang berkoar-koar mengkritisi dengan menggunakan sebuah istilah dengan salah.

Kedua, baik dalam hukum sekuler maupun fiqih, harus sangat berhati-hati dalam menggunakan istilah. Ada dua hal yang bisa jadi sangat serupa kata-kata dan karakteristiknya, tapi memiliki perbedaan sedemikian rupa sehingga hukum yang berlaku terhadapnya pun jadi berbeda.

Ketiga, bisa jadi salah menilai dan bersuudzon. Misalnya kalau Bashar al-Assad ternyata bahkan tidak didakwa untuk genosida (apalagi terbukti?), nanti dibilang dunia internasional kok nggak adil padahal jelas-jelas genosida.

Keempat, nggak salah kan kita saling berbagi ilmu, hehehe, soalnya begitu banyak ilmu yang sudah dibagi oleh teman-teman kepada saya, jadi sekali-sekali saya harus lah share dari sedikit yang saya punya.

Jadi begitulah. Kita mulai ya penjelasannya.

DEFINISI GENOSIDA

Menurut Pasal 2 Konvensi tentang Pencegahan dan Hukuman untuk Kejahatan Genosida (1948), Genosida didefinisikan sebagai:

“…the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious, as such:

(a) Killing members of the group,

(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group,

(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part,

(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;

(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.”

Agak malas menerjemahkan semuanya. Tapi ada beberapa unsur penting dalam kejahatan tersebut untuk diamati:

Pertama, sebuah tindakan, dan tindakan tersebut tidak terbatas pada pembunuhan, dan tidak ada jumlah minimum yang harus dibunuh.

Kedua, tindakan ini ditujukan secara unik kepada sebuah kelompok tertentu (nasional, etnis, ras, atau agama)

Ketiga, ini unsur yang terpenting, ada sebuah niat untuk menghabisi seluruh atau sebagian anggota kelompok tertentu itu.

Unsur ketiga inilah kunci dari kejahatan genosida yang membedakannya dengan kejahatan lain, yang akan dibahas di bagian selanjutnya, inshaaAllah.

KEJAHATAN TERHADAP KEMANUSIAAN: TERMASUK GENOSIDA?

Nah, Kejahatan Terhadap Kemanusiaan (Crimes Against Humanity) juga adalah sebuah istilah yang begitu ringannya kita gunakan padahal belum tentu benar.

Prinsipnya, Kejahatan Terhadap Kemanusiaan (disingkat KTK deh ya) didefinisikan oleh Statuta Roma (1998) Pasal 7(1): “…any of the following acts, when committed as a part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population…”

Tiga unsur penting dari KTK adalah:

Pertama, sebuah tindakan. Tindakan ini tentu harus merupakan sebuah pelanggaran Hak Asasi Manusia (HAM) yang sangat serius, dan cakupannya sangat luas. Pasal 7(1) mencantumkan sebuah daftar pelanggaran HAM serius yang bisa termasuk KTK, di antaranya (b) extermination (pemusnahan masal), dan (h) persekusi

(PS: saya sengaja pilih dua contoh ini karena penting untuk pembahasan nanti)

Kedua, tindakan tersebut adalah bagian dari serangan kepada populasi sipil, saya rasa cukup jelas,

Ketiga, serangan tersebut harus bersifat meluas atau sistematis. Ini adalah unsur terpenting dari KTK yang intinya adalah bahwa serangan di poin Pertama harus telah terencana dan terstruktur, dan dampaknya juga luas.

Nah, apakah genosida termasuk dalam KTK?

Jawabnya adalah: dulu iya dan sekarang tidak.

Saat pengadilan militer kepada Nazi, yang dilakukan di Nuremberg, Jerman (nama gaulnya Nuremberg Trials), genosida secara istilah tidak disebut karena belum nge-hits. Tapi dalam salah satu kasus yang diadakan di Nuremberg Trials tersebut, yaitu Streicher Case, pembantaian masal dan pemusnahan terhadap Yahudi dikatakan sebagai persekusi yang merupakan KTK menurut Statuta Nuremberg Trials (Pasal 6[c]).

Persekusi sendiri di Statuta Roma Pasal 7(2)(g) didefinisikan sebagai:

“…the severe deprivation of fundamental rights contrary to international law by reason of the identity of the group or collectivity.”

Atau pelanggaran hak-hak dasar menurut hukum internasional dengan alasan identitas suatu kelompok.[2]

Nah, mirip sekali kan konsepnya dengan definisi genosida di atas tadi? Karena itulah pada perkembangan awalnya, memang genosida merupakan salah satu jenis persekusi yang merupakan salah satu jenis KTK.

Nah, bedanya apa dong?

GENOSIDA DAN PERSEKUSI: THE CRIME OF CRIMES

Dari putusan hakim Kupreskic trials, di International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, kalimatnya saangat puanjang, tapi intinya begini:

Persekusi adalah salah jenis KTK yang paling sadis dan paling buruk, sedangkan genosida adalah jenis persekusi yang paling buruk.

Kenapa bisa demikian? Silahkan coba lihat persamaan dan perbedaan utama dari definisi genosida dan persekusi. Malas scroll atas? Saya juga. Hahaha. Intinya bedanya begini.

Persamaan : Keduanya melakukan diskriminasi dan penyerangan atas kelompok tertentu karena identitasnya.

Perbedaan:

Persekusi: ingin menyakiti (bisa termasuk membunuh sebagian) sebuah kelompok, tanpa niat menghabisi

Genosida: ingin menghabisi sebuah kelompok

Di sini, yang harus ditekan bahwa ini adalah kejahatan yang sangat tergantung mens rea. Saya sangat teringat sedikit fiqih yang saya ketahui, bagaimana niat sangat berperan dalam menghukumi sesuatu.

Hukum internasional melihat bahwa yang jahat bukan hanya tindakan yang buruk, melainkan terutama dalam bahasan kita kali ini, yaitu niat. Sebuah niat bahwa sebuah kelompok boleh dijahati hanya karena identitasnya sebagai anggota kelompok tersebut (agama, ras, etnis, dll). Nah, niat yang ada pada kejahatan persekusi hanya sampai bahwa kelompok tersebut boleh dijahati serta merta karena identitasnya.

Genosida, yang membuatnya lebih ekstrim dari persekusi, adalah menganggap bahwa kelompok tersebut bukan hanya boleh dijahati tapi tidak memiliki hak untuk ada di muka bumi ini. Inilah alasannya kenapa genosida, menurut hukum internasional, adalah kejahatan yang paling jahat, hingga hakim pada International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Kambada Trials) berkata:

“…due to the … dollus specialis (special intent) to destroy in whole or in part, genocide is the ‘…crime of crimes…’”

Makanya, dalam KTK ada kejahatan pemusnahan masal (extermination) tapi itu belum tentu bisa dikatakan sebagai genosida. Bukannya mengatakan bahwa pemusnahan masal itu tidak sadis. Sadis kok. Tapi kurang satu unsur, yaitu pemusnahan masal belum dengan niat untuk menghabisi suatu kelompok serta-merta karena identitasnya. Kalau pemusnahan masal sudah dilakukan dengan niat tadi, nah dia naik pangkat deh ke genosida.

Karena itulah kemudian karena begitu istimewanya kejahatan genosida ini, maka akhirnya dibuat jenis kejahatan sendiri yang terpisah dari Persekusi dan bahkan KTK. Di Statuta Roma, misalnya, KTK diatur di Pasal 7 sedangkan Genosida diatur di Pasal 6.

PENUTUP

Nah, demikianlah penjelasan ribet dari genosida. Intinya sih sederhana: genosida itu bukan sekedar secara meluas membantai orang.

Genosida adalah, intinya, ingin sebuah kelompok tertentu (berdasarkan identitas etnis, agama, dll), jumlahnya berkurang atau bahkan habis.

Nah dengan demikian, mungkin jelas bagaimana kalau Israel bisa jadi melakukan genosida terhadap orang Arab Muslim Palestina, sebagaimana hasil ‘sidang’ Russels Tribunal. Sedangkan Bashar al-Assad walaupun telah membantai banyak kaum Ahlus Sunnah, tapi belum tentu dapat dibuktikan melakukan Genosida jika tidak dapat dibuktikan bahwa tujuannya adalah ‘ahlus sunnah harus habis’ (saya sih belum bisa teryakinkan bahwa ini adalah genosida. Persekusi sih lebih mungkin.)

Kurang lebihnya saya mohon maaf, kalau add yang mau ditanyakan silahkan J

[1] Saya ingin menyampaikan banyak terima kasih kepada Dr Paul Behrens, dosen asal Jerman, yang dulu mengajar saya Hukum Pidana Internasional saat S2 di University of Edinburgh (UK). Beliau sangat khusus meneliti tentang genosida, dan sering mengingatkan bagaimana istilah ‘genosida’ sering digunakan secara kurang tepat. Dalam Russels Tribunal –suatu pengadilan fiktif akademis untuk mengadili Israel (silahkan lihat http://www.russelltribunalonpalestine.com/en/ ) beliau diundang menjadi Saksi Ahli untuk memberikan keterangan terkait kejahatan genosida

[2] Sebetulnya ada perbedaan cakupan istilah ‘kelompok’ dalam genosida dan persekusi tapi menurut saya itu bukan hal yang terlalu penting dalam pembahasan sekarang. Kalau ada yang penasaran monggo komen atau email, inshaaAllah saya bisa kirimkan perbandingannya 🙂

Invasi Saudi ke Yaman vs Invasi Saudi ke Suriah: Perbandingan Legalitas dalam Hukum Internasional

Saudi Fighter Jets

Saudi Fighter Jets

Kenapa Saudi tidak/belum kirim pasukan ke Suriah? Jawabnya saya ndak tau, belum tanya sama Pakde Salman. Tapi dari perspektif hukum internasional bagaimana? Nah, sebetulnya banyak yang sudah tau kok: karena Presiden Yaman berdaulat dan berhak meminta bantuan melawan pemberontak, sedangkan kalo di Suriah, (sayangnya) si Assad lah yang berdaulat dan apa iya mau kirim pasukan lawan pemerintah yang sah? Tapi biar keren kita pake (1) analisis hukum, dan (2) tetep dikasih masalah untuk dipikirin hehehe.

ANALISIS HUKUM INTERNASIONAL

Dalam hukum internasional, tindakan agresi itu dianggap sebagai salah satu kejahatan internasional yang paling serius sampai tingkatannya sudah Jus Cogens atau Peremptory Norm (norma tertinggi dalam hukum internasional, kalo ada traktat dll yang melanggarnya maka traktat itu  dianggap hapus. Silahkan lihat Konvensi Wina 1969 pasal 53, juga ILC Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts with commentaries 2001, di penjelasan Pasal 26).

Apa itu agresi? Annex pada Resolusi Majelis Umum PBB No. 3314 tahun 1974, yang kemudian dikutip di amandemen Statuta Roma pada Kampala Agreement di Pasal 8bis, menjelaskan bahwa pengertian agresi adalah:

“…the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations.” (Dengan penambahan penekanan)

Maksud dari sovereignty dan independence ini adalah kedaulatan pemerintah untuk mengambil keputusan dan memaksakan berlakunya hukum di wilayah di mana dia berdaulat itu, tanpa intervensi asing. NAH, prinsipnya itu adalah sebuah pemerintah berdaulat mah monggo aja mau mengizinkan siapapun masuk ke wilayahnya, namanya dia yang punya.

Artinya ada dua unsur utama dari agresi: “penggunaan kekerasan bersenjata” dan “melawan kedaulatan, integritas territorial, dan kemandirian politik Negara lain”, yang keduanya harus terpenuhi.

Maknanya ada beberapa.

Pertama, suku Houthi tidak bisa dibilang melakukan agresi, karena bukan ‘negara lain’ yang diserang.

Kedua,  kalau Presiden Yaman sudah mengizinkan bahkan meminta bantuan kepada Negara lain (dan presiden ini masih diakui), ya artinya syarat “melawan kedaulatan” tidak terpenuhi. Jadilah statement Kemlu Iran ini tidak tepat, dan justru sangat sah serangan Saudi ini. Bagaimana dengan korban sipil yang terjadi? Itu udah beda jalur dan beda pembahasan.

Ketiga, kalau sampai Saudi menyerang pemerintah Suriah, bisa jadi masuk ke tindakan agresi.

Akan tetapi ada satu lagi koridor sebetulnya, namanya Humanitarian Intervention. Maksudnya adalah tindakan agresi (kekerasan bersenjata, dan melawan kedaulatan) tapi ditujukan untuk alasan kemanusiaan, misalnya untuk membebaskan suatu kaum/masyarakat dari tirani. Nah, ini menimbulkan banyak sekali perdebatan, karena di satu ada sejarah panjang tentang just war (perang untuk tujuan yang baik, misalnya membebaskan orang yang tertindas pemerintah dzalim dll) dalam doktrin abad pertengahan, tapi di sisi lain orang udah capek dengan perang setelah kedua perang dunia II.

Nah, sebetulnya di Agresi tadi kalau semuanya memperhatikan ada satu unsur tambahan di kejahatan agresi yaitu bahwa agresi itu adalah “dengan cara yang bertentangan dengan Piagam PBB”. Piagam PBB di Pasal 2(7) mengatakan bahwa tidak boleh melanggar kedaulatan, kecuali dengan pembatasan yang diberikan di Bab VII Piagam PBB yang membuka peluang intervensi berupa sanksi termasuk otorisasi tindakan militer oleh Dewan Keamanan. Jadi di antara perdebatan yang ada, ada kesepakatan bahwa setidaknya ada satu jenis agresi yang bisa dibenarkan yaitu jika mendapatkan otorisasi dari PBB, misalnya otorisasi untuk menyerang Libya dulu itu.

Tapi bagaimana dengan Perang Irak yang tahun 2003? Nah mayoritas Negara di dunia mengakui bahwa itu adalah hal yang salah. Tapi ya bagaimana, lah wong UK dan USA punya hak Veto jadi siapa yang mau memberi sanksi ke mereka?

Nah, karena itu untuk amannya secara politis, lebih baik Saudi tidak mengirimkan pasukan ke sana. Nah, tapi mereka mengirimkan dana dan senjata? Itu bagaimana?

BANTUAN SAUDI KE MUJAHIDIN SURIAH

Statement Menlu Iran itu sangat lucu karena di satu sisi dia menuduh Saudi Arabia melanggar kedaulatan Negara, padahal dia sendiri melakukannya.

Dalam kasus USA v. Nikaragua (1986) di ICJ,[1] USA divonis bersalah karena melanggar hukum kebiasaan internasional berupa pelanggaran kedaulatan negara yaitu Nikaragua. Bagaimanakah USA melanggar kedaulatan Nikaragua? Nih kutipannya:

“..training, arming, equipping, financing and supplying the contra forces or otherwise encouraging, supporting and aiding military and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua..” (Operative Clause 3, Judgment)

Terserah Iran mau menyangkal kayak apa, tapi ya kelihatan buanget bahwa Iran banyak sekali mensuplai berbagai macam hal kepada pemberontak Syiah Houthi. Jadi ya mereka sendiri melakukan apa yang mereka tuduhkan, dan ironisnya tuduhannya kepada Saudi justru salah. Emang unyu gemes gemeeesss pengen lempar sepatu (tapi latihan dulu jangan kayak Bush, dilempar sepatu tapi dianya berhasil menghindar).

Nah, sekarang pertanyaannya adalah bagaimana dengan dukungan Saudi Arabia ke beberapa kelompok Mujahidin yang berperang melawan Assad? Saya tidak tahu apakah Saudi Arabia mengirimkan milisi resmi (kalau iya itu tetap masuk ke definisi agresi, silahkan lihat Pasal 2 dari Annex dari Resolusi Majelis Umum PBB No. 3314 tahun 1974), tapi yang saya tahu minimal kirim uang dan senjata. Banyak orang-orang asal Saudi yang ikut bertempur, tapi kelihatannya itu atas nama individu dan bukan atas nama Negara (ini sudah pisah personalitas hukum).

Tindakan mendanai dll ini tidak tergolong dalam tindakan agresi tetapi masih tergolong melanggar kedaulatan. Ibaratnya keduanya dosa besar tapi satunya XL dan yang lain XXXL. Dosanya sedikit lebih kecil dibandingkan agresi langsung. Apakah ini mungkin alasan kenapa Saudi masih berani bermain di wilayah ini? Apalagi temannya banyak, sebagaimana yang kita ketahui banyak sekali pihak yang membantu FSA termasuk Barat.

Lalu, memang ada perdebatan sengit apakah boleh menggunakan justifikasi humanitarian intervention untuk melakukan agresi. Tapi bagaimana kalau ‘hanya’ di level intervensi yang tidak sampai agresi? Kelihatannya argument pro humanitarian intervention akan punya sedikit tambahan justifikasi, apalagi ditambah dengan fakta bahwa jahatnya Assad ke Sunni sudah jauh melebihi jahatnya Nikaragua bahkan Sadam. Tapi mungkin masih belum sejahat Pemerintah Afrika Selatan zaman Apartheid dulu, dan saat itupun tidak ada intervensi langsung (kecuali sanksi-sanksi embargo ekonomi dan militer dari PBB)?

Jadi sekarang pertanyaannya begini: apakah justifikasi Saudi Arabia untuk membantu Mujahidin di Suriah memiliki dasar dalam hukum Internasional? Ataukah sebetulnya menyimpangi hukum internasional tapi kebetulan buanyak yang mendukung sehingga secara politis tidak bisa diapa-apakan?

Nah, tadi kan saya bilang ini mau kasih masalah untuk dipikirin. Sekarang monggo difikirkan pertanyaan ini <3

Untuk segala kekurangannya saya mohon maaf, kalau ada koreksi atau masukan monggo lho atau kalau ada pertanyaan juga silahkan 🙂

Catatan Kaki:

[1] yang putusannya tentu hanya mengikat para pihak yang bersengketa (Pasal 59 Statuta ICJ) tapi dapat menjadi sumber rujukan dalam hukum internasional (Pasal 38 Statuta ICJ), karena kontennya bisa merujuk pada sumber-sumber mengikat dalam hukum internasional misalnya hukum kebiasaan internasional (Pasal 38 Statuta ICJ)

CATATAN TAMBAHAN: TUDUHAN KEJAHATAN PERANG KEPADA PASUKAN SAUDI ARABIA DI YAMAN

Ada beberapa artikel yang menunjukkan bahwa banyak tuduhan kepada Saudi Arabia karena melakukan kejahatan perang di Yaman. Apakah itu betul, padahal sudah saya jelaskan legalitasnya di atas?

Bedakan antara Jus Ad Bellum dan Jus In Bello.

Jus Ad Bellum adalah “hukum untuk memulai perang”, atau alasan-alasan sah untuk memulai perang. Itulah yang saya bahas di tulisan saya yang di atas. Sumber hukum utamanya adalah Piagam PBB seperti yang sudah dijelaskan di atas, dan pelanggaran terhadapnya disebut AGRESI. 

Jus In Bello adalah “hukum tata laksana perang”, atau metode-metode sah yang boleh digunakan selama berperang. Mudahnya adalah siapa yang boleh ditembak dan siapa yang tidak, dan kehati-hatian apa yang harus dilakukan oleh para pihak yang berperang untuk mencegah korban yang mestinya tidak diserang. Sumber hukum utamanya adalah Konvensi Jenewa 1949 I-IV dan Protokol-Protokol Tambahan 1977, dan pelanggaran terhadapnya disebut WAR CRIMES atau KEJAHATAN PERANG.

Bagaimana hubungan antara keduanya? 

Tidak ada. 

Bisa saja seseorang melakukan serangan ke negara lain yang melanggar Piagam PBB, tetapi saat perang berlangsung dia melakukan kehati-hatian yang baik agar tidak mengenai obyek sipil. Dengan begini, bisa kena AGRESI tapi bisa jadi tidak kena WAR CRIMES.

Demikian juga seseorang bisa saja melakukan serangan ke negara lain dengan cara yang tidak melanggar Piagam PBB (misalnya memang dimandatkan oleh Dewan Keamanan) tapi kemudian di lapangan dia asal bombardir warga sipil. Dengan begini, bisa jadi tidak kena AGRESI tapi kena WAR CRIMES.

Dalam Fiqih Jihad juga dikenal pembedaan seperti ini. Misalnya dalam Bidayatul Mujtahid karya ibn Rushd, dalam Bab Jihad dibedakan penjelasan (1) kapan boleh menyerang musuh dan kapan tidak boleh menyerang musuh, dengan (2) saat perang berlangsung siapa saja musuh yang boleh diserang dan siapa yang tidak boleh diserang.

Dengan demikian, walaupun inshaaAllah sudah jelas Saudi tidak salah dalam mengirimkan pasukan ke Yaman, tapi bisa jadi mereka tetap melakukan WAR CRIMES (walaupun tentu akan ada banyak versi yang menceritakan bagaimana kejadiannya). 

Allaahu’alam, mari kita lihat prosesnya.

Hugo Grotius dan Mare Liberum: Akademisi, Integritas, dan Kekuasaan

Assalaamu’alaykum warahmatullaahi wabarakaatuh,

Ada sebuah kisah menarik yang mungkin dapat diambil ibroh-nya, terutama dengan beberapa kejadian akhir-akhir ini. Walau judulnya tampak seram, inshaaAllah isinya sesederhana mungkin (ramah awam hukum).

Hugo Grotius (Hugo de Groot) adalah salah seorang akademisi hukum internasional asal Belanda yang sangat terkenal di abad ke 17. Salah satu buku karyanya yang terkenal adalah Mare Liberum. Dua hal penting tentang karyanya ini adalah:

  1. Intinya beliau mengatakan bahwa laut itu bagian manapun padanya tidak boleh dimiliki oleh siapapun, tidak boleh di monopoli, karena itulah hukum kebiasaan yang berlaku sejak jaman Romawi.
  2. Awalnya beliau mempublikasikannya tanpa nama, jadi awalnya tidak ada yang tahu bahwa Mare Liberum adalah karya Hugo Grotius.

Nah, ada sebuah kejadian menarik yang terjadi pasca penulisan Mare Liberum.

Ironis sekali, justru Belanda mempraktekkan monopoli wilayah laut di beberapa tempat. Singkat cerita, Inggris keberatan pada monopoli Belanda tersebut. Akhirnya pihak Kerajaan Belanda dan Kerajaan Inggris bertemu untuk membahas keberatan ini dan mencari jalan tengah.

Tentu masing-masing Kerajaan akan membawa ahli hukum terbaik mereka. Ironis sekali tetapi tidak sulit memprediksinya, tentu saja Kerajaan Belanda akan membawa pakar hukum internasional terbaik mereka: Hugo Grotius. Akhirnya, karena perintah Kerajaan, Hugo Grotius terpaksa berargumen tentang bolehnya klaim kepemilikan atas wilayah laut, bertentangan dengan apa yang sebenarnya dia percayai.

Pelajaran Pertama: Ini resiko yang dihadapi akademisi jika sudah ditarik oleh penguasa

Yang kemudian sangat menarik adalah apa yang dibawa oleh pihak Kerajaan Inggris dalam pertemuan tersebut. Mereka berargumen bahwa laut itu bagian manapun padanya tidak boleh dimiliki oleh siapapun, tidak boleh di monopoli, karena itulah hukum kebiasaan yang berlaku sejak jaman Romawi.

Yep, mereka menggunakan Mare Liberum untuk melawan penulisnya, dan yep, bukunya betul-betul dibawa dan ditunjukin ke perwakilan Kerajaan Belanda. Dan yep, dalam hati Hugo Grotius, dia terkejut saat melihat hal tersebut (beneran lho di kisahnya disebut begitu).

Pelajaran Kedua: Pasti akan ada yang berkata “Bukankah dulu anda yang mengajarkan…” untuk mempermalukan sang akademisi. Sengaja atau tidak sengaja, tetap saja malu karena si akademisi tahu kok.

Akhirnya Hugo Grotius berargumen yang intinya bahwa janganlah hukum itu dilihat secara stagnan, melainkan dilihat dengan perspektif sesuai jaman. Mungkin semacam argumen “jangan taqlid lah” tapi ala JIL (Jaringan Islam Liberal).

Pelajaran Ketiga: NIH resiko yang dihadapi akademisi jika sudah ditarik oleh penguasa.

Kalau anda tahu sebetulnya kasus apa yang menginspirasi saya untuk berbagi kisah ini, saya mau klarifikasi dulu. Saya tidak melakukan penilaian terhadap kasus tersebut, siapa yang benar atau salah, saya tidak tahu apa-apa tentang kasus tersebut dan yang terpenting adalah bahwa itu #BukanUrusanSaya.

Saya cuma menyoroti betapa besar resiko dan fitnah (dalam artian bahasa Arab ya, bukan dalam bahasa Indonesia) yang dihadapi seorang akademisi jika sudah berada dalam lingkar dalam penguasa. Sejauh ini saya tidak berani terlibat dan berdoa supaya saya tidak perlu terlibat dalam lingkar dalam penguasa (tanpa bermaksud Ge eR bahwa ada penguasa yang mau melibatkan saya hahaha).

Di saat yang sama, saya sangat SANGAT salut jika ada akademisi yang bisa tetap menjaga idealism dan integritasnya walaupun berada dalam lingkar penguasa tersebut. Kisah Hugo Grotius hanya salah satu dari entah berapa milyar kisah serupa.

(Kisah Hugo Grotius ini diambil dari Ram Prakash Anand. 1982. Origin and Development of the Law of the Sea. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers)

PS: inshaaAllah I will publish an English version of this because it is quite an interesting story :3

Clarification on My Journal Article: Al Qassam and Terrorism

Assalaamu’alaykum warahmatullaahi wabarakaatuh,

Al Qassam

Very recently my article titled: “Terrorism and the Crime of Aggression under the Rome Statute” was published in Jurnal Mimbar Hukum, Vol 27, No. 1, February 2015, pp. 128-144. In this particular article, I mentioned a number of actors which have (or had) ‘terrorist’ labels as case studies. Among them are the Ezzedin Al-Qassam Brigades of Palestine (Al Qassam) and the Al Qaeda. Now this may not sound nice to some people: why is this guy putting the Al Qassam (1) on the same level with Al-Qaeda, and (2) as terrorism case study?

So I thought I should explain why I did what I did.

First of all, by Allah, I have great respect and admiration to the Al-Qassam. They are very tough fighters and inspiration to Muslims all around the world. To this day I have never and will not speak ill of them. I always pray for their strength in Imaan and persistence in spirit, as well as patience in fighting when it comes to that.

Second, the word ‘terrorist’ is a very popular word and heavily associated with negative judgment. However, there is no true single definition of the word. Page 129-130 of my article makes a brief mention on a few legal definitions of the word, and how even those are very problematic. Exploring all aspects of the definition of terrorism would deserve its own article.

However, the article talks about terrorism in a legal sense with no inherent judgment. If the Al Qassam fits the definition of terrorists as mentioned in the article, just like Al-Qaeda (and the United States of America), so be it. As a matter of law, such a judgment does not necessarily automatically incur a judgment that such a label makes it a bad thing.

There is nothing wrong with the Al-Qassam becoming terrorists according to the Israeli Defense Force, but it may be wrong if (and only if) certain acts are directed towards civilians not participating in hostilities. There is everything wrong in what may be apparent in the Al Qaeda act such as bombing civilians (including the alleged 9/11 attack, which I still have a hard time believing that it is actually Al Qaeda. However I used this conclusion because such an assumption becomes an easy case study for the points I wish to make), however there is nothing wrong with the Al Qaeda of Yemen fighting against the Houthi Rebels.

Afterall, ‘one man’s terrorist Is another man’s freedom fighter’.

Thirdly, I just find it amusing that in the end I can conclude that Al Qaeda and Al Qassam (who are commonly labeled as terrorists by the West at the time I wrote the articles) can NOT be held responsible for the Crimes of Aggression, while instead certain acts of western states CAN be held responsible for those crimes.

So, this concludes my clarification. I apologize if any Al Qassam supporters (somehow) reads my article and gets offended by the label of ‘terrorists’, and I hope this clarification is sufficient to explain how the article was never meant to bring negative association towards the Al-Qassam.

Wassalaamu’alaykum warahmatullaahi wabarakaatuh

 

 

Fajri Matahati Muhammadin

Can “Soft Law” be Regarded as International Law?

Can “Soft Law” be Regarded as International Law?

by Fajri Matahati Muhammadin

Abstract

A typical classroom of introduction to international law in Indonesia law schools might normally be taught that ‘soft law’ is not really law as they are not binding. A very understandable stance in a legal tradition that is very strong in legal positivism. However, what will we find if we understand law as a tool to construct its subjects? What if, regardless its formal designation, certain instruments are actually followed by its subject similar to those formally designated to be legally binding? If we consider this, especially in context of international law, one may come to a very different conclusion to whether soft law is really international law or not.

Keywords: Soft law, Sources of International Law, Legal Constructivism

INTRODUCTION

The term ‘soft law’ is defined by Black’s Law Dictionary as ‘Int’l Law. Guidelines, policy declarations, or codes of conduct that set standards of conduct but are not legally binding’,[1] with the ‘non-binding’ nature to be the distinguishing characteristic from ‘hard law’ which is legally binding.[2] Soft law can take various forms, such as interstate conference declarations, United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) Resolutions, codes of conducts by international organisations, drafts by the International Law Commission etc.[3]

While such non-binding nature may easily imply that it is not a law (as will be elaborated in detail later), it will be shown later how soft law may have implications beyond its literal definition, therefore such a question will prove to be very legitimate: can soft law be regarded as international law? This essay will answer that question by explaining first what may constitute a law and then to examine whether or not soft laws are included in that. This method is a form of deductive analysis, known also as hypothetical syllogism.[4].

INTERNATIONAL LAW

A. A Common Ground in Definitions of Law: A Binding Nature

There are various definitions of the term ‘international law’. They may be differences in the scope that such law governs: some say it primarily applies to states (and other subjects are less clear),[5] others do are say it applies between states as well as between individuals equally,[6] others point that they may also include international organisations and other non-state entities,[7] which may be generalized as “law that applies to subjects of international law”.

Blacks Law Dictionary defines ‘law’ in the following words:

“…1. The regime that orders human activities and relations through systematic application of the force of politically organized society, or through social pressure, backed by force, in such a society; the legal system… 2. The aggregate of legislation, judicial precedents, and accepted legal principles; the body ofauthoritative grounds of judicial and administrative action; esp., the body of rules, standards, and principles that the courts of a particular jurisdiction apply in deciding controversies brought before them … 3. The set of rules or principles dealing with a specific area of a legal system…”[8]

Further, the word ‘rule’ is defined as follows:

…an established and authoritative standard or principle; a general norm mandating or guiding conduct or action in a given type of situation.”[9]

The different definitions,[10] however, do not differ in stating that there should be a ‘rule’ or ‘law’ in it. One way or another, despite certain disagreements in certain aspects, all definitions agree that law must contain binding rules or obligations. If something that claims to be ‘law’ but does not contain binding rules, then it is not a law. This is a strictly positivistic legal view,[11] which are limited to the formalities of the law. It will later be shown that one cannot merely stick to this definition, as the understanding of law may be broader than mere formalities.

B. Classical Sources of International Law: Is The Definition That Simple?

There is no doubt that international agreements, customary international laws, and general principles of laws, are laws,[12] as they all provide binding rules obligations. However, is this all of how we understand what is law and what is not? As an illustration, let us make a detour on judicial decisions as ‘law’.

Using the simple positivistic legal understanding of law, the subsidiary sources of law (judicial decisions and scholar’s works) are not binding and therefore not a law.[13] However, extra attention may be needed in discussing past judicial decisions as source of law.

One thing that is very easy to be seen is that when parties adjudicated by a particular judicial body in a particular case, the judgment will create binding obligations[14] and therefore create laws towards the said parties.[15]What may be very intriguing would be the implications of such international judicial decisions as sources of law outside the dispute it settled. This may call for some additional understanding towards the definition of law in the previous sub-section.

The immediate and simple conclusion that one could make would be that judicial decisions are not binding, and therefore are not considered as law per se,[16] despite being persuasive authorities (very persuasive, in the case of ICJ judgments).[17] International law does not recognize the binding force of precedence, as clearly demonstrated by Article 38(1)(d) of the ICJ Statute (with reference made to Article 59 of the ICJ Statute) which clarifies the status of these judicial decisions as ‘subsidiary’ source of law.

However, it has been widely claimed that while formally courts merely say that they only apply the law,[18] in many cases, court judgments become considered as binding rules that the international world follows –and can therefore become laws as well.[19] While international law does not have any central authority to legislate or make laws, laws could be scattered here and there and therefore it is the court’s role to not only crystalize it by setting approaches in determining customary international laws,[20] but to also contribute in the “..crafting and ensuring consistency in contemporary international law”.[21]

To begin with, we see a trend of the ICJ settling its disputes while trying to also be consistent with its previous cases,[22] which whose judgements are often cited by disputing states and scholars as authoritative sources.[23] Then it could be seen how the Reparitions Case[24] became a very important milestone in determination of the international legal personality of international organisations.[25] In the area of international criminal law, we have the Celebici Case[26] as a milestone in understanding how to apply superior responsibility. It is a reality that these judicial decisions have actually become authoritative enough to be considered law.[27]

However, law making by international courts are not always successful. Instances also exist when they are abandoned instead, such as how the Lotus Case[28]was abandoned by the Convention on the High Seas of 1958, and the Icelandic Fisheries Case[29]was abandoned by the negotiations of UNCLOS III.[30] It is thus apparent that judicial decisions don’t always become laws. It will depend on the court’s exposure towards cases bringing new and disputed legal matters,[31] which the court’s respond to this is highly contributive towards the law, and then the acceptance of the international community will further legitimize it (those not accepted are “...marginalized, seen as exceptional, and have minimal law making effect”).[32]

Having all that said, there is a lesson to take from the reality of judicial decisions. While judicial decisions are traditionally seen as not a law because they are not formally binding, the reality shows that they can actually become laws despite their non-binding formal label. This reflects more of a constructivist school of thought that sees law not only on whether it is binding or not like the legal positivists, but also at the effects it carries out to the international community as a matter of implementation.[33] Under this train of thought, therefore, certain instruments that are not binding in a formal positivistic sense can actually be considered as law if the norms embedded in it are actually being followed by the legal subjects. It is this perspective that will be used to consider whether soft laws are laws or not.

SOFT LAW AND LEGAL OBLIGATIONS

As previously explained, soft laws are not per se laws according to a positivistic legal view as they are not binding. However, it will be shown that laws can indeed be found in soft laws.

A. Soft Law and Treaties

Treaties, which some scholars claim as the most important source of international law,[34] at times, would be faced with certain issues in their application and would therefore need to be interpreted. When an authoritative interpretation exists, which includes those agreed upon after the conclusion of the treaty (as per Article 31(1)(a) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Between States 1969 [VCLT]), it should be read as integral part of the treaty for the ‘..purpose of its interpretation’.[35] Having that said, such an interpretation is an integral part of the law as well.

Sometimes, such agreement on interpretation could be made through hard law or separate agreement. An example to this would be the Anti Dumping Agreement[36] which is a subsequent agreement to interpret Article VI of GATT 1994 of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Making such an agreement is sometimes preferable, because it involves states directly committing themselves to the provisions, and has direct legal effects in national jurisdictions, and other benefits that come with hard laws.[37] However, there are some drawbacks in doing so, since the formal commitment is seen as more restrictive to the states, and makes for more lengthy and more fierce negotiation processes while sometimes change is needed faster –and soft law can accommodate that need.[38]

The question that need to answered in this essy now is whether or not soft law can actually replace hard law in serving the necessity of making these needed laws. As the facts will show, soft law actually can bring about the needed laws as well. An example would be the case of the International Covenant on the Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 1966 (ICESCR).

The ICESCR does not specifically mention whether there is such a thing as ‘rights to water’. Article 11 and 12 essentially provides that everyone has adequate standards of living conditions and to enjoy the highest standards of such living. The articles mention food, housing, and general living conditions, but made no specific mentioning of water. While in 2000, the World Health Organisation (WHO) and the United Nations Children Fund (UNICEF) found that around 1.1 billion people did not have access to safe water and around 2.4 billion people live without sanitation.[39] Contrasting that fact with the very common knowledge that all humans need water, in 2002 the Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (CESCR), which is the treaty body for the ICESCR, issued the General Comment No. 15 which interprets Article 11 and 12 of the ICESCR so that it includes the access to water as a human right under those articles.[40]

The UN Charter, specifically in Article 62 in describing the functions and powers of the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC),[41] only says that the ECOSOC (and all committees under it) can only make recommendations. However, General Comment No. 15 especially in Chapter III does provide obligations of states and the international community with regards to ensuring access to water, effectively making it an integral part of the law.

It is not that simple to actually see the works of the CESCR as an authoritative interpretation, as it is a committee independent from states thus there is no agreement per se in making that interpretation. However, it has been a practice of states to accept the role of treaty bodies in being authoritative in making interpretations.[42] Not to mention, in case of the CESCR, its works are always reviewed by the UNGA that consists of almost all countries in the world.[43]

Another example of Soft Law becoming law would be the Codex Alimentarius. This is a compilation of international food safety standards issued by the Codex Alimentarius Commission, which was established by the UN Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) and the World Health Organization (WHO).[44] The Codex Alimentarius itself is not a binding instrument, and is a form of soft law.[45] However, the WTO has adopted the Codex Alimentarius as a standard of food safety through the Article 3(4) of the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures. Therefore it is now a part of the WTO laws binding to all its members (today reaching 159 members[46]), despite being originally formally soft law.

Even more, at times soft law can ‘defeat’ treaties as source of legal obligations. In 2001, the USA submitted a complaint to the WTO against Brazil for producing generic copies of certain materials used in the production of AIDS drugs, the patent for which was owned by some USA companies.[47] Allegedly, such a thing would have been a violation of the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), but some exceptions could be made via Article 30 and 31 of the TRIPS.

However, the majority of the UN Commission on Human Rights (CHR) almost unanimously voted to endorse Brazil’s policy (except the USA, of course) through Resolution No. 2001/33. This resolution specifically mentions that the “access medications in context of pandemics such as HIV/AIDS” is a right. Further, it also has provisions which could be understood as to set aside strict patents in such situations.[48] After that, the USA dropped its claims.[49] Not only that this is due to the fact that the CHR works are generally acknowleged by the international community especially as shown by the overwhelming majority in the vote to adopt this resolution, but also the general international pressure to the USA with regards to this particular matter at the time.[50] This shows that now the right of access to medication in pandemics, which trumps patent laws, is integral in Article 12 of the ICESCR on rights to highest attainable standard of health (which the CHR Resolution noted in its preambulatory clause paras 1, 2, and 7).

B. Role of the UN General Assembly

Despite representing all members of the UN (today reaching 193 members[51]), the proposal to make UNGA Resolutions  as source of international law during the drafting of the ICJ Statute was rejected.[52] While it may be obvious that the UNGA Resolutions are not binding (as the UN Charter, Chapter IV under ‘functions and powers’, refers to them as ‘recommendations’) –ergo : soft law, the facts show that the role of the UNGA in making international law is undoubtedly very apparent.

Supported by at least a majority of the UN members (sometimes overwhelmingly or even unanimously), these resolutions can serve as an authoritative interpretation which is consequently an integral part of the law. An example of such can be observed in the example of defining ‘aggression’, where the UNGA can provide authoritative interpretations.

The word ‘aggression’ as a violation of peace that must be supressed and eliminated has been an very important part of the purpose of the United Nations as mentioned in Article 1(1) in its’ statute. However, the word itself has yet to be defined and has been subject to debate for a long time which necessitates the UNGA to come up with Resolution No. 2330 (A/RES/2330) to establish the Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression. In 1974, after deliberating on the results of that special committee, the UNGA issued Resolution No. 3314 (A/RES/3314) with a definition of aggression. This definition was later strengthened by an explicit reference to it in the Kampala Agreement which was adopted without a vote to amend the Rome Statute in 2010.[53]

Similarly, the word ‘friendly relations’ and ‘cooperation among states’ in Article 1(2) and 1(3) of the UN Charter was further defined in the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States through the UNGA Resolution No. 2625 (A/RES/25/2625).

Furthermore, Resolutions of the UNGA have been used to determine what the customary international law is, most noticeably by the ICJ in the Nicaragua Case.[54] In determining whether or not the acts of the USA was in breach of interntional customary law, the ICJ largely focused on gathering the Opinio Juris, by referring to UNGA Resolutions as reflections upon which customary international law can be derived from even in the absence of a vast number of state practice.[55] They include: Resolution No. 2625 (A/RES/25/2625) and No. 2131 A/RES/20/2131, which mentions a duty to refrain from assisting civil strifes and armed bands in the territory of other states (drawing also upon a resolution by the General Assembly of the Organization of American States, not the UN, but also an example of soft law),[56] and Resolution No. 3314 (A/RES/3314) to use the definition of ‘aggression’.[57]

The same has been taken by the concluding international customary law from a wide array of UNGA Resolutions. In the field of state control of natural resources, there have been numerous UNGA Resolutions setting standards to it e.g. Resolution No. 3281 (A/RES/29/3281), No. 3201 (A/RES/S-6/3201), No. 3171 (A/RES/3171), and No. 1803 (A/RES/1803).[58] The Arbitrator for the Texaco v. Libya case[59] used these standards, especially that in the UNGA Resolutions No. 1803 (A/RES/1803) in determining the laws governing the dispute of exproppriation and the rule of ‘appropriate compensation’, noting that it was customary international law.[60]

Furthermore, UNGA Resolutions have been known to be able to conjure up laws that did not exist before. An example to that would be the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UNDHR), adopted through Resolution No. 217 (A/RES/217). The horrors experienced throughout World War I and most especially World War II became a push for almost all states around the world to call for an international system to protect human rights better than before, which used to be generally just under national laws and some very few instruments of international law.[61]

The idea of human rights has started to appear in the UN Charter in Article 1(3) and a few others, but then it was the UNDHR that laid out the main set of human rights which was adopted without a vote. These were then further elaborated in a large number of legally binding conventions which are generally ratified by a very large numbers of states, which include but not limited to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966 (ICCPR), the ICESCR, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women of 1979 (CEDAW), the Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989 (CRC), and so many others, all quoting the UNDHR in their preamble. It did take some lengthy years to for those ‘follow-up’ treaties to actually be drafted and then enter into force, but there is no doubt that the UNDHR was a law making instrument which was integral to the evolution of human rights law.[62]

This is not yet to mention the UNGA endorsement to soft laws issued by other bodies, such as the case of the previously mentioned CESCR General Comments and CHR Resolution, as well as the works of the International Law Commission (which will be explained in the next sub-section). Therefore there is no doubt that the UNGA resolutions can be law.

C. The International Law Commission

The International Law Commission is a commission set up by the Sixth Committee of the UNGA,[63] with purpose of codifying existing law and making progressive developments of law.[64] Both of those purposes are usually not exercised separately for two reasons:

–          The existing law can, to the states, be not satisfactory, unnacceptable, or outdated. Therefore on this point, there is a need to open the possibilities to progressively develop international law.

–          In the existing law, there are always some practices leaning towards the needed change anyways, so that the ILC can also use them as foundation to progressively develop international law.[65]

Members of the ILC are experts who are chosen from a wide array of geographical regions but are not delegates of their countries, and are elected by the UNGA (this done to contribute to its credibility as a body).[66] The ILC works are reported to the UNGA, to be followed-up in a few alternative ways e.g. recommending members to adopt as treaty or adopting through resolution.[67] Nothing makes their works formally binding per se, making them soft laws. However, observing the implications brought by the works of ILC, one cannot deny that these works can become law.

The best example on the success of ILC drafts to be adopted as a treaty would be the VCLT. It was drafted mainly by codifying existing laws, but added some new provisions as well e.g. provision on reservations, change of circumstances, and jus cogens.[68] There were also other new additions to the treaty by the states when the final draft was put to negotiation, e.g. Articles on consent to be bound, exchange of instruments, and material breach of humanitarian treaties.[69]

Now the VCLT has only 113 parties,[70] but a significant number of non-parties are applying it nonetheless. E.g. Indonesia cited it in a constitutional court judicial review,[71] and was highly referred to as what the law governing international agreements should be like in the academic draft for a new law on international agreement[72] (this law is still under deliberation to replace Law No. 24 of 2000, which does not mention the VCLT at all but its provisions are generally consistent with the VCLT). In the Icelandic Fisheries Case, in discussing matters on the effect of change of circumstances towards the obligations rising out of treaties (Article 62 of the VCLT).[73] This was despite the fact that the VCLT did not enter into force until 27 January 1980[74] which was around seven years after the case was even decided. This is because it has achieved the status as customary law,[75] which is evidence of success of the ILC in codifying and progressing international law.

Similar to this was the reference towards the Vienna Convention On Succession Of States In Respect Of Treaties of 1978 (VCSS) in the Gabcikovo-NagymarosCase as an unquestionable part of customary international law.[76] This was despite the VCSS only having 16 parties at the time of its entry into force (hardly a significant number compared to the rest of the world), which was one year before the judgment came out but in the middle of the proceedings of this case.[77] Not to mention, Hungary (a party to the dispute) was not even a party to the said convention, yet the ICJ still referred to it as binding source of law for its judgement of the case.

The Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts of 2001, which was adopted through UNGA Resolution 56/83 (A/RES/56/83), is an example of ILC’s soft law that (to this date) has never become a treaty, but it has been recognized as law. A very big evidence for this is the Gabcikovo-NagymarosCase, where the ICJ stated that “..the existence of a state of necessity must be evaluated in the light of the criteria laid down by the International Law Commission in Article 33 of the Draft Articles on the International Responsibility of States..”,[78] stating that the provisions were customary international law,[79] and therefore using it as a major reference to what the law is.

CONCLUSIONS

Leaning more to the view of a legal constructivist rather than that of a positivistic legal view, it is then very apparent that soft laws, despite its formal designation, can become law. Such way of viewing law (legal constructivist) sees law as a construction or direction towards the behavior of the subjects of that law, and therefore whether or not a law is followed by the subjects would be of a paramount significance. It has been shown through various examples (there are more examples that cannot be included in this essay) that soft laws have been referred to as law and consequently have been followed by states in a massive scale that it evolves into customary international law.

This so called ‘hardening’ of soft laws can come in many forms. It can happen due to its position towards a treaty, just like the Codex Alimentarius and the CESCR General Comments, it can happen through the support of the UNGA which might as well mean the support of almost the entire world, some by external bodies such as the ICJ, or other forms. However, soft laws have something in common with judicial decisions: they rely on the recognition of the international community. When the international community does infact have a trend in following them, be it out of voluntary practice or ‘legally imposed’ by judicial bodies, then yes: soft laws are laws.

 

ENDNOTES

[1]Bryan A. Gardner (ed.). 2009. Blacks Law Dictionary (9th ed.). St. Paul, MN:West, p.1519

[2]Alan Boyle and Christine Chinkin. 2007. The Making of International Law. New York: Oxford University Press, p.213

[3]Ibid,

[4] Susanne Bobzien. The Development of Modus Ponens in Antiquity. Phronesis, Vol. 47, No. 4 (2002), pp.359-394, at 360

[5]See: Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts (Eds). 1992. Oppenheim’s International Law: Introduction and Part I (9th Edition). Essex: Longman, pp.16-17

[6]E.g. Philips C. Jessup, Found in Note 1, at p.892

[7]Malcom Shaw. 2008. International Law (Sixth Edition). New York: CambridgeUniversity Press, at p. 197

[8] Gardner, Note 1, at p.962

[9]Gardner,Note 1, at p.1446

[10]Compare with: Shaw,Note 7, at p.1; H.L.A. Hart in Raymond Wacks. 2006. Philosophy of Law: A Very Short Introduction. New York: Oxford University Press, p.28; Austin in Wacks, Note 10, p.23; St. Augustine in Mark C. Murphy. Natural Law Theory. In Martin P. Golding and William A. Edmundson (eds). 2005.The Blackwell Guide to thePhilosophy of Lawand Legal Theory. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, at p.16, and Oppenheim in Jennings and Watts, Note 5, p.4

[11]Gregory C. Shaffer and Mark A. Pollack. Hard vs. Soft Law: Alternatives, Complements, and Antagonists in International Governance. Minnesota Law Review,Vol. 94, No. 3, (2010), pp.706-799,at p. 713

[12]See the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ Statute), Article 38 (1) (a), (b), and (c)

[13]ICJ Statute Art. 38(1)(d)

[14]Direct quotation can be found in Shaw,Note 7, p.101

[15]ICJ Statute Art. 59

[16]Boyle and Chinkin, Note 2, pp.266-268

[17]David Harris. 2010. Cases and Materials on International Law (Seventh Edition). London: Sweet & Maxwell, p.43

[18] Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1996, p. 226, para 18

[19]For a deeper discussion on this, seeBoyle and Chinkin, Note 2, pp.278-285

[20] Ibid,

[21]Boyle and Chinkin, Note 2, p.268

[22]Harris, Note 20

[23]Shaw,Note 7, p.110

[24] Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1949, p. 174

[25] Philippe Gautier. , The Reparation for Injuries Case Revisited: The Personality of the European Union,

Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 4 (2000), pp.331-361, at pp.331-332

[26]Antonio Casesse (Ed).2009. The Oxford Companion to International Criminal Justice. New York: Oxford University Press, at p.434

[27]Boyle and Chinkin,Note 2, pp. 293-296

[28]S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.),1927P.C.I.J. (Ser. A) No.10 (Sept. 7)

[29] Fisheries Jurisdiction (United Kingdom v. Iceland),Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1974, p. 3.

[30]Boyle and Chinkin,Note 2, p.301

[31]Ibid at p. 269

[32]Ibid at p.301

[33]Shaffer and Pollack,Note 11, p.713

[34]Shaw, Note 7, p.94

[35]ILC Commentary on the Law of Treaties, found in : Boyle and Chinkin,Note 2, p.216

[36] Agreement On Implementation Of Article VI of the General Agreement On Tariffs And Trade 1994 (or GATT 1994)

[37]Shaffer and Pollack,Note 11, p.718

[38]Ibid,p.719

[39]WHO and UNICEF. 2000. Global Water Supply and Sanitation Assessment 2000 Report (http://www.who.int/water_sanitation_health/monitoring/jmp2000.pdf , accessed on 19 November 2013, at 5pm), at page 1

[40]CESCR General Comment No. 15, The Rights to Water, 2002 (E/C.12/2002/11)

[41]The CESCR is a subsidiary body under the ECOSOC to monitor the application of the ICESCR (see the UN Official Website, Subsidiary Bodies of ECOSOC, http://www.un.org/en/ecosoc/about/subsidiary.shtml , accessed on 19 November 2013 at 5.20pm)

[42]Boyle and Chinkin,Note 2, p.217

[43]See Article 13 and 62 of the UN Charter

[44]Codex Alimentarius Official Website. About Codex (http://www.codexalimentarius.org/about-codex/en/, accessed on 21 November 2013, at 8.21am)

[45]Shaffer and Pollack,Note 11, pp.756-757

[46]World Trade Organization Official Website. Members and Observers. (http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm accessed on 24 November 2013 at 9.51pm)

[47]Andreas Fischer-Lescano and Gunther Teubner. Regime-Collisions: the Vain Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law. Michigan Journal of Internatonal Law, Vol.25 (2004), pp.999-1046, at pp.1024-1025

[48]See Operative Clause 4 of the CHR Resolution No. 2001/33

[49]Fischer-Lescano and Teubner, Note 47, pp.1028-1029

[50]Ibid

[51]United Nations Treaty Collection. Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice (http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=I-1&chapter=1&lang=en, accessed on 24 November 2013 at 9.24pm)

[52]Gregory J. Kerwin. The Role of United Nations General Assembly Resolutions in Determining Principles of International Law in United States Courts. Duke Law Journal,Vol.32, No. 4 (1983), pp876-899, p.879

[53]Annex I of the Rome Conference Resolution No. RC/Res.6 (2010)

[54] Militarv and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America). Merits,Judgment. I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 14.

[55]Ibid,para 188

[56]Ibid,para 191-193

[57]Ibid,para 195

[58]Kerwin, Note 52, p.883

[59]Texaco Overseas Petroleum Compny v. The Government of Libyan Arab Republic (1977) 53 I.L.R. 389

[60]Ibid,para 87 (see also )

[61]Shaw,Note 7, p.271

[62]Boyle and Chinkin,Note 2, p.227

[63]ILC Official Page. Introduction (http://www.un.org/law/ilc/, accessed on 23 November 2013 at 11:47am)

[64]Article 1(1) of the Statute of the ILC

[65]Boyle and Chinkin,Note 2, p.174

[66]Ibid, pp.172-173

[67]Article 23 of the Statute of the ILC

[68]Boyle and Chinkin,Note 2,p. 190-191

[69]ibid

[70] United Nations Treaty Collection. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?&src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXIII~1&chapter=23&Temp=mtdsg3&lang=en, accessed on 24 November 2013 at 2.10pm)

[71] Indonesian Constitutional Court Decision No. 36/PUU-X/2012, para 3.19

[72]People’s Representative Council Official Website. 2012. Naskah Akademik Rancangan Undang-Undang Tentang Perjanjian Internasional (http://www.dpr.go.id/uu/delbills/RUU_Naskah_Akademik_RUU_Usul_Inisiatif_DPR_RI_tentang_Perjanjian_Internasional_(masih_dalam_proses_Pembahasan_Tingkat_I).pdf, accessed on 24 November 2013 at 1.03pm)

[73]Icelandic Fisheries Case, paras 36-37

[74]See note 72

[75]Boyle and Chinkin,Note 2,p. 190-191

[76]Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia),Merits,Judgment, 1. C. J. Reports 1997, p. 7, para 123

[77]United Nations Treaty Collection. Vienna Convention on State Succession in Respect of Treaties (http://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXIII-2&chapter=23&lang=en accessed on 24 November 2013 at 7.14pm)

[78]Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Case, para 50

[79]Ibid,para 51